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# The COINTELPRO Papers

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Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars  
Against Domestic Dissent

*by*  
*Ward Churchill and*  
*Jim Vander Wall*

**Foreword by John Trudell**

**Preface by Brian Glick**

South End Press

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## *Dedication*

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For Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, two brothers who paid COINTELPRO's ultimate penalty during the pre-dawn hours of December 4, 1969.

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## About the Authors

Ward Churchill (Creek/Cherokee *Métis*) is co-director, with Glenn Morris, of the Colorado Chapter of the American Indian Movement and coordinator of American Indian Studies with the Center for Studies of Ethnicity and Race in America at the University of Colorado/Boulder. He has served as a delegate of the International Indian Treaty Council to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Inter-American Indian Congress, as well as to the nations of Libya and Cuba. His previous books include *Marxism and Native Americans* (1983), *Culture versus Economism: Essays on Marxism in the Multicultural Arena* (1984), and *Critical Issues in Native North America* (1989). He is also a regular columnist for *Zeta Magazine* and editor of *New Studies on the Left*.

Jim Vander Wall has been an active supporter of the struggles of Native Peoples for sovereignty since 1974 and has written several articles on FBI counter-intelligence operations. He is co-author, with Ward Churchill, of *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars on the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement* (1988) and an editor of *New Studies on the Left*.

Brian Glick is an activist/attorney who has long been involved in the defense of those – notably Geronimo Ji Jaga Pratt – targeted for neutralization by federal counterintelligence operations. He is coauthor of *The Bust Book* (1969) and *The Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual* (1984), and author of *War at Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do About It* (1989).

Chip Berlet is a long-time researcher on the workings of America's police state. Editor of a periodical, *The Public Eye*, devoted to exposing secret police and intelligence activities, he has also been a frequent contributor to journals like *Counterspy* and *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. He is presently associated with the National Lawyers Guild Anti-Repression Project.

John Trudell (Santee Dakota) was national chairman of the American Indian Movement from 1974-79, when the position was dissolved. On February 12 of the latter year, his entire family – his wife Tina, children Ricarda Star (age five), Sunshine Karma (age three) and Eli Changing Sun (age one), as well as his mother-in-law, Leah Hicks Manning – were murdered on the Duck Valley Paiute Reservation in Utah as part of a government anti- AIM counterintelligence operation. An accomplished poet, Trudell has authored a book of verse, *Living in Reality* (1982), and has recorded several tapes of his poetry with musical accompaniment. These include *Tribal Voice* (with Tribal Voice, 1983), *J.T./J.E.D.* (with Kiowa guitarist Jesse Edwin Davis, 1985), *A.K.A. Graffiti Man* (with the Graffiti Band, 1986), *Heart Jump Bouquet* (with the Graffiti Band, 1987) and *But This Isn't El Salvador* (with the Graffiti Band and Tribal Voice, 1987).

## Foreword

### Living in Reality

...Living in Reality  
we are targets  
of your unwariness  
With Warriors for targets  
You Create  
Your own destruction

This is how we  
bring you down  
target by target  
You wound yourself  
Using your greed  
WE watch  
Your spirit fade

Living in Reality  
We can endure  
Your cages  
Your bullets  
Your lies  
Your confusion

We know  
You have destroyed  
Your Peace  
Living in Reality  
You only exist.

*- John Trudell*  
(Poem Fragment)

## *Introduction*

Gee, but I'd like to be a G-Man  
And go Bang! Bang! Bang! Bang!  
Just like Dick Tracy, what a "he-man"  
And go Bang! Bang! Bang! Bang!  
I'd do as I please, act high-handed and regal  
'Cause when you're a G-Man there's nothing illegal.

- Harold Rome -  
from "The G-Man Song"  
1937



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## *Preface*

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# The Face of COINTELPRO

Regardless of the unattractiveness or noisy militancy of some private citizens or organizations, the Constitution does not permit federal interference with their activities except through the criminal justice system, armed with its ancient safeguards. There are no exceptions. No federal agency, the CIA, the IRS, or the FBI, can be at the same time policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury. That is what constitutionally guaranteed due process is all about. It may sometimes be disorderly and unsatisfactory to some, but it is the essence of freedom...I suggest that the philosophy supporting COINTELPRO is the subversive notion that any public official, the President or a policeman, possesses a kind of inherent power to set aside the Constitution whenever he thinks the public interest, or "national security" warrants it. That notion is postulate of tyranny.

— Congressman Don Edwards —  
1975

The FBI documents collected in this book offer a unique window into the inner workings of the U.S. political police. They expose the secret, systematic, and sometimes savage use of force and fraud, by all levels of government, to sabotage progressive political activity supposedly protected by the U.S. constitution. They reveal ongoing, country-wide CIA-style covert action — infiltration, psychological warfare, legal harassment, and violence — against a very broad range of domestic dissidents. While prodding us to re-evaluate U.S. democracy and to rethink our understanding of recent U.S. history, these documents can help us to protect our movements from future government attack.

This is the final volume of what amounts to a South End Press trilogy on domestic covert action. Ward Churchill's and Jim Vander Wall's *Agents of Repression*<sup>1</sup> details the FBI's secret war on the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement. *My War at Home*<sup>2</sup> shows that such covert operations have become a permanent feature of U.S. politics. It analyzes the specific methods used against progressive activists and opens a discussion of how to respond.

Now Churchill and Vander Wall have reproduced many of the FBI files on which our books are based. Some of these documents illustrate recent FBI campaigns against the American Indian Movement (AIM) and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Others reveal early attacks on Marcus Garvey (1920s) and Alger Hiss (1950s). The bulk are from the counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) that the FBI mounted to "disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize" the civil rights, black liberation, Puerto Rican independence, anti-war and student movements of the 1960s.

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In this book, we see the actual directives that set in motion those infamous 1960s programs. Here, too, are action proposals that FBI field offices submitted in response to the COINTELPRO directives. FBI Headquarters teletypes back its approval or modifications. Agents report specific operations in which they took part. Supervisors summarize progress in neutralizing a particular target. Policy memoranda adjust Bureau tactics in light of new dangers and opportunities. Most illuminating are the book's facsimiles of some of the weapons the FBI actually deployed in its hidden war at home. From the Bureau's arsenal of psychological warfare, Churchill and Vander Wall show us:

- the letter the FBI secretly sent to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in December 1964, in an attempt to provoke his suicide;
- other forged letters to activists and their supporters, families, employers, landlords, college administrators and church superiors;
- FBI-authored articles and editorials which "cooperative news media" ran as their own;
- cartoon leaflets that the FBI published in the name of certain radical groups in order to ridicule and antagonize others.

Although some of these documents have been published previously, the collections are hard to find and many are out of print. The most thorough and useful to date – the National Lawyers Guild's *Counterintelligence: A Documentary Look at America's Secret Police*,<sup>3</sup> – has been incorporated into *The COINTELPRO Papers*. The NLG Civil Liberties Committee generously donated its limited resources to subsidize publication of this book (and *War at Home*) instead of reprinting its earlier compilation.

The FBI documents reproduced here originated as confidential internal communications. They were for Bureau eyes only. They remained secret until March 1971, when a "Citizen's Committee to Investigate the FBI" removed boxes of files from an FBI resident agency office in Media, Pennsylvania, and released them to the press. Gradually, more files were obtained through the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which had been temporarily strengthened to help restore public confidence in government in the wake of Watergate and the exposure of official lies about the Vietnam War. A few agents and informers began to disaffect from the FBI and publicly confess their misdeeds. New senate and house intelligence committees held public hearings and published voluminous reports. These, in turn, enabled activists to get more documents through FOIA requests and lawsuits.

The full story of COINTELPRO has not yet been told. The Bureau's files were never seized by congress or the courts. Many have been destroyed. Others remain hidden or were released with such heavy deletion that only "the," "and," "or" and "but" remain (examples are reprinted in Chapter 1 of *The COINTELPRO Papers*, with a critique of the process which generates such absurdities). The most heinous and

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embarrassing counterintelligence actions were not committed to writing, and ex-operatives are now legally prohibited from disclosing them.

Still, an unprecedented wealth of detailed information has been amassed. That material is summarized in *Agents of Repression, War at Home* and elsewhere. What sets *The COINTELPRO Papers* apart is the number and scope of the FBI documents it reproduces. As the title indicates, these documents are drawn mainly from the FBI's formal counterintelligence programs, in place from 1956-1971. This is not because these were the FBI's only programs of domestic covert action. Rather, it is because they were the only ones to have their records substantially revealed.

COINTELPRO involved a unique experiment. Though covert operations have been employed throughout FBI history, the COINTELPROs were the first to be both broadly targeted and centrally directed. FBI headquarters set policy, assessed progress, charted new directions, demanded increased production, and carefully monitored and controlled day-to-day operations. This arrangement required that national COINTELPRO supervisors and local FBI field offices communicate back and forth, at great length, concerning every operation. They did so quite freely, with little fear of public exposure. This generated a prolific trail of bureaucratic paper. The moment that paper trail began to surface, the FBI discontinued all of its formal domestic counterintelligence programs. It did not, however, cease its covert political activity against U.S. dissidents. The documents show that the Bureau evaluated the COINTELPROs as "successful over the years." It disbanded them only "to afford additional security to our sensitive techniques and operations." Continued reliance on those same techniques and operations was officially authorized, only now on a case-by-case basis, "with tight procedures to insure absolute security."

By discontinuing use of the term "COINTELPRO," the Bureau gave the *appearance* of acceding to public and congressional pressure. In reality, it protected its capacity to continue precisely the same activity under other names. Decentralization of covert operations vastly reduced the volume of required reporting. It dispersed the remaining documentation to individual case files in diverse field offices, and it purged those files of any caption suggesting domestic covert action. The Bureau's "sensitive techniques and operations" have since been further insulated from public scrutiny. Scheduled congressional hearings into the Bureau's mid-1970s campaign against AIM were squelched by means of what turns out to have been yet another FBI covert operation. The FOIA has been drastically narrowed, with thousands of files reclassified "top secret." The Intelligence Identities Protection Act now makes it a federal crime to disclose "any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent."

This careful concealment of post-COINTELPRO domestic counterintelligence action is part of a broader effort to rehabilitate the U.S. political police. Central to that effort has been a sophisticated campaign to refurbish the public image of the FBI. The Bureau's egomaniacal, reactionary, crudely racist and sexist founder, J. Edgar Hoover, died in 1972. After interim directors failed to restore the Bureau's prestige, two federal judges, William Webster and William Sessions, were recruited to clean

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house and build a "new FBI." The new directors have cultivated a low-visibility managerial style and discreetly avoided public attack on prominent liberals. Anti-communism – the time-honored rationale for political police work – has been augmented by "counter-terrorism" and "the war on drugs," pretexts that better resonate with current popular fears. The old myth of the FBI as crime-busting protector of democratic rights has been revived in modern garb by films like *Mississippi Burning* and the television series, *Mancuso FBI*.

This repackaging seems to have sold the "new FBI" to some of the most prominent critics of earlier COINTELPRO. University professors and congressional committees that helped to expose the domestic covert action of the past now deny its persistence in the present. Because of their credentials, these respectable "objective" sources do more damage than the FBI's blatant right-wing publicists. Left uncontested, their sophistry could disarm a new generation of activists, leaving them vulnerable to government subversion.

The introduction to *The COINTELPRO Papers* refutes one such academic expert, Athan Theoharis, in his preposterous claim that the FBI's war on AIM during the 1970s was not a COINTELPRO-style "program of harassment." Equally treacherous is *The FBI and CISPES*, a 1989 report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence.<sup>4</sup> This is nothing more than a whitewash of the Bureau's covert and extralegal effort to wipe out domestic opposition to U.S. intervention in Central America.

That FBI campaign was first made public by a central participant, Frank Varelli. The Bureau admits it paid Varelli from 1981 to 1984 to infiltrate CISPES. Varelli has testified that the FBI's stated objective was to "break" CISPES. He recounts a *modus operandi* straight out of the annals COINTELPRO – from break-ins, bogus publications and disruption of public events to planting guns on CISPES members and seducing CISPES leaders in order to get blackmail photos for the FBI.<sup>5</sup>

Alerted by Varelli's disclosures, the Center for Constitutional Rights obtained a small portion of the Bureau's CISPES files and released them to the press. The files show the U.S. government targeting a very broad range of religious, labor and community groups opposed to its Central America policies. They confirm that the FBI's objective was to attack and "neutralize" these groups.<sup>6</sup> Mainstream media coverage of these revelations elicited a flurry of congressional investigations and hearings. Publicly exposed, the FBI tried to scapegoat the whistle blower. Its in-house investigation found Varelli "unreliable" and held his false reports of CISPES terrorism responsible for the entire FBI operation. The Bureau denied any violation of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens or involvement in the hundreds of break-ins reported by Central America activists. A grand total of six agents received "formal censure" and three were suspended for 14 days. The FBI moved its CISPES file to the national archives and Director Sessions declared the case closed, a mere "aberration" due to "failure in FBI management."<sup>7</sup>

The Bureau's slander of Varelli gave the congress an easy way out. The single congressional report, *The FBI and CISPES*, endorses the FBI's entire account, without any reservation or qualification. It legitimizes a cover-up of current covert operations by exploiting the past reputation of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

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That committee – known initially as the “Church Committee,” after its founding chair, Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) – gained respect in the mid-1970s through detailed public documentation of FBI and CIA abuses. In truth, the committee never did play quite the heroic role claimed for it by liberal historians. Compromised from the outset, it allowed the agencies under investigation to turn over only sanitized versions of selected files and then to edit and censor the committee’s reports before publication.<sup>9</sup> It colluded in the FBI’s continuing concealment of a decade-long secret war on the Puerto Rican independence movement.

Church and his successor as committee chair, Senator Birch Bayh (D., Indiana), eventually were driven from office. They fell victim to the same combination of right-wing disinformation and Democratic Party passivity that later set up House Speaker Jim Wright.<sup>9</sup> Divested of its liberal populist leadership, the intelligence committee became – like so many other congressional and administrative bodies – an instrument of the very agencies it purports to oversee. It was this latter-day committee which ratified the FBI’s coverup of its campaign against Central America activists without hearing from a single critic or victim. Relying exclusively on FBI and Justice Department testimony, the committee crudely reiterates the Bureau’s own self-serving findings, often verbatim. It writes off Frank Varelli with the undocumented assertion that his “credibility...was called into doubt at a hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.”<sup>10</sup>

The committee also ignores testimony that the reports submitted in Varelli’s name, which provided the FBI’s pretext for attacking CISPES, were actually dictated by FBI higher-ups.<sup>11</sup> It makes no reference to Varelli’s repeated, detailed sworn statements – corroborated by the Bureau’s own files – that the FBI used COINTELPRO methods against CISPES in order to achieve COINTELPRO ends. To rationalize its dismissal of the campaign against CISPES as a mere “aberration” from the FBI’s “definite pattern of adherence to established safeguards for constitutional rights,”<sup>12</sup> the committee carefully avoids any reference to the sordid history of COINTELPRO. Neither the acronym nor the concept appear even once in its report.

Such a whitewash should not be allowed to obscure the reality of continuing COINTELPRO-type attacks on progressive activists. Ongoing domestic covert action is more than amply documented by *The COINTELPRO Papers, Agents of Repression and War at Home*. The targets are not limited to the opponents of U.S. intervention in Central America. They include virtually all who fight for peace and social justice in the United States – from AIM, Puerto Rican *independentistas* and the Coalition for a New South, to environmentalists, pacifists, trade unionists, homeless and seniors, feminists, gay and lesbian activists, radical clergy and teachers, publishers of dissident literature, prison reformers, progressive attorneys, civil rights and anti-poverty workers, and on and on. Consider the following examples drawn from 1989 alone:

- national leaders of Earth First! imprisoned on the word of an FBI infiltrator, Mike Tait;<sup>13</sup>

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- the coordinator of the National Lawyers Guild's anti-repression task force, active in the defense of Puerto Rican *independentistas*, subpoenaed at the FBI's instigation before a gratuitous, punitive grand jury and faced with jail for refusing to testify against a former client;<sup>14</sup>
- more than 200 African-American elected officials in Alabama, Georgia and North Carolina victimized by FBI smear campaigns, false criminal charges and elaborate "sting" operations.<sup>15</sup>

These can be no more than the tip of the iceberg, given that the great bulk of COINTELPRO-type operations remain secret until long after their damage has been done. By all indications, domestic covert operations have become a permanent feature of U.S. politics. The implications of this are truly alarming: in the name of protecting our fundamental freedoms, the FBI and police systematically subvert them. They routinely take the law into their own hands to punish dissident speech and association without the least semblance of due process of law. Those who manage to organize for social justice in the United States, despite the many obstacles in their path, face country-wide covert campaigns to discredit and disrupt their constitutionally protected political activity.

The documents reproduced in this book reveal a U.S. political reality which is the antithesis of democracy. They also suggest an alternative reading of recent U.S. history. Memoirs and commentaries on "The Sixties" have recently become quite popular. COINTELPRO, however, receives little attention in these accounts. It is rarely mentioned, and even then it seems somehow not to affect the rest of the story. Otherwise responsible historians describe a systematic campaign to covertly discredit progressive movements without so much as considering the possibility that their own perceptions might be distorted as a result of that campaign.

Take, for instance, Todd Gitlin's often insightful and eloquent account of his experience in the 1960s. A sophisticated participant-observer and early president of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin is well aware of COINTELPRO. Yet, at least one pivotal incident reported matter-of-factly in his book turns out to have been an FBI covert operation. Recalling a 1969 telephone threat which helped split the emerging women's movement from SDS, Gitlin repeats a widely accepted account attributing the call to Cathy Wilkerson, a late-SDS and future Weather Underground militant. Gitlin was shocked to learn, at an SDS reunion in 1988, that neither Wilkerson nor any other SDS woman had made such a call. Who knows how many other incidents represented as historical fact by Gitlin (let alone in the writings of those lacking his integrity) are actually COINTELPRO fiction?<sup>16</sup>

COINTELPRO has been especially effective in distorting the public image of the Black Panther Party (BPP). The BPP was the most prominent African-American political force in the U.S. during the late '60s, with chapters all across the country. Working from a 10 point socialist program for black self-determination, it formed (legal) armed street patrols to deter KKK and police brutality, gave out free food and

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health care, and fought against hard drugs. The BPP was instrumental in forging a broad-based "rainbow coalition" against U.S. intervention abroad and for community control of the police, schools and other key institutions at home. Its weekly newspaper, *The Black Panther*, brought a radical anti-imperialist perspective on national and international developments to over 100,000 readers.

These achievements have by and large been ignored by white historians, who present instead only the FBI's view of the BPP. Even books about COINTELPRO tend to regurgitate as scholarship the very lies and racist caricatures which the Bureau promoted through COINTELPRO. At best, such studies equate the government's violence with the BPP's, overlooking the fact that the FBI and police harassed, vandalized, beat, framed and murdered Panthers for years before finally provoking the party's retaliation. A prime example is Kenneth O'Reilly's *Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972*. Here we find the BPP identified as a gang of "preening ghetto generals spouting off-the-pig rhetoric and sporting black leathers, Cuban shades, and unkempt Afros." They were "peripheral characters...who never attained mass support." In a portrayal laced with the FBI's racist epithets – "monsters," "cold-blooded killers," "nihilistic terror" – O'Reilly argues that "the Black Panther Party invited the sort of FBI repression that typified Lyndon Johnson's last two years in the White House and Richard Nixon's first four." One such "invitation" consisted, we are told, of a "coloring book depicting Black children challenging white law and order in the ghetto." Only the most careful reader will discover, some 21 pages later, that this "outrageous Panther provocation" was actually a COINTELPRO forgery published by the FBI to discredit the BPP.<sup>17</sup>

Clearly, COINTELPRO and similar operations under other names work to distort academic and popular perceptions of recent U.S. history. They violate our basic democratic rights and undermine our ability to alter government policy and structure. They have done enormous damage to the struggle for peace and social justice. Though formidable and dangerous, such domestic covert action is not insurmountable. It can be overcome through a combination of militant public protest (as in recent "FBI Off Campus" campaigns) and careful internal education and preparation within progressive movements. The greatest gift of *The COINTELPRO Papers* is its potential for helping present and future activists grasp the methodology of this form of repression in order to defeat it. Read these documents with that in mind, and use them well!

*Brian Glick*  
New Rochelle, New York  
– March 1990 –

# Guide to the Documents

by Chip Berlet and Brian Glick

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113-4 Memo: Disrupt marriage of St. Louis civil rights activist Reverend Charles Koen and discredit him in black community through anonymous accusations of sexual infidelity.  
115 Second FBI anonymous letter against Koen.  
116 Document: St. Louis reports results of distribution of bogus underground newspaper designed to divide black activists.  
118-9 Document: Director suggests all offices follow Miami example of providing derogatory background information on COINTELPRO targets to cooperative media.

## Guide to the Documents

- 120 Memo: Anonymous letter to discredit Republic of New Afrika (RNA) leader.
- 121 Document: Director approves above letter.
- 122 Document: Discussion of campaign to discredit RNA and prevent land purchase in Mississippi.
- 124-5 Memo: Tactics to "thwart and disrupt the Black Panther Party (BPP)."
- 127 Memo: Provide information to cooperative media to "foster split" between Black Panther Party and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).
- 128 Document: Proposal to create false impression that Stokely Carmichael is a CIA informant.
- 130 Memo: Plan to provoke violence between Black Panther Party and another black organization (US).
- 131 Bogus Cartoons: Used in Black Panther Party/US campaign to provoke violence.
- 132 Memo: Discussion of continuing plan to provoke violence between Black Panther Party and US.
- 133 Document: Summary of "Tangible Results" and "accomplishments" of Black Panther Party COINTELPRO, e.g., "Shootings, beating and a high degree of unrest;" and collapse of BPP program providing free breakfast for ghetto youth.
- 134 Documents. Anonymous mailing of derogatory cartoon targeting Newark Black Panther Party.
- 136-7 Memo: Proposal to provoke Jewish Defense League violence against BPP.
- 138 Document: Anonymous letter to Chicago gang leader Jeff Fort provoking violence against BPP.
- 139 Document/sketch. FBI informant's drawing of floorplan showing where BPP leader Fred Hampton slept. Used by police to murder Hampton and Mark Clark.
- 141 Airtel: Cash bonus requested for FBI informant who targeted Hampton for deadly raid.
- 144-5 Airtel: Hoover reprimands San Francisco FBI for criticizing plan to discredit and destroy BPP.
- 148 Memo: Summary of anti-black COINTELPRO; friction created among BPP leaders.
- 150 Airtel: Hoover informs agents that when targeting BPP, purpose is disruption, and "it is immaterial whether facts exist to substantiate the charge."
- 151-2 Teletype: Propose forged letter to divide BPP and isolate Geronimo Pratt.
- 154-5 Memo: Bogus underground newspaper proposed to discredit Geronimo Pratt, ridicule BPP and "foment mistrust and suspicion" among its members.
- 156 Teletype: Continue targeting Pratt.
- 158 Memo: FBI and prosecutor collude to keep evidence from judge and defense attorneys in trial of three former Panthers ("the New York 3").
- 160-1 Airtel: Director summarizes success in shattering BPP and driving BPP leader Huey Newton crazy.
- 162-3 Memo: "Thwart BPP newspaper; FBI anonymous letters charge BPP anti-semitism to disaffect donors solicited by conductor Leonard Bernstein; further disinformation and Jewish Defense League provocation.

### *COINTELPRO New Left*

- 177-8 Memo: Disruption of new left formalized as new program.

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- 180 Target anti-war leaders Dellinger and Hayden.  
181-2 Newark proposes new left be "destroyed or neutralized from the inside," Hayden labelled as informer.  
183 12 point master plan for COINTELPRO against new left.  
185-6 Memo: Cartoons, pamphlets and anonymous letters used to disrupt SDS at Temple University.  
187 Cartoon. Used to discredit SDS at Temple University.  
192-3 Memo: Block emergence of Detroit area anti-war coalition; bogus letter in name of Black United Front demanding \$25,000 from "white liberals."  
194-6 Disrupt Liberation News Service through divisive anonymous letter.  
197 Memo: Milwaukee proposes plan to discredit alternative newspaper in Madison, Wisconsin.  
199 Airtel: Newark proposes plan to disrupt Princeton SDS through conservative campus group.  
200 Airtel: Director approves plan to disrupt Princeton SDS.  
201 Cartoon from campaign to disrupt Princeton SDS  
202 Director urges plan to "drive a wedge between the new left and the black student power advocates" at New York University.  
203 FBI-authored racist letter from anonymous "SDS member" used in COINTELPRO operation at NYU.  
204 Letter: Approval of NYU COINTELPRO.  
205-7 Memo: Plan to use "anonymous messages" with "a mystical connotation" to harass Temple University new left activists.  
209 Director urges anonymous communications "to cause confusion in the organizing for [Los Angeles anti-war] demonstration by causing dissent amongst its sponsors."  
210 Memo: COINTELPRO operation proposed to inhibit "the embryonic alliance" between SDS and BPP.  
211 Letter: Authority granted for above operation by using informants to create rift.  
212 Memo: Detroit requests device to squirt "foul smelling feces" on publications distributed by Radical Education Project.  
213 Airtel: Divide SDS and BPP through bogus racist, sexist, homophobic attack in name of "Newark SDS."  
214-5 Airtel: Plant newspaper article decrying Jane Fonda's fundraising for BPP.  
216-7 Airtel: FBI-authored letter to newspaper columnist from fictitious person smearing BPP-supporting actress Jean Seberg as pregnant from Black Panther rather than white husband.  
218 Director approves action vs. Seberg, with adjustments to protect FBI cover.  
219 Document/*Los Angeles Times* clipping: Claim Seberg COINTELPRO successful.  
227 Document/Postcard: FBI sends "Minutemen" death-threat post card to intimidate author Churchill.

### COINTELPRO – AIM

- 242 Report: Source describes Denver AIM organizational structure.  
243 Teletype: Report on AIM sent to legal attache in Ottawa, Canada.  
245-6 Teletype: Police brutality against AIM activist Russell Means.

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- 307-9 Document: Summary of justification for and tactics used in AIM investigation, stresses fostering of paranoia.

### *Conclusion*

- 312 Chart: Admitted FBI illegal acts committed during COINTELPRO era.  
313 Teletype: Director calls for compilation of reports of FBI warrantless electronic surveillance in domestic security investigations.  
315 Airtel: Wide range of political "extremists" labelled "terrorists."  
331 Chart of penal coercion techniques and functions.

## Guide to the Documents

- 247-8 Teletype: Circulation of false claim that AIM was obtaining illegal automatic weapons; FBI and local law enforcement coordinate operations against AIM.
- 252 Document: Establishing predication for criminal investigation of AIM.
- 253 Teletype: Use of reporter at Wounded Knee as unwitting informant for FBI through covert cooperation of management.
- 256-60 Memo: Position paper on role of FBI in case of "a major confrontation in Indian country," based on analysis of Wounded Knee operations.
- 263-5 Teletype: Unsubstantiated rumor of AIM arms purchases; proposal to use that rumor to block funding of AIM by Sammy Davis, Jr.
- 266-7 Document: Initiate "forceful and penetrative interview program" against AIM activists.
- 271 Memo: Characterization of AIM as violent and destructive "insurgents."
- 274 Memo: COINTELPRO veteran agent Richard G. Held assigned to direct investigation into death of two agents in "Peltier" Pine Ridge killings case.
- 275 Memo: Involvement of agent Richard W. Held, son of Richard G., in Pine Ridge case.
- 276 Memo: Glowing evaluation of performance of Richard W. Held on Pine Ridge during period of intense repressive abuses against AIM supporters.
- 277 Memo: Director desires prompt resolution of any "inconsistencies" in stories relating to Pine Ridge killings.
- 279 Tactical summary shows use of grand jury to coerce reluctant witnesses to implicate Peltier and others in Pine Ridge killings.
- 280 Teletype: Richard G. Held returns from Rapid City to duties as SAC Chicago.
- 281 Memo: Richard G. Held continues involvement in Pine Ridge case, plans to meet with judge.
- 282-3 *FBI Terrorist Digest*: AIM included in summary of possible terrorist attacks on 1976 Bicentennial celebrations.
- 284-7 Teletype: Lengthy report from single unverified source alleges non-existent AIM "Dog Soldiers" plan massive campaign of murder and terrorism.
- 288-9 Memo: Media leak that FBI shared information on Native American protests with CIA.
- 290-3 FBI analyzes acquittal in first Pine Ridge killings trial in order to be sure to convict Peltier in second trial.
- 294 Memo: Co-defendant dismissed so "full prosecutive weight of the Federal Government could be directed against Leonard Peltier."
- 296 Affidavit: Myrtle Poor Bear alleges she heard Peltier plan to ambush FBI agents at Pine Ridge, and that later he confessed.
- 297 Affidavit: Myrtle Poor Bear alleges she saw Peltier actually shoot FBI agents.
- 298-9 Affidavit: Myrtle Poor Bear abandons claim Peltier planned and confessed killings; adds substantial detail to her "eyewitness" account.
- 300 Airtel: "Enclosed herewith one pair of hands" taken from as yet unidentified Anna Mae Aquash. Initial autopsy inconclusive despite bullet lodged in skull.
- 301 Identification Report: Fingerprints reveal identity of Anna Mae Aquash.
- 302 Teletype: Ballistics test showed rifle claimed as Pine Ridge killings weapon could not have fired the cartridge casing recovered from trunk of car.
- 303 Lab Notes: Firing pin test showing lack of match—described as "inconclusive" at trial.

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## Introduction

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### A Glimpse Into the Files of America's Political Police

The inescapable message of much of the material we have covered is that the FBI jeopardizes the whole system of freedom of expression which is the cornerstone of an open society...At worst it raises the specter of a police state...in essence the FBI conceives of itself as an instrument to prevent radical social change in America...the Bureau's view of its function leads it beyond data collection and into political warfare.

– Thomas I. Emerson –  
Yale Law Professor  
1971

A picture, as they say, is worth a thousand words. Actually seeing the visual representation of that which others describe, and from which they draw conclusions, can serve for many people as a sort of ultimate proof of the propositions at issue. The truth of this old adage seems quite pronounced in this instance, which leads us to reproduce secret FBI documents to allow the Bureau to document its own lawlessness.

In *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement* (South End Press, 1988), we endeavored to prove among other things that the Bureau has since its inception acted not as the country's foremost crime-fighting agency – an image it has always actively promoted in collaboration with a vast array of “friendly” media representatives and “scholars” – but as America's political police engaged in all manner of extralegality and illegality as expedients to containing and controlling political diversity within the United States. In essence, we argued that the FBI's *raison d'être* is and always has been the implementation of what the Bureau formally designated from the mid-1950s through the early '70s as “COINTELPROs” (COunterINTElligence PROgrams) designed to “disrupt and destabilize,” “cripple,” “destroy” or otherwise “neutralize” dissident individuals and political groupings in the United States, a process denounced by congressional investigators as being “a sophisticated vigilante operation.”<sup>1</sup> Our case, it seemed to us, was rather plainly made.

Such clarity is, predictably enough, anathema to the Bureau and the more conscious apologists it has cultivated, both of whom wish to deny the realities we have sought to expose. For the FBI, as well as the broader politico-legalistic structure of which it is an integral part, there are matters of policy and outright criminal culpability to be covered up through systematic denial of truth and the extension of

certain countervailing mythologies. Many apologists have based their careers and professional reputations on shielding the Bureau from exposure while assisting in the perfection and perpetuation of its preferred myths.

On this score, a review of *Agents of Repression* written for the *Washington Post* by Athan Theoharis, a professor at Marquette University, serves as an instructive example.<sup>2</sup> The techniques employed in this attempt to discredit our theses afford virtual textbook instruction in how the facts of the Bureau's activities and agenda are obscured from the public by properly-anointed "experts" while the officially-approved image of the Bureau is reinforced, or at least maintained, through the mainstream media.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the *Post* review bears detailed scrutiny.

### *Of Myths and Documentation*

After accurately summarizing the main thrust of our conclusions regarding the nature, scope and duration of the FBI's domestic counterintelligence operations, Theoharis tries to bring about their dismissal out-of-hand. "Do the authors document these alarming charges?" he asks. "The answer is quite simply: They do not." Observe that he does not attempt to challenge the appropriateness of the documentation we offer, arguing that it is insufficient to our purposes or that we have somehow misinterpreted it. Instead, he asserts that we use no documentation at all, a claim intended to lead his readers to the false impression that *Agents* consists of nothing more than a lengthy stream of heavy-handed and unsupported accusations against the FBI.

In order to accomplish this gross distortion, he simply remains silent about the fact that we accompanied our 388 pages of text with 79 pages of notes (all in fine print), some 1,513 entries in all, hundreds of them citing more than a single source, and fully a third referring to specific FBI and/or other government documents. Having ignored the evidentiary record upon which we base our work, he contrives to extend a countering, essentially fictitious "record" of his own. Focusing on our main thesis, that rather than being suspended in anything other than name in 1971 (when the FBI says it was), COINTELPRO was actually continued and even escalated against the American Indian Movement over the next several years, the reviewer sets his stage.<sup>4</sup> The most serious problem with *Agents*, he says, is that "the authors seem indifferent to the uniqueness, and thus significance, of the FBI's COINTELPRO operations. They were unique because Bureau officials launched formal, action-oriented programs whose main purpose was not to collect evidence for prosecution, and in the process created a rather comprehensive written record of their actions."<sup>5</sup> He goes on to claim that:

In contrast to its activities against the Black Panthers [before 1971], activities authorized and monitored exclusively by the Bureau, the FBI's activities involving AIM were designed to result in judicial prosecution [and] were subject to review by

Justice Department officials...The FBI files released on AIM do not document a program of harassment.

In this passage, Theoharis has carefully implanted another pair of serious pieces of disinformation in his supposedly factual rebuttal. One concerns the extent to which the Bureau has made available documents concerning its anti-AIM campaign, while the other centers upon what is allegedly revealed within this documentation. Both of these contribute directly to furtherance of the myth by which the FBI wishes to be publicly understood. Each element will be considered in turn, because both reveal much about the methods and functions of academic apologists in service to the Bureau propaganda system.

### *"The AIM Files"*

After mentioning "the FBI files released on AIM," Theoharis sums up his point with a snide query: "Can we then read between the lines and conclude that by the 1970s FBI actions were not recorded in writing?" Leaving aside the possibility that by this point in its history agents might well have learned not to record certain things in written form, it is abundantly clear to anyone familiar with the material to which the reviewer refers that neither *we* nor *he* has had the opportunity to assess what the FBI did or did not commit to paper with regard to its actions against AIM. Still less have we been forced to "read between the lines" of available documents in order to arrive at conclusions contradicted by such evidence. Contrary to Theoharis' smug remark about what his own perusal of these files shows, the fact of the matter is that the vast bulk of them have never been released.

Although the Bureau acknowledges having compiled hundreds of thousands of "investigative" documents during the course of its major anti-AIM activities, only 17,000-odd pages of this material have been declassified and made available to researchers at the "reading room" facility in FBI headquarters, and most of these show extensive deletions. The reviewer is being deliberately misleading when he casually juxtaposes the veritable mountains of paper available through the FBI on its Black Panther COINTELPRO with the paucity of documents made available on AIM – pretending these are equivalent data-bases – and then suggests he had predicated his conclusions upon a comparison of the two sets of files. Nor is he more forthcoming about why such a disparity in the availability of these records exists.

In essence, the FBI was quite literally forced to divulge most of its Panther files by the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations during hearings held in 1974 and 1975. Conversely, the Bureau was able to avoid being compelled to do this with regard to its anti-AIM operations, under circumstances which bear recounting.<sup>6</sup> Concerning the Panther documents, the Senate committee itself found its hand forced by a seemingly endless series of revelations about governmental transgressions during the early '70s. There was a "credibility gap" engendered by the federal executive branch having been caught lying too many times, too red-



handedly and over too many years in its efforts to dupe the public into supporting the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. This had reached epic proportions when Daniel Ellsberg leaked the "Pentagon Papers," a highly secret government documentary history of official duplicity by which America had become embroiled in Indochina, and caused particularly sensitive excerpts to be published in the *New York Times*.<sup>7</sup> The situation was greatly exacerbated by the so-called Watergate Scandal, which followed immediately, in which it was publicly revealed that virtually the entire Nixon administration had been, as a matter of course, engaging in exactly the same sort of behavior on many other fronts, both at home and abroad. To compound the crisis even further, a citizen's action group raided the FBI's Media, Pennsylvania resident agency, appropriated its files, and exposed the long-secret existence of COINTELPRO in the *Washington Post*.<sup>8</sup> As a result of all of these factors, public confidence in government was at an all-time low, and showed signs of unraveling even further.

In this peculiar and potentially volatile set of circumstances, a government-wide effort was undertaken to convince the citizenry that its institutions were fundamentally sound, albeit in need of "fine-tuning" and a bit of "housecleaning." It was immediately announced that U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn from Vietnam as rapidly as possible. Televised congressional hearings were staged to "get to the bottom of Watergate," a spectacle which soon led to the resignations of a number of Nixon officials, the brief imprisonment of a few of them, and the eventual resignation of the president himself. Another form assumed by this high-level exercise in (re)establishing a national consensus favoring faith-in-government was the conducting of a series of well-publicized and tightly-scripted show-trial-type hearings with regard to the various police and intelligence agencies which had been exposed as complicit in the Vietnam and Watergate "messes."

For its part, the FBI was cast as an agency which had "in the past" (no matter how recent) and "temporarily" (no matter how long the duration) "gotten out of control," thus "aberrantly" but busily trampling upon citizens' civil and constitutional rights in the name of social and political orthodoxy. To add just the right touch of melodrama to the whole affair, the Bureau was made to "confess" to a certain range of its already completed COINTELPRO operations – such as the not-directly-lethal dimensions of its anti-Panther activities – and to provide extensive portions of its internal documentation of these misdeeds. As a finale, Bureau officials were made to appear properly contrite while promising never to engage in such naughty things again. The FBI's *quid pro quo* for cooperating in this charade seems to have been that none of its agents would actually see the inside of a prison as a result of the "excesses" thereby revealed.<sup>9</sup>

The object of all this illusory congressional muscle-flexing was, of course, to instill in the public a perception that congress had finally gotten tough, placing itself in a position to administer "appropriate oversight" of the FBI. It followed that citizens had no further reason to worry over what the Bureau was doing at that very moment, or what it might do in the future. This, in turn, would allow the *status quo*

sufficient breathing room to pass laws and executive orders gradually converting the FBI's COINTELPRO-style illegalities into legal, or at least protected, spheres of endeavor.<sup>10</sup> The selling of this bill of goods was apparently deemed so important that congress was willing go to to extreme lengths in achieving success.

Hence, in 1975 the Senate Select Committee concluded that in order to complete its (re)building of the required public impression, it might be necessary to risk going beyond exploration of the Bureau's past counterintelligence practices and explore *ongoing* (i.e.: ostensibly post-COINTELPRO) FBI conduct *vis à vis* political activists. Specifically at issue in this connection was what was even then being done to AIM, and hearings were scheduled to begin in July. But this is where the Bureau, which had been reluctantly going along up to that point, drew the line. The hearings never happened. Instead, they were "indefinitely postponed" in late June of 1975, at the direct request of the FBI, and on the basis of what by the Bureau's own admission turned out to have been a major disinformation ploy designed to win it widespread public support.<sup>11</sup>

The FBI's AIM files have thus ended up, not in the public domain as Theoharis would have his readers believe, but amongst the Bureau's most secret archives. While it is true, as the reviewer states, that the relatively few AIM files the FBI has chosen to release "do not document a program of harassment," what he intentionally leaves *unstated* is even more true: the released files in themselves provide a vastly insufficient evidentiary base from which Theoharis or anyone else might conclusively determine whether a *de facto* COINTELPRO was conducted against AIM. And sheer common sense will warn that the Bureau has not so fiercely resisted producing its records in this matter because their content is neutral or serves to absolve it of wrongdoing.<sup>12</sup>

### "Judicial Prosecution"

The obvious question at this point is whether the FBI's success in blocking access to AIM files makes it impossible to arrive at *any* legitimate conclusion concerning what the Bureau did to that organization. Are we guilty, as Theoharis claims, of mere reliance upon "guilt by association - i.e., that because the FBI launched a formal program to harass the Black Panthers, it adopted the same practices against AIM"? Hardly. Even disregarding such unofficial sources as eyewitness and victim accounts of various episodes of the Bureau's anti-AIM campaign - many of which we will always insist hold *at least* as much validity and integrity as any FBI teletype, field report or memorandum - there are still a great number of official sources which we could and did use to support the conclusions we reached in *Agents*.

These include several reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a pair of reports of the Justice Department's Task Force on Indian Matters, a report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Subcommittee on Internal Security), the findings of the federally-sponsored Minnesota Citizens' Commission to Review the FBI, a report from the General Accounting Office, transcripts of the 97th Congress' first

session on FBI authorizations, several legal depositions, Bureau of Prison records, grand jury summaries, voluminous trial transcripts, an array of legal briefs and hearing transcripts, transcriptions of oral arguments on appeal and a number of judicial opinions. These sources, adding up to tens of thousands of pages of documentation, were all cited repeatedly, and most of them quoted, in *Agents*.

Theoharis avoids mentioning this extensive documentary base – consisting of the same sort of material he himself has drawn upon quite heavily in his own books on the FBI – while summarily dismissing our effort as “undocumented.” And well he might. The conclusions reached in virtually every item of the *real* record correspond quite neatly with one or more of those drawn in *Agents*. This is to say that the tangible, officially available record of the FBI’s anti-AIM campaign leads directly away from the sort of absolution of the Bureau Theoharis seeks to foist on his readers. It was, after all, the Civil Rights Commission – not Churchill and Vander Wall – which determined after extensive on-site investigation that the FBI had been complicit in rigging the 1974 Pine Ridge tribal election against AIM candidates.<sup>13</sup> And it was this same federal agency which officially reported that the Bureau was involved in perpetrating “a reign of terror” against AIM members and supporters on the same reservation, during the same period.<sup>14</sup>

Similarly, it was not the “tendentious” authors of *Agents*, but federal district judge Fred Nichol who noted that he was dismissing charges against AIM defendants because of the methods employed by the FBI and federal prosecutors. “The waters of justice have been polluted,” said the judge, by the Bureau he had “revered so long,” but which had “stooped so low” in its vendetta against AIM.<sup>15</sup> And again, it was not us but the foreman of a federal jury who, when acquitting other AIM defendants of murder charges the FBI had lodged against them, observed that aspects of the case assembled by the Bureau had been so obviously fabricated that not a member of the jury believed them.<sup>16</sup> We could, as we did in *Agents*, go on in this vein for hundreds of pages. But that book has already been written.

The last two examples are especially important, however, since they disprove Theoharis’ argument that, “in contrast to its activities against the Black Panthers...the FBI’s activities involving AIM were designed to result in judicial prosecution.” The first untruth embedded in this proposition is that the COINTELPRO directed against the Panthers did not use false prosecution as a tactic.<sup>17</sup> The reality is, as is borne out in a Bureau document quoted verbatim in *Agents*, “key black activists” were repeatedly arrested “on any excuse” until “they could no longer make bail.” As an illustration of how this worked, we examined in some detail the case of former Panther leader Geronimo Pratt, imprisoned in San Quentin for the past 18 years as a result of FBI actions causing him to be repeatedly prosecuted on bogus charges until he was finally convicted of a murder the Bureau had known he never committed.<sup>18</sup>

As concerns AIM, the facts – which Theoharis opts to ignore – fit *precisely* the same pattern. After the 1973 siege of Wounded Knee, for instance, the FBI caused 542 separate charges to be filed against those it identified as “key AIM leaders.” Russell

Means alone was faced with 37 felony and three misdemeanor charges. Organization members often languished in jail for months as the cumulative bail required to free them outstripped resource capabilities of AIM and supporting groups. Yet, when it came time for the trials, the transparency of the Bureau's evidence was such that hundreds of charges were simply dropped while the remaining defendants were acquitted in droves. The net result of this FBI "prosecution" effort was an absurdly low 15 convictions, all on such petty or contrived "offenses" as "interfering with a federal officer in the performance of his duty." *None* of the 40 charges leveled at Means held up in court.<sup>19</sup> But, while the juridical nature of what the Bureau was doing may be seen as ludicrous at best, this "prosecutorial" element of the anti-AIM campaign self-evidently served to "disrupt," "destabilize" and even "cripple" its target.

At another level, one might reasonably ask what sort of *bona fide* "investigation to facilitate prosecution" is involved in FBI agents bribing an individual, as they did with Louis Moves Camp, to testify as an "eyewitness" to the participation of others in felonious acts allegedly committed at a time when the witness was a thousand miles from the scene?<sup>20</sup> This is just one of the "Bureau activities involving AIM" which came out during the 1974 trial of Russell Means and Dennis Banks, the sort of activity which caused Judge Nichol to dismiss charges and write the opinion quoted earlier. The same query might be entered with regard to other of the FBI's efforts to secure conviction of AIM members. For example, what sort of legitimacy is it that attaches itself to the arrangement in which charges were dropped against Marvin Redshirt, confessed murderer of Los Angeles cab driver George Aird, in exchange for his admittedly perjured testimony against AIM members Paul "Skyhorse" Durant and Richard "Mohawk" Billings, men who were subsequently exonerated from having any part in the crime?<sup>21</sup>

We can easily go on framing such questions: What, exactly, is the difference between the way the FBI subverted the judicial system to "get results" during its COINTELPROs against "black extremists," and its well-documented kidnapping and raw coercion of a mentally unbalanced Indian woman, Myrtle Poor Bear, in order to force her to sign three mutually contradictory – and utterly false – affidavits; the Bureau's choice of the affidavits was, to be sure, duly submitted in court as an expedient to obtaining AIM member Leonard Peltier's extradition from Canada.<sup>22</sup> For that matter, what is the precise distinction between the COINTELPRO usage of phony witnesses such as Julio Butler in order to obtain the murder conviction of Geronimo Pratt on the one hand, and the FBI's later use of Poor Bear in the same capacity to secure a murder conviction against AIM member Richard Marshall on the other?<sup>23</sup> And again, what are we to make of FBI agents who went on the stand and testified to one thing in the murder trial of AIM members Dino Butler and Bob Robideau, only to reverse *completely* their testimony on the same events during the subsequent trial of Leonard Peltier on the same charge?

Obviously, the *documented* nature of the FBI's activities "designed to result in judicial prosecution" of AIM members was identical to those it employed under the

rubric of COINTELPRO against the Black Panther Party and other black liberation organizations. For Theoharis to argue that the Bureau's "prosecutorial" tactics against AIM are normal FBI procedure not only tends to dissolve the very distinction between the COINTELPRO and "post-COINTELPRO" eras he seeks to establish, it bespeaks a very interesting view on his part of how the judicial process should be used.

Theoharis does make an important and serious point when he observes that the Panther COINTELPRO was "action-oriented" in ways which went beyond any conceivable definition of the judicial arena. We agree. So much so that, in *Agents*, we broke the tactical methodologies of COINTELPRO out into 10 separate categories, only one of which concerned manipulation of the judicial system, and demonstrated by example how each had been applied to the Panthers and other black liberation groups. This, however, hardly serves to validate either his assertion of a "contrast" between what was done to the Panthers and AIM, or his contention that the latter was not subjected to a comparable "program of harassment." To the contrary, we also demonstrated, on the basis of available documentation, that *each* of the remaining nine non-judicial COINTELPRO methods was utilized during the repression of AIM.

Take, for example, the category of "black propaganda." In the book, we quote verbatim one of the FBI's "Dog Soldier Teletypes," deliberately released to the press in 1976 under the guise of alerting the public to the "fact" that some "2,000 AIM warriors" were on the verge of launching an outlandish wave of terrorism throughout South Dakota. We cite a number of articles in major newspapers across the country in which this disinformation immediately and prominently appeared, as well as statements by local police authorities responding to the "menace." And we quote then-director of the FBI Clarence Kelley, on the witness stand shortly thereafter, admitting that he knew of no factual basis whatsoever to support these wild public allegations on the part of his typically close-mouthed Bureau. Several other instances of FBI activity *vis à vis* AIM in the propaganda area are also chronicled and substantiated with comparable documentation in *Agents*.<sup>24</sup>

Or, take the matter of the COINTELPRO tactic of infiltrating *agents provocateurs* into target organizations (*provocateurs*, as opposed to mere informants, are used to actively and illegally disrupt, entrap and otherwise neutralize their quarry). In *Agents*, we present an undeniable case that this was done to AIM in exactly the same fashion as it was done to the Panthers. The matter concerns the activities of one Douglass Durham, and is abundantly documented through such sources as the earlier-mentioned Skyhorse/Mohawk case (during which FBI undercover employee Durham went on the stand impersonating an "Towa psychologist" in order to cause bail to be denied the defendants), the *provocateur's* own admission of what he'd done after he was unmasked as an infiltrator in 1975, and his subsequent testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. And so it goes, point by point, down the entire list of elements comprising the Bureau's COINTELPRO repertoire.

All of this disproves Theoharis' assertion that, when it came to AIM, the FBI's methods "were designed [only] to result in [legitimate] judicial prosecution." It also contradicts his accusation that, in concluding otherwise, we were forced to rely upon sheer "guilt by association." And, by rights, it should expose for what it really is the reviewer's allegation that "at no time do [we] substantiate [our] conjecture that an FBI-orchestrated conspiracy to harass AIM." Contrary to the fabricated version of reality presented in the *Post* review, it has been solidly demonstrated that the American Indian Movement was very much the victim of a *de facto* COINTELPRO operation.

### *Mythology*

Merely being on the receiving end of a disingenuous review, while never pleasant, hardly warrants the assembly of an in-depth counter-critique such as we have provided here. At issue here, however, is not just the fact that Theoharis used his mainstream media forum as a vehicle with which to prevent accurate information from reaching the public, but the kinds of inaccuracies he seeks to promulgate as a replacement. It is not so much that he denies the validity of the way in which we used our documentation in *Agents*, for example, as that he denies such documentation exists. The upshot here is that he deliberately portrays the FBI – which in actuality went to extraordinary lengths to block disclosure of its AIM files in the 1970s, and which has clamped the tightest mantle of secrecy around them ever since – as a model of propriety, thoroughly forthcoming and above-board in the handling of these records, with nothing hidden about its anti-AIM campaign. The image projected by Theoharis' reference to a fictional "release" of AIM files is that the Bureau – which in reality has once again taken to treating the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts as so much toilet paper, generally refusing to release *any* new document unless expressly required to do so by court order – is that of an "open" agency which typically makes its records available to researchers and the public at large. The resultant mis-impression is a building block in the reviewer's reasonably subtle construction of the real "contrast" he wishes to impart concerning what was done to the Black Panther Party and what was done to AIM. The locus of the false distinction Theoharis is after lies not so much within the experiences of the two groups as within the FBI itself.

In "the bad old days" of COINTELPRO, the story goes, the Bureau was proven to have committed criminal acts and used official secrecy to conceal them, but those days ended forever in the wake of the Church Committee investigations. When an FBI agent like Richard W. Held orchestrated a program in 1971 to disrupt and destroy the Los Angeles Black Panther Party, Theoharis agrees that this was a political counterintelligence program because FBI documents released to the Church Committee concerning these activities bore the caption "COINTELPRO." However, when the same agent was involved in the same type of program using exactly the same techniques against AIM on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975 or the Puerto

Rican independence movement in San Juan in 1985, Theoharis would have us believe this could not have been a COINTELPRO because the FBI has not released related documents bearing said caption. And, according to him, for us to assert otherwise is by definition simply "guilt by association."<sup>28</sup> The pacifying effect upon readers intended by the spooning up of this stale pabulum is unmistakable. And for the relative few who might remain skeptical in the face of this sort of reassurance, the reviewer offers a slightly different tranquilizer. They are calmly handed the option of sharing "the authors' outrage over some of the Bureau's [post-COINTELPRO] *investigative methods* and the fairness of the American legal system [emphasis added]," as if in the end we had somehow all agreed that it is only investigative rather than counterintelligence techniques which are at issue, and that the actions of the FBI in this quarter conform to some recognizable system of legality. The invitation extended to skeptics is thus no more than a final touch to the reviewer's main purpose, a ruse designed not only to divert the last measure of attention away from what is contained in *Agents*, but to posit in its stead an impression of the reviewer's preferred version of reality.

We have arrived at the core of the myth, perpetuation of which constitutes the real purpose of reviews such as Theoharis'. This is, and has always been, the central myth of the FBI. Regardless of the variations and complexities of the lesser mythologies required to support it at a given moment or given context, it has remained remarkably consistent and ultimately reducible to the simplest terms: "Don't worry, *everything is OK now.*" No matter when or in what circumstances the Bureau has been called to account, its official spokespeople and unofficial apologists can be counted upon to queue up and say whatever is necessary to pass along the idea that, while there may have been "problems" or "errors" in the past, these have been corrected. There has never been, in such recountings, any current reason for worry or concern. All has *already* been set right.

This theme prevailed in the 1920s, in the wake of the Palmer Raids. It was maintained in the '30s, after the worst of the Bureau's union busting had been completed. It continued in the '40s, when the true extent of the FBI's surveillance of the citizenry began to be apparent. During the '50s, it held up even as the Bureau's linkages to McCarthyism were exposed. In the '60s, those who would pose uncomfortable questions concerning FBI activities were, like Martin Luther King, dismissed as liars and "paranoids." Even during the 1970s, as the COINTELPRO revelations were ushered forth, the myth was used as the Bureau's major defense. And in the end, as always, it held sway. Meanwhile, through it all, the apparatus of political repression which the myth was created to shield continued, essentially unhindered by real public scrutiny of any sort, to be evolved, perfected and applied.

As we enter the '90s, the FBI's slaughter of "AIM militants" has long since been completed and hidden from view. CISPES (Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) and some 200 other domestic dissident groups have more recently found themselves monitored, disrupted and occasionally destabilized by Bureau operatives using many of the same COINTELPRO tactics employed against "New

Left" organizations two decades ago.<sup>26</sup> And still Professor Theoharis would have us believe the FBI no longer engages in political counterintelligence programs and when evidence emerges to the contrary, the Bureau (not the victims) should be given every benefit of the doubt.

We readily concur with his assessment that these are "important questions of decided contemporary relevance." Unlike him, however, we will continue to conclude that their importance lies in the fact that, concerning the form and function of the FBI, things have never been "OK." Further, we will continue to assert that things will never *be* OK in this regard until the realities both he and the Bureau seek so desperately to hide are brought fully into the open, until the whole pattern of FBI performance has at last been pieced completely together, called by its right name and placed before the public. Then, perhaps, real corrective action can occur. Unquestionably, the start of any such positive process must rest in destroying the myth Theoharis so clearly presents.

### *The COINTELPRO Papers*

Citation of materials not readily accessible to the general public is not in itself sufficient to decide such issues, and this takes us right back to the proposition that a picture is worth a thousand words. Therefore, in this follow-up volume to *Agents* we will photographically reproduce a substantial selection of the FBI documents which led us to the conclusions expressed in *Agents*. Hence, when we say, for example, that the Bureau was engaged from its earliest moments in precisely the same tactics of political repression which later marked the COINTELPRO era *per se*, we do not intend to leave the matter open to debate or charges of "conjecture." Instead, we will provide the exact facsimile of a document – such as the accompanying 1919 letter written by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover proposing a strategy which was ultimately used to neutralize black nationalist leader Marcus Garvey – allowing the Bureau itself to create a "word picture" concretizing our case for us.

As concerns the Garvey letter, readers should take careful note of the fact, clearly drawn by Hoover, that it is not written about an individual who is believed to have violated (or is planning to violate) any particular law. To the contrary, the FBI director is recommending – to the very sort of Justice Department officials whose "review" Theoharis would have us believe now safeguards us against such FBI activities – that the federal government devote its vast legal resources to contriving a case, *any* case, against Garvey, to make him *appear* guilty of a crime. In this way, the black dissident's eventual imprisonment could be made to seem a simple "criminal matter" rather than the act of political repression it actually was. The key to understanding what really happened in the Garvey case lies squarely in appreciation of the fact that the decision to bring about his elimination had been made at the highest level of the Bureau long before any hint of criminal conduct could be attached to him.

In the same vein, when we contend that upon approval of Hoover's plan the FBI



PLEASE REFER TO  
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 AND REFER TO  
 THE PUBLIC LAW NUMBER

**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,**  
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

JCH-190

October 11, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RIDGELY.

I am transmitting herewith a communication which has come to my attention from the Panama Canal, Washington office, relative to the activities of MARCUS GARVEY. Garvey is a West-Indian negro and in addition to his activities in endeavoring to establish the Black Star Line Steamship Corporation he has also been particularly active among the radical elements in New York City in agitating the negro movement. Unfortunately, however, he has not as yet violated any federal law whereby he could be proceeded against on the grounds of being an undesirable alien, from the point of view of deportation. It occurs to me, however, from the attached clipping that there might be some proceeding against him for fraud in connection with his Black Star Line propaganda and for this reason I am transmitting the communication to you for your appropriate attention.

The following is a brief statement of Marcus Garvey and his activities:


Subject a native of the West Indies and one of the most prominent negro agitators in New York;

He is a founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League;

He is the promulgator of the Black Star Line and is the managing editor of the Negro World;

He is an exceptionally fine orator, creating much excitement among the negroes through his steamship proposition;


In his paper the "Negro World" the Soviet Russian Rule is upheld and there is open advocacy of Bolshevism.

Respectfully,  


**1919 letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, proposing to frame Marcus Garvey as a means of "neutralizing" the black nationalist leader's political effectiveness.**

used infiltrators against Garvey's non-criminal United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in order to cast about for *some* kind of "evidence" through which a plausible case against its leader could be developed, we are prepared to back it up. For instance, we can reproduce the 1921 report to the Bureau from James Wormley Jones, code-named "Confidential Agent 800," a black man paid by the Bureau to work his way into a position of trust within UNIA. It should be noted that even with this highly-placed source of inside information, the FBI was unable to assemble any sort of case against Garvey in its first two attempts, both of which had to be abandoned for lack of even the appearance of substance. In the end, having charged him with everything from income tax evasion to conspiracy, the Bureau managed

A report from James Wormley Jones, the "confidential agent 800" who infiltrated UNIA and helped finger Marcus Garvey for the FBI.



to obtain a conviction on only a single, relatively minor, count of mail fraud. This was enough, however, to take the black leader out of the political arena and into Atlanta federal prison, from whence he could be deported as an "undesirable alien" in 1927.<sup>27</sup>

Or, if we wish to leap three decades ahead and assert that comparable methods were utilized by the Bureau *vis a vis* "liberal" government officials such as Alger Hiss – an expedient in promoting McCarthyism and the Red Scare of the late 1940s and early '50s – we can produce documents to this effect. For example, consider the accompanying letter from Horace Schmahl to FBI agent Thomas Spencer. Schmahl, it should be noted, was an ostensible private investigator retained by Hiss defense attorneys to ferret out evidence which would exonerate their client from charges he'd used a position in the State Department to spy for the Soviet Union. In actuality, Schmahl was reporting directly to the Bureau on every nuance of the defense strategy, a matter which undoubtedly proved a great boon in the government's securing of a conviction.

The particular missive from Schmahl we reproduce is especially interesting because it shows him alerting the FBI to Hiss' attorneys' plans to argue on appeal that the key piece of evidence introduced by the government at the trial – a

HORACE W. SCHMAHL  
TRIAL PREPARATION  
TEL. DI4-1795

62 William Street  
New York, New York

Robert S. Gilson, Jr.  
Edward F. Gamber  
Associates

22 November 1950

Mr. Thomas Spencer, Special Agent  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U. S. Court House  
Foley Square  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Spencer:

Today I had a visit from Mr. J. Howard Haring, the handwriting expert who had been retained upon your suggestion by Mr. McLean in the original Hiss investigation. I had an occasion to use Mr. Haring on some other matter, and he told me that Mr. Lockwood had recently called on him, accompanied by an attorney named Lane. Mr. Haring told me that Messrs. Lockwood and Lane had with them a typewriter expert named Tytel. According to Mr. Haring, Lockwood and Lane proposed to retain Mr. Haring to assist Mr. Tytel in some task which he had undertaken upon the request of Messrs. Lockwood and Lane in anticipation of a new trial in the Hiss case.

It appears that Tytel had been retained by Mr. Hiss' attorneys to reconstruct a Woodstock typewriter which would have the identical type characteristics as the machine on which the Whittaker Chambers papers had been typed. It seems furthermore that Tytel is doing this work with the aid of typed records only. He claims that he has not seen or had any physical contact with the Woodstock typewriter which figured in the original trial. Tytel told Mr. Haring that he expected to testify in this anticipated new trial that he had been able to reproduce a machine having the same type characteristics as the machine introduced in the course of the original trial without ever having seen the machine. This would appear to indicate that Hiss' new counsel might try to argue that the Whittaker Chambers papers, on the basis of which Hiss was convicted, were forgeries produced on a machine other than the Fansler Woodstock typewriter which had been doctored up to match the type of that machine. Mr. Tytel furthermore told Mr. Haring that in the course of his efforts to produce a Woodstock typewriter which would match the type characteristics of the original machine, he went "form blind". Mr. Haring tells me that "form blindness" is an occupational ailment that sometimes befalls handwriting or typewriting experts when they concentrate strenuously on certain types of print or writing over a period of time. Tytel wanted to

Letter demonstrating that the private investigator supposedly working on Alger Hiss' defense effort was actually reporting to the FBI.

Woodstock typewriter once owned by Hiss, the type irregularities of which supposedly matched those appearing in alleged espionage correspondence - could have been altered to produce the desired result. Schmahl's warning allowed the Bureau

Page 2 - Mr. Thomas Spencer

retain Haring to complete his work. Haring, who is a good patriotic American, said that he would have none of it and suggested that Messrs. Lockwood, Lane and Tytel leave his office.

Mr. Kenneth Simon left with my secretary an affidavit obviously prepared by Mr. Rosenwald, which he wanted me to sign. I refused to sign this affidavit. However, I am sending you herewith enclosed a copy of it for your files.

I expect to be pretty well tied up for the remainder of this week and therefore, find it difficult to drop-up and see you personally.

I would prefer that you destroy this letter after it has served your purpose. I remain, with my very best personal regards to yourself and Mr. McAndrews.

Faithfully yours,

Horace Schmahl

P.S. Needless to say that any other information that will come into my hands will be promptly submitted to you.

sufficient time to assemble a countering argument that no such modifications to a typewriter were possible. When we say the FBI was aware that its counter-argument – which served to keep the government's "proof of espionage" propaganda campaign alive (and Hiss in prison) was categorically untrue, we can make our case by reproducing the accompanying January 1951 memo from A.H. Belmont to D.M. Ladd in which the author admits the "FBI Laboratory advised that it would be possible for a person who is well versed in typewriter defects and similarities in type design to construct a typewriter so that it would make these defective characteristics appear on paper when the machine was used." Instructively, both documents were among the many thousands of pages in its Hiss files the Bureau kept secret for nearly three decades after the case was closed.<sup>21</sup>

Both of the examples used thus far have seemed to demonstrate that the reality of COINTELPRO greatly predates the formal adoption of the acronym during the mid-1950s. If, on the other hand, we wish to demonstrate that this reality has continued to exist after the FBI so pointedly abandoned the term in 1971, we can readily illustrate our point. We can, for example, simply reproduce the accompanying September 1983 teletype concerning the infiltration of an agent with "extensive UC [undercover] experience" into the Dallas chapter of CISPES. And lest the reader be persuaded the Bureau was doing this because it genuinely believed the organization was engaged (or planning to engage) in *bona fide* criminal activities – "terrorism," according to current FBI director William Sessions – attention should

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd DATE: January 30, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS,  
was; ET AL  
PERJURY  
ESPIONAGE - R

PURPOSE

To advise that the Hiss attorneys have attempted to construct a Woodstock typewriter which will have the same typing characteristics as the typing on the Chambers documents used as evidence in this case; that by pure conjecture they apparently intend to show that Chambers had constructed a Woodstock typewriter on which Chambers typed these documents, and that they, too, can construct a similar typewriter from the typing characteristics on the Chambers documents; that they are also endeavoring to prove that the film on which the "Dunstan papers" were photographed was not manufactured in 1935, but was manufactured at a later date. The FBI Laboratory advised that it would be possible for a person who is well versed in typewriter defects and similarities of type design to construct a typewriter so that it would make these defective characteristics appear on paper when the machine was used; that if the Hiss attorneys have subsequently had a machine "doctored" to produce the defects appearing in the 54 Chambers documents used by the Laboratory technician in his testimony in court, and those only, then they could easily have made a grave error, inasmuch as every different character that makes its appearance in the 54 documents would have to be studied carefully and the type faces "fined" in the typewriter; that not only would the defects discovered by the Laboratory have to be identical, but the reconstructed typewriter would have to aus all of its own characteristic letter defects eliminated and all of the characteristics appearing on the 54 documents. SA:G Donegan and USA Saypol have been fully advised of defense tactics and they contemplate no action until such time as the defense files a motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence.

BACKGROUND

You will recall that Alger Hiss was convicted mainly on the Government's presentation in evidence of 54 typewritten documents produced by Whittaker Chambers, which he claimed were

PLJ:mas;(nlf)

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EX - 75

INDEXED - 50

FEB 1 1951

4721

EX 65A

CH

Although federal prosecutors in the case of Alger Hiss contended that it would be impossible to alter Hiss' typewriter to match incriminating documents, here we find the FBI acknowledging the reverse was true. Upon advice of the Bureau, the government continued to deny the possibility of alteration during Hiss' appeal.

U.S. SD-13  
 BUREAU SECTION  
 DL 00010 2032358Z  
 RR HQ  
 DE DL (u)  
 R 090239Z SEP 83 (u) (10 SEP 83 04 09Z) (u)  
 FBI DALLAS (199-795) (P5)  
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
 TO DIRECTOR FBI (199-8848) ROUTINE b7C  
 (ATTN: SSA [redacted] Declassify on: OADR  
 BT (u) 7/9/87 Classified by SP4ELW/KCA ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE  
 Declassify on: OADR  
 COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT WITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR (CISPES) (u)  
 FCI-EL SALVADOR-TERRORISM (OO: DALLAS) (u)  
 ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED b7C  
 (u)  
 b1 [redacted] (S)  
 FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, DALLAS DIVISION PLANS  
 TO INTRODUCE AN SA INTO THE DALLAS CHAPTER OF CISPES. (u)  
 SA [redacted] WHO HAS HAD EXTENSIVE UC EXPERIENCE,  
 INCLUDING RECENT FCI PROJECT IN DALLAS, HAS BEEN SELECTED  
 TO JOIN CISPES AND ATTEND THEIR MEETINGS AND VARIOUS  
 FUNCTIONS. (u) 199-8848-83  
 b1 [redacted] (S)  
 cc Rm 2358  
 [10 OCT 25 1983] (u) 10/14/83  
 b7C [redacted] SKP  
 [1 SEP 20 1983] (u)  
 RECEIVED TELETYPE UNIT  
 SECRET

Teletype describing infiltration of CISPES, 1983.

be paid to the next reproduction, a November 1983 teletype originally classified as "secret." It explains rather clearly that the FBI found it "imperative to formulate some plan of attack against CISPES," not because of its suspected involvement in terrorism or any other criminal activity, but because of its association with "individuals [deleted] who defiantly display their contempt for the U.S. government by making speeches and propagandizing their cause." In plain English, CISPES was

7  
 \*

RECEIVED TELETYPE UNIT

[CONFIDENTIAL] 352 (M)

OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

NOO 224 314 1912Z

[RR HQ DL FA

DE HQ] (u)

R 12 1922Z [NOV 83] (u)

FM NEW ORLEANS] (199C-RR (P)

TO DIRECTOR] ROUTINE

DALLAS] (199C-795) ROUTINE

SAN ANTONIO] (199C-753) ROUTINE

BT] (u)

[CISPES] IT - EL SALVADOR.

MARKINGS, NOTATIONS, AND ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED  
IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" UNLESS OTHERWISE  
NOTED. (u)

[REDACTED] b2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT IS IMPERATIVE AT THIS TIME TO FORMULATE SOME PLAN OF  
ATTACK AGAINST CISPES AND SPECIFICALLY, AGAINST INDIVIDUALS, (M)

~~SECRET~~  
Classified by SP4ELW/KFA  
Declassify on: OADR  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP4ELW/KFA  
ON 7/17/87

199-5548-12611

[12 NOV 29 1983] (u)

[REDACTED] b2


~~SECRET~~

11/20 55.WFO 11/20/83 [REDACTED] DMV

Teletype proposing actions against CISPES because of its "defiance," 1983.

politically objectionable to the Bureau - no more, or less - and was therefore deliberately targeted for repression. COINTELPRO by any other name is still COINTELPRO.<sup>29</sup>

The collection of FBI self-portraits contained herein is far from exhaustive. There are several reasons for this, beginning, of course, with the fact that so many of the Bureau's documents remain secret. Conversely, the material which has been released runs into hundreds of thousands of pages, most portions of which are



redundant, a seemingly endless repetition of the same theme. Many thousands of the documents released over the years were provided in such poor quality that they are simply impossible to reproduce with enough clarity to render them legible in book format. Still others were released in such deleted form as to be useless in any way at all (examples of this are provided in Chapter 1). A final problem presents itself in that the Bureau has run so many of these sorts of counterintelligence operations, and over such an extended period, that any attempt to offer a comprehensive, start-to-finish exposition would inevitably prove too bulky for a single volume, or even a dozen volumes.

Some means of not only organizing, but limiting the material we wish to present has therefore been necessary. The method we have employed has been to focus our attention on several of the entities the FBI itself has targeted for its fiercest attacks: the *Puertorriqueño* independence movement, the black liberation movement (particularly the Black Panther Party), and the American Indian Movement. Additionally, we will provide sections illustrating the tactics employed against a new left organization, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and two of the old left, the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).<sup>30</sup> In each case, given constraints of available space, we will provide background narrative to "ground" our study, to provide readers with insights into the specific historical and topical contexts from which the COINTELPROs emerged and functioned, both socially and politically. In each instance, we also provide an overview of FBI counterintelligence operations *vis à vis* the Bureau's COINTELPRO targets since such things were supposedly stopped in 1971.



Most of the documentary material, with the exception of that concerning AIM, is drawn directly from the period when COINTELPRO reigned in its own name. This is partly because the documents are virtually crystalline in their representation of what the FBI's domestic counterintelligence operations are all about. It is also because, like the official non-Bureau sources we utilized in *Agents*, they provide so obvious a basis from which to understand the meaning underlying the FBI's AIM documents. The lines of continuity between the "pre-COINTELPRO," COINTELPRO and "post-COINTELPRO" eras are thereby dramatically underscored, and perhaps as a result an increasing number of activists can learn to recognize them from their own recent experiences. If so, this volume will have amply served its purpose, for in such recognition may be forged the means by which we may surmount the process of official political repression which has served for so long to abort the potential for positive social change in the United States. In our view, participation in the fostering of such change is the sole defensible motivation for anyone to engage in the acts of writing or publishing at the present time.

Clearly, there were many reasons for our doing this book, but it was the outlook expressed immediately above which ultimately proved decisive. In the end, we have assembled *The COINTELPRO Papers*, not simply to vindicate *Agents of Repression*, or to have another bibliographical entry in the *curriculum vita*, but to amplify the conclusions we reached in that volume. Simultaneously, we have sought to create a readily accessible mini-archive which will ultimately say more than we ever could. We have felt a responsibility to do this because the sad fact is that COINTELPRO lives. We must all learn its face. Only in unmasking it can we ever hope to destroy it and move forward to our more constructive goals and objectives.

*Ward Churchill & Jim Vander Wall*  
Boulder, Colorado  
- May 1990 -

## *The COINTELPRO Papers*

The FBI, by infiltrating and spying on selected groups in American society, arrogated to itself the role of a thought police. It decided which groups were legitimate, and which were a danger – by FBI standards – to the Republic. It took sides in social and political conflicts...deciding, for example, that those who opposed the war in Vietnam, or whose skin was black, should be targets for FBI attention. Since the FBI acted secretly, it distorted the political process by covertly acting against certain groups and individuals. In short, the FBI filled the classic role of a secret political police.

– David Wise –  
*The American Police State*



# Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents

We must be prepared to surrender a small measure of our liberties in order to preserve the great bulk of them.

- Clarence M. Kelley -  
FBI Director  
1975

Anyone having opportunity to review documents released by the FBI immediately encounters the fact that in most cases portions of the original document have been deleted. In some instances, this may consist of only a name or a few words; elsewhere, the entire text of documents has been obliterated (see accompanying examples) prior to their having been "made available" to the public. In such cases, Bureau censors will almost always scribble a code or series of codes - (b)(1)(b), for example - in the margins of each page, explaining the statutory basis upon which they decided to withhold particular bits of information. In order to understand not only the codes, but their underlying basis, it is necessary to review the evolution of such "exemptions."

### *"National Security"*

The origins of the FBI's ability to declare its documents (or portions thereof) secret by reason that their release might "compromise the security of the United States" lie in two executive orders handed down during the early 1950s. The first was Harry Truman's EO-10290 (16 FR 9795, Sept. 25, 1951) which extended the military system of national security classification over certain nominally civilian police and intelligence agencies engaged in counter-espionage and counterintelligence operations directed at "agents of foreign powers hostile to the United States." The Truman order provided that the Bureau might withhold, even from courts of law, documents deriving from such pursuits under four classifications: "Security Information - Top Secret," "Security Information - Secret," "Security Information - Confidential," and "Security Information - Restricted."

Two years later, President Dwight D. Eisenhower effected EO-10501 (18 FR 7050, Nov. 10, 1953) which revised the classification system to include only three

THE COINTELPRO PAPERS

SECRET

SAC, NEW YORK February 3, 1990

DIRECTOR, FBI

**[REDACTED]** (S)

ESIT:RACE - B  
Bufile 65-5068

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1259 SSP/SLW 12-13-78  
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 12-13-88

**PERSONAL ATTENTION**

**[REDACTED]** (S)

**[REDACTED]** (S)

**[REDACTED]**

**[REDACTED]** (S)

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
CC: Boston  
Los Angeles  
San Francisco  
Washington Field Office

65-3170-20  
FEB 3 1990  
BOSTON

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The people's right to know. Information "released" by the FBI on the Rosenberg espionage case more than 30 years after the fact. Such extensive deletion in Bureau investigative documents is not at all uncommon. To the contrary, it has become normative under Ronald Reagan's E.O. 12356 if, indeed, documents are released at all.

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categories: "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential." The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 921) then added a fourth classification designated as "Restricted Data." Operating behind the shield of this series of headings, the Bureau also developed a sequence of internal classifications of its own: "Strictly Confidential," "Sensitive," "JUNE," and even "Do Not File." Taken together, this complex of security classifications was sufficient to hide virtually the entirety of the FBI's proliferating political action files for a full decade.

In 1964, congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 80 Stat. 250), designed and intended to provide citizen access to government files. However, in passing the act, congress failed to challenge the prerogative of the federal executive to simply declare whole bodies of information secret for reasons of national security. Instead, the act allowed agencies such as the FBI to exempt material they felt was:

(A) Specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national security and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such executive order.

This loophole allowed the Bureau to continue hiding its political files for another decade. With the COINTELPRO revelations of the early '70s demonstrating just what kind of documents the FBI was withholding, however, congress amended the FOIA in 1974 (P.L. 93-502) to provide that Bureau claims to national security exemption would be subject to *in camera* review by federal district courts to determine whether the classification assigned file materials in given cases was actually appropriate. This procedure may seem at first glance to represent a solution to the problem. But, as has been noted elsewhere:

The courts have shown reluctance to exercise their new power. Too often, despite notorious abuses by many agencies of the power to classify documents, courts have accepted at face value an agency's allegation that information has been properly classified, and have refused to examine the documents for themselves.<sup>1</sup>

Part of the problem may have been initially that as of the date the amended FOIA took effect (February 1975), even the lowest ("confidential") national security classification was still defined quite subjectively under Richard M. Nixon's EO-11652 (37 FR 5209, March 8, 1972) as material of which "unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security."<sup>2</sup> In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed EO-12065 (43 FR 28950, July 3, 1978), defining the classification somewhat more stringently: "'Confidential' shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *identifiable* damage to the national security [emphasis added]." Section 1-101 of this order also stipulated that, "if there is a reasonable doubt which classification ['Top Secret,' 'Secret,' or 'Confidential'] is appropriate, or whether the information should be classified at all, the less restrictive designation should be used, or the information should not be classified." Both points were reiterated in a separate directive to the recently-formed Interagency Classification Review Committee (43 FR 46280, Oct. 2, 1978).

In its amended form, the FOIA makes no allowance at all for restricting information on the basis of "national security," providing instead that classification must pertain to matters genuinely affecting "national defense" and "foreign policy." Carter's executive order and corresponding ICRC directive follow suit, at least to the extent that they define valid national security concerns as being only those matters

clearly bearing on "the national defense and foreign policy of the United States." Section 1-601 of the order also specifies that "classification may not be used to conceal violations of the law, inefficiency, an administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency, or to restrict competition."

As a domestic police agency, the FBI has – by definition – relatively little real role to play in either national defense or foreign policy. This is all the more true when the targets of the Bureau's attentions are U.S. citizens rather than "aliens" or "agents of foreign powers" supposedly operating within the country. Yet, anyone examining those documents the Bureau has "released" for public scrutiny will discover myriad instances in which text has been blacked out, with an accompanying "(b)(1)" notation indicating this was done for reasons of national security. The text of entire documents is often deleted on this basis, as was the case with some 95,000 pages pertaining to the Rosenberg case alone. Further, as Ann Mari Buitrago and Leon Andrew Immerman have pointed out:

The FBI has also been known to "white" out classification markings entirely, so that the reader cannot tell whether the markings had ever been made. This is an unjustifiable practice unless – as is quite unlikely – the markings themselves are exempt under the FOIA.<sup>3</sup>

These deletion practices have been patently illegal since 1975 when the amended FOIA took effect and were even more so in light of President Carter's instructions in 1978. Hence, although no FBI employees were ever penalized for their blatantly consistent violation of the law in this regard, occasional court victories forced selected batches of documents into the open. In April 1983, however, Ronald Reagan signed EO-12356 (48 FR 6304, April 9, 1983), effectively authorizing the Bureau and other U.S. intelligence agencies to withhold documents as they saw fit.<sup>4</sup> While this does not in itself legalize the FBI's documentary misconduct, it greatly confuses the issue, making it as difficult to force the Bureau to reveal its files as it was in the late 1960s.

### *Police Records*

The FOIA offers another set of loopholes, collectively known as the "(b)(7) exemptions," through which the FBI has routinely passed *en route* to deleting information. The statutory language at issue allows the Bureau to withhold:

...investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with law enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by any agency conducting a lawful national security investigation, confidential information fur-



nished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.

Taken together, these provide an umbrella under which the Bureau can hide (and has hidden) many things. A particularly striking example concerns the use of the (b) (7) (a) category: the FBI has consistently sought to employ it, but has argued that FOIA applicants should not even be informed that it was being employed insofar as such notification might alert the subjects of investigations that there was (or had been) an investigation of them, and that the investigation was (or had been) in regard to suspected criminal activities. By the same token, says the Bureau, notifying applicants officially that there was no investigation of their activities might serve to allow them to continue criminal conduct "secure in the knowledge that the FBI is not yet on their trail." Thus, in simplest terms, the Bureau holds that it should be able to use the (b)(7)(a) exemption whenever it wants, but the exemption itself should be considered exempt within the "spirit" of the FOIA. As is usually the case, the FBI has simply proceeded to put its novel interpretation of the law into practice from time to time; hence, one finds occasional passages blacked out by Bureau censors without provision of accompanying code notations in the margins.

While struggling to prevent its reliance upon (b)(7)(a) from becoming a part of the record, the Bureau has, on the other hand, indulged itself spectacularly in the use of (b)(7)(c), ostensibly to "protect the privacy" of third parties mentioned in documents, but who were not themselves subject to the investigation in question. This tends to possess a certain appropriate sense until we note that the censors have often left many, even all, genuine third party names undeleted in the documents released while simultaneously blacking out the names of agents and FBI officials (including, in one document we have on file, the name of director J. Edgar Hoover himself). The latter, of course, are public officials rather than *bona fide* "third parties," and have *never* been legally entitled to "privacy" while in performance of their public duties. The Bureau's attempt to "reconcile" the situation has led censors to apply the (b)(7)(c) exemption to *all* names of third parties and FBI personnel alike in many documents. Bureau abuse of this exemption category was so flagrant that, in a memo dated May 25, 1977, the Justice Department set forth guidelines intended to curtail at least the worst manipulations:

...if the FBI has a file on John Doe — our requestor — and information has been deliberately placed in that file which pertains to Richard Roe, that Roe information is presumptively information about Doe as well and should not ordinarily be withheld from him on 7(c) grounds. If it does not pertain to Doe, one may well ask, why is it in the Doe file at all?...the routine excising/denial of all "third-party information" is to cease.

The Bureau didn't comply, of course, any more than it has ever conformed to the legal requirements that it restrict its (b)(7)(d) deletions with regard to "informer confidentiality" to appropriate instances. Despite a June 2, 1977 Justice Department

memorandum emphasizing that the FOIA explicitly prohibited such exemptions to conceal unlawful activities on the part of the Bureau, the FBI has continued to conceal the fruits of its "black bag jobs" (burglaries) behind wording indicating they derive from "anonymous sources" and deleting material as if these sources were actually human beings. Similarly, the product of ELSURS (Electronic Surveillance) is typically referred to as coming from "confidential sources," with information carefully deleted in such a way as to make it appear that censors are protecting live informers.

One key to determining the type of activity at issue lies in the use of FBI internal informant identity codes left intact in the documents:

Permanent numbers are assigned to "sensitive" sources of information - for example "CSNY 1020-S\*" ("a confidential source, New York") or "CNDI5" ("a confidential National Defense Informant"). Source numbers followed by "S" are "security" sources; by a "C," "criminal;" by an "R," "racial." Asterisked sources are unavailable to testify and are likely to be illegal investigative techniques...Electronic Surveillances and burglaries are often given "S\*" numbers...<sup>5</sup>

The FBI has also contended that it is entitled to utilize the (b)(7)(d) exemption with regard to the identity of virtually any informant insofar as individuals performing such a "service" have done so only on the basis of a promise of confidentiality, either expressed or implied. For the most part, this is a categorically false contention. Former FBI agents have pointed out that standard Bureau procedure has always been to instruct informants from the outset that the FBI itself retained the option of calling upon them to testify in open court, an understanding by which promises of anonymity are effectively precluded.<sup>6</sup> The Bureau's convenient "interpretation" of the FOIA in this connection serves to retain its power in determining what (if any) information concerning informers will be released, and facilitates its hiding of illegal intelligence-gathering techniques within the framework of exemptions.

Another dubious use to which the Bureau has put the (b)(7)(d) clause has been to consistently delete the identities of government employees and agencies which have provided information during investigations. This is not only contrary to the intent of the FOIA, but in direct contravention of the guidelines laid down in the FBI's own manual, which states clearly that federal employees cannot be considered confidential sources. Bureau censors also habitually extend this lid of secrecy to cover the identities of state and local agencies and personnel, such as police departments, although they have absolutely no legal authorization to do so.

Finally, as with (b)(1) exemptions, there have always been serious questions about how the Bureau utilizes (b)(7)(d) to withhold information for reasons of "national security." Many of the FBI's more outrageous activities have been "reclassified" under national security headings in order to hide them. Although the (b)(7) cluster of exemptions is legally bound to the 1974 FOIA Amendments Congressional Conference Committee definition that national security considerations exist

solely in "military security, national defense or foreign policy," as pertains to (b)(1),

...most "national security" investigations [have] had no connection to any national security interest. Investigations other than "criminal" or "applicant" were most often called "subversive," not "national security" cases. Such cases were conducted under headings such as "domestic intelligence," "internal security," "subversive matters," "racial intelligence," or "extremist." Such cases involved domestic dissenters almost exclusively, with no connecting strand to national defense or foreign relations. Yet these investigations are now, for concealment under FOIA exemptions, being justified in the name of "national security." The very term "investigation" is an euphemism when, as is often the case, it denotes a program to suppress lawful political action and speech.<sup>7</sup>

As with the primary (b)(1), "national security" escape mechanism, much of this transparently illegal Bureau manipulation of the classification system was shielded by Ronald Reagan EO-12356 in 1983.

### *Other Loopholes*

One might think the preceding provided more than ample latitude for the Bureau to hide most anything it desired. Not in the view of the FBI. For instance, deletions have often been made on the alleged basis that they are authorized through the FOIA (b)(2) provision that reporting agencies might exempt information pertaining exclusively to "internal administrative procedures" such as "personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave and the like."<sup>8</sup> A 1976 Supreme Court ruling added that the "general thrust of the exemption is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matters in which the public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest."<sup>9</sup>

Notwithstanding these firm instructions, the Bureau has consistently "construed" (b)(2) to mean that it is free to excise such things as markings referring to file numbers, markings referring to type of investigation, records of document dissemination, case leads, agents' initials and notes synopsisizing the contents of given documents. Self-evidently, all of this might well be of legitimate interest to the public. A May 25, 1977 Justice Department memo ostensibly ended the routine deletion of such material, yet the FBI has persisted in blacking out whatever in the sphere it considers "sensitive."<sup>10</sup> An indication of what is meant by this may be readily discerned in the fact that just one of the markings, "JUNE," refers exclusively to unwarranted electronic surveillance and surreptitious entries. Its very appearance would therefore provide *prima facie* evidence of illegal Bureau activity.

The notation (b)(3) seldom appears with reference to FBI deletions; when it does, it usually refers to information associated with secret grand jury proceedings. Although the secrecy surrounding such proceedings is objectionable in a number of ways, it is legally valid for the Bureau to withhold such material. Similarly, the (b)(5)

exemption, allowing the withholding of documents originating in other government agencies (such as the military, CIA, or local police departments) is seldom used by FBI censors, although it does appear from time to time. Another occasionally used exemption notation, "(k)(5)," derives not from the FOIA but from the Privacy Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1896). This allows withholding of:

...investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity would be held in confidence, or, prior to the effective date of this section [Sept. 27, 1975] under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence.

Finally, as Buitrago and Immerman note, "One more 'exemption' must be considered: one which, though not mentioned by the FOIA or PA, enables the FBI to keep significant information from requesters. The FBI normally refuses to provide, or inform the requester of, information unilaterally determined to be 'outside the scope of' or 'not pertinent to' a request. Unfortunately, for the requester, information kept back as 'outside the scope' may be highly pertinent to a request. Yet this information will not be released and its existence will be difficult to discover."<sup>11</sup>

## Conclusion

Despite the considerable range of means, both legal and illegal, available to the FBI to keep its documents (or portions of documents) secret, far more of this information has become public than the Bureau wanted. This is due only in part to such congressional actions as compelling disclosure of many of the Panther COINTELPRO files, processes which almost automatically propel the documents thus released into the FBI reading room. Large quantities of documents have also been released as the result of privately generated law suits – more than 100,000 pages in the Geronimo Pratt case alone,<sup>12</sup> another 100,000 as a result of litigation concerning the 1969 Hampton-Clark assassinations in Chicago<sup>13</sup> – and individual FOIA requests. Although each page of this material has been technically "declassified" and introduced into the public domain, the Bureau is not required to make any special public notice of the fact, or to make the items accessible through its reading room. To the contrary, many such documents, once "released," are denied to a different requester.

Many thousands of pages of material therefore remain isolated in the hands of individual recipients and – for FBI purposes – almost as secret as when lodged in Bureau archives. While much of this material is redundant, it still bears a certain research utility since FBI censors have proven amazingly erratic in what they delete. Material blacked out when a document is released pursuant to a given FOIA request or court order may well appear (although other information is usually censored)

when the same document is provided with regard to a different request or order. In the same fashion, whole documents which are withheld in a given release often appear in the next. Comparison of multiple releases of the same document allow the assembly of a complete, or nearly complete, version. By using this comparison technique whole files can be assembled.

The task confronting those who wish to see as complete as possible a documentary record (and research base) on FBI activities is thus not simply to try to compel the Bureau to reveal more of its documents, although this is plainly an important and necessary enterprise. It is also to assemble as broad as possible a selection of those FBI materials which have already escaped from Bureau control in one place, where they may be properly catalogued, indexed, compared and rendered generally accessible to the public. Indeed, a need has long been recognized, and on at least one occasion seriously attempted, by progressives. The expense and sheer scale of such effort, however, greatly outstrips the resources and capabilities of even the most ambitious individuals and private political or legal organizations.

Still, the need is there. And it stands as mute testimony to the shallowness of established rhetoric on "scholarship," "openness," and "the public's right to know" that no element of government, or any major library or university, has ever undertaken to approach the task in anything resembling a systematic and comprehensive way. Until someone does, it is left to each of us to gather what we can, and to learn whatever is possible from what we gather.

# COINTELPRO – CP, USA

During the ten years that I was on the U.S. Intelligence Board...never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the questions: "Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it moral and ethical?" We never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned with was this: will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will it reach the objective we desire to reach?

– William C. Sullivan –  
Former FBI Assistant Director  
1975

The FBI's first formally designated COINTELPRO was directed against the Communist Party, USA (CP or CP,USA).<sup>1</sup> It was initiated by a closely guarded memorandum written by Director J. Edgar Hoover to a select group of officials within the Bureau's counterintelligence and internal security wings on August 28, 1956, bidding them to create extralegal "action programs" aimed at negating the CP's "influence over the masses, ability to create controversy leading to confusion and disunity, penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinion is molded, and espionage and sabotage potential."<sup>2</sup> With the exception of the last two areas mentioned, both of which seem to have been added on an almost *pro forma* basis, the stated objectives of COINTELPRO-CP,USA were all entirely legal modes of activity. The objective was thus plainly to "cripple or destroy" the CP as a *political* rather than "criminal" entity.

The immediate response to Hoover's concealed directive was a second secret memo, this one from Alan Belmont, head of the FBI's Internal Security Section, to L. V. Boardman of the Counterintelligence Division, recommending that these two legally separate units quietly collaborate to "foster factionalism" within the party and "initiate on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence program against the CP." Belmont concluded that "[t]he Internal Security Section is giving this matter continuous thought and we are remaining alert for situations which could afford additional opportunities for further disruption of the CP, USA."<sup>3</sup>

FBI counterintelligence operations against the CP predate these memos. The party had been targeted for "special attention" from the moment it emerged under the leadership of Louis Fraina and Charles E. Ruthenburg as a left-wing splinter of the Socialist Party of America (SPA) during September 1919.<sup>4</sup> This was a period in

American history when ideologies for positive social change had made tremendous inroads into the country's popular consciousness.

Talk of a major 'reconstruction' of American society was commonplace, and support for major and fundamental reforms was widespread...In a number of American cities, such as Butte [Montana], Portland [Oregon], Seattle, Toledo and Denver, Soldiers, Sailors and Workers' Councils were formed in conscious imitation of the Russian soviets, while thousands attended meetings in cities such as Denver, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington, D.C. to demand recognition of Bolshevik Russia, the freeing of political prisoners, and withdrawal of American troops from Russia...Even more ominous in the eyes of conservatives was the clearly increasing strength of radicalism within the labor movement.<sup>5</sup>

In response to this massive upsurge of public sentiment to alter the U.S. socio-economic and political *status quo*, on June 12, 1919 Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer requested that congress appropriate \$500,000 to "fight radicalism."<sup>6</sup> On July 19:

Congress appropriated special funds for the Justice Department for prosecuting radicals, and on August 1 Palmer announced creation of the General Intelligence Division (GID), which had the sole function of collecting information on radical activities. Under the leadership of a twenty-four-year-old graduate of Georgetown University Law School named J. Edgar Hoover, the GID began a program of collecting information on radicals from private, local, state and military authorities, set up index files on hundreds of thousands of alleged radicals, began to heavily infiltrate radical organizations, and became a major agent fostering [a] red scare through its practice of sending out sensationalized charges against radicals to major organs of the media, including charges that strikes and race riots had connections to communist activity. The GID's program of general surveillance of radical activity was entirely without Congressional authorization, since money appropriated could only be used for "detection and prosecution of crimes," but the Justice Department got around this by authorizing the GID to secure evidence which might be of use under legislation "which may hereafter be enacted" ...There is some evidence that Hoover...deliberately exploited the radical issue to enhance the power and prestige of the...GID, a tactic [he] would frequently use throughout his career.<sup>7</sup>

Actually, Hoover's prototype of the FBI did far more than "surveille" domestic dissidents. Indeed, it took a lead role in carrying out the so-called Palmer Raids, a draconian sweep of the nation designed to crush all manner of progressive expression in the U.S., from anarchism and radical unionism to socialism and communism. The first of these occurred on November 7, 1919, with GID agents raiding the offices of the Union of Russian Workers (URW) in twelve cities across the country. Although no evidence of criminal activity was ever linked to the URW, more than 650 warrantless arrests were effected; 250 more occurred in Detroit alone on November 8.<sup>8</sup> By December 21, 242 alleged "radical aliens," who had received no token of due process in the matter, were packed aboard the steamship *Buford* and arbitrarily deported to the USSR.<sup>9</sup> As concerns the CP:

The climactic event of the red scare occurred on January 2, 1920, when federal agents under the direction of Hoover and Palmer swooped down on radical hangouts in over thirty cities across the country and arrested somewhere between five and ten thousand persons believed to be alien members of the CP and the [closely related Communist Labor Party] CLP. Those arrested included virtually every local or national leader of the parties, and the raids disrupted the activities of practically every local communist organization in the country...The majority of arrests and break-ins were made without either search or arrest warrants.<sup>10</sup>

In New Jersey, "several 'bombs' were seized which turned out to be iron bowling balls. Throughout the country, only three pistols were seized in raids on what was [claimed] to be dangerous radicals actively plotting a revolution."<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, the January 2 raids were followed up with "minor sweeping operations in various parts of the country during the next six weeks, with the last major raid in Seattle on January 20."<sup>12</sup>

The massive arrests completely overwhelmed detention facilities in many areas. In Detroit, eight hundred persons were detained for up to six days in a dark, windowless, narrow corridor in the city's federal building; they had access to one toilet and were denied food for twenty-four hours...Many of those arrested were beaten or threatened while in detention; in some cases persons coming to visit or bail out those arrested were themselves arrested on suspicion of being communists. Palmer explained such persons were "practically the same as a person found in an active meeting of the [CP] organization."<sup>13</sup>

Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, meanwhile, announced on January 19 that mere membership in the CP would be considered sufficient grounds to warrant deportation of alien residents of the U.S., or bring about the denaturalization of those who had become citizens.<sup>14</sup> An unknown number of party members were shipped abroad before U.S. District Judge George Anderson finally put a stop to the practice in June of 1920, sharply rebuking Palmer and Hoover as having fomented virtual mob rule from the right: "A mob is a mob whether made up of government officials acting under instructions from the Department of Justice or of criminals, loafers and the vicious classes."<sup>15</sup>

Although the judge's ruling effectively ended the federal onslaught against progressive organizations, "by the mid-twenties, most liberals and social reformers had been thoroughly intimidated. But the more lasting significance of the red scare...was its devastation of all the organizations that had been built up so laboriously for twenty years which were capable of providing leadership for any sort of radical political or labor movement - the SPA, the IWW [Industrial Workers of the World, an anarcho-syndicalist union], the NPL [Non-Partisan League], the CP and the CLP...[And the] general climate of repression that prevailed throughout the twenties made it extremely difficult for rebuilding to occur."<sup>16</sup> With regard to the CP in particular, both party and FBI sources concur that this meant a drastic decline in membership over a span of barely more than six months; in October 1919, the CP ranks totaled 27,341, while by April of 1920 they had shrunk to 8,223.<sup>17</sup>



Hence, when Hoover was able to recast the GID as the FBI in 1924, he was very much in a position to sanctimoniously disavow any further “political activities” on the part of his Bureau, not because of any legal or moral considerations, but because he could feel he’d already destroyed radicalism as a viable force in American society. Throughout the 1920s and most of the ‘30s, the director was true to his word, at least insofar as placing a counterintelligence focus upon the CP *per se* was concerned. Rather, the application of such methods became situational, designed to “keep a lid on” party growth by destroying particular projects through which the CP hoped to bolster its shattered credibility. Examples of this include FBI collaboration in the brutal suppression of the party-backed textile workers’ strikes in Passaic, New Jersey (1926); New Bedford, Massachusetts (1927); and Gastonia, North Carolina (1928).<sup>18</sup> Similar handling was accorded CP initiatives to support the Unemployed Movement and Bonus Army during the early ‘30s,<sup>19</sup> while pressure was maintained upon those – such as Eugene Dennis, Jack Barton, Sam Darcy, and Harry Bridges – identified as key party leaders.<sup>20</sup> CP forays into union activities in the ‘30s were also repressed quite harshly, and with Bureau complicity, as in the Imperial Valley, California agricultural workers’ strike (1930) and the Harlan County, Kentucky coal miners’ strike (1931-32).<sup>21</sup>

Still, the decade of the Great Depression provided rather fertile ground for CP recruitment, and by the late 1930s party membership was estimated to be as high as 40,000.<sup>22</sup> Hoover therefore appears to have determined that a resumption of counterintelligence measures against the party would be in order. In this desire, he was aided to some extent by the formation of Representative Martin Dies’ House Un-American Activities Committee in May 1938 and, briefly, by a wave of anti-CP sentiment following the signing of the nazi-Soviet “Mutual Non-Aggression Pact” in August of 1939.<sup>23</sup> Beginning at least as early as September 6, 1939, Hoover utilized a directive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt as the “authorizing basis” for illegal action against the party. The relevant portion of Roosevelt’s instruction reads as follows:

The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of the Department of Justice to take charge of the investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations...This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis...To this end, I request all police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the [FBI] any information obtained by them relating to espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities*, and violations of the neutrality laws [emphasis added].<sup>24</sup>

Using the term “subversive activities” as a virtual synonym for the holding of any left-leaning ideological outlook, arch-reactionary Hoover began to devote an increasing proportion of the Bureau’s energy and resources to “consideration” of organizations such as the CP and Socialist Workers Party (SWP; see next chapter). He encountered no resistance from the Roosevelt administration in such activities, and, as COINTELPRO architect William C. Sullivan would later recall, the methods

of "investigation" included such anti-CP counterintelligence measures as "sending out anonymous letters and phone calls...in 1941."<sup>26</sup> Sullivan also recounted how one of his first assignments as an agent, in December 1941, was to bug and monitor party meetings in Milwaukee.<sup>26</sup> But, by late 1942, the situation had changed appreciably. With the U.S. engaged in World War II, and the Soviet Union a crucial ally in the campaign against Nazi Germany, Roosevelt sought to "clarify" his earlier position. On January 3, 1943 he issued another statement:

On September 6, 1939, I issued a directive providing that the [FBI]...should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations, pointing out that the investigations must be carried out in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis and all information sifted and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility...I am again calling the attention of all law enforcement officers to the request that they report all such information promptly to the nearest field representative of the [FBI].<sup>27</sup>

Despite the president's careful avoidance of using the words "subversive activities," a matter which can be construed as removing whatever authorization Hoover might previously have enjoyed in terms of placing a Bureau emphasis upon operations targeting "communists and communist sympathizers," the director consistently cited this 1943 directive as "further authorization" for his "war on Bolshevism." The FBI's anti-communist activities were thus continued without disruption. For instance, on February 27, 1946, Intelligence Division head D.M. Ladd suggested in a memo to Hoover that the Bureau undertake a campaign to influence public opinion by leaking "educational material" about the CP through "available channels." The purpose of this, according to Ladd, was hardly investigative or designed to stop criminal activity, either real or perceived. Rather, it was expressly to cause the political undermining of party support accruing from such "liberal elements" as churches and labor unions, and to "demonstrate the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country."<sup>28</sup> Hoover approved, and Ladd turned to conservative columnists such as Walter Winchell as well as outright fascist sympathizers like Father John Cronin to carry the word.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, in 1948, the Bureau's role as a bastion of anti-communism, and as the primary vehicle for covert action against the CP, was concretized and to some extent legitimated. Attorney General Tom Clark formulated a Justice Department policy position, shortly after released as a public statement by President Harry Truman, which relied almost entirely upon J. Edgar Hoover's "interpretation" of Roosevelt's earlier posture:

On September 6, 1939, and again on January 8, 1943, a Presidential directive was issued providing that the [FBI] should take charge of investigative work relating to espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities*, and *in related matters*....The [FBI] has fully carried out its responsibilities with respect to the internal security of the United States under these directives...I wish to emphasize at this time that these directives continue in full force and effect...Investigations in matters relating to the internal

security of the United States must be conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis, and by a single central agency. The [FBI] is the agency designated for this purpose. At this time again, I request that all information concerning activities within the United States, its territories or possessions, *believed to be subversive in nature*, be reported promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [emphases added].<sup>30</sup>

After a lengthy review and consultation with his National Security Council, Truman issued a revised version of this statement, broadening his authorization of Bureau action against "subversives, and in related matters," on July 24, 1950.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile, "During HUAC hearings in 1949-50, the FBI resumed its open collaboration with the now-Democratically-controlled committee. In fact, the major purpose of HUAC hearings during these years seemed to be that of 'publicizing information in FBI files.'"<sup>32</sup> As the matter has been put elsewhere:

[The FBI's] efforts to contain radicalism by [such techniques as] leaking derogatory information about prominent radicals and organizations did not constitute the sole political activities of FBI officials. They also sought to reduce the ability of radical organizations to function effectively or recruit new members. For a time, with the intensification of Cold War fears and the rise of McCarthyite politics, these informal efforts bore fruit. In 1948, for example, twelve Communist party leaders were indicted under the Smith Act of 1940 [18 U.S.C.A. § 2385]. Then, under provisions of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 [66 Stat. 163] and the Communist Control Act of 1954 [68 Stat. 1146], Communist, Communist-front, and Communist-action organizations were required to register as foreign agents with the Subversive Activities Control Board and to label their publications as Communist propaganda. Beginning in 1947 and extending throughout the 1950s, moreover, through highly publicized hearings congressional committees (notably the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security) relied directly or indirectly on FBI investigative reports to expose Communist influence in the federal government, in the entertainment industry, in labor unions, and in public schools and universities. Last, FBI investigative reports were employed during the conduct of federal loyalty/security programs to raise doubts about the loyalty of, and deny employment to certain ["subversive"] individuals."<sup>33</sup>

As a result of such harassment, J. Edgar Hoover was able to announce that the anti-communist crusade in which his Bureau was playing such a leading role had been able to bring about a reduction in overall CP membership to approximately 12,000.<sup>34</sup> Apparently realizing that his boast might be construed as an admission that there was "no longer a need" for the Bureau's services in "combatting subversion," he quickly offered a warning that although the number of party members might no longer be large, the public should not allow the information to be used "by the ignorant and apologists and appeasers of communism in our country as minimizing the danger of these subversives in our midst."<sup>35</sup>

The 1953 change from Truman's "liberal" Democratic administration to that of conservative Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower entailed no discernable alteration

in the government's view of the FBI's self-defined mission of "fighting communism." To the contrary, on December 15, 1953, Eisenhower issued a statement in this regard which amounted to little more than a paraphrase of that offered by Truman in 1950.<sup>36</sup> Under Eisenhower, the bulk of FBI anti-CP activity was carried out under the heading COMINFIL (for Communist Infiltration). Within this program, the Bureau supposedly investigated party attempts to "influence" blacks, young people, women, veterans, religion, education, industry and other targets. But, as the Senate Intelligence Committee reported in 1976, although the COMINFIL investigations were supposed to focus only on the CP [in its alleged role as an "agency of a foreign power"] attempts to infiltrate various groups, "in practice the target often became the domestic groups themselves" and the COMINFIL investigations "reached into domestic groups in virtually every area of American political life."<sup>37</sup> There is no evidence that anyone in the Eisenhower administration ever expressed concern over the situation.

Cumulatively, all of these things laid a reasonably solid *post hoc* policy foundation under the Bureau's anti-CP counterintelligence "efforts [which dated from] the early 1940s,"<sup>38</sup> a flow of activity which congealed into COINTELPRO-CP, USA by the mid-'50s. That the new program was devoted *entirely* to extralegal (or clearly illegal) rather than prosecutorial initiatives was both because what the FBI had typically found objectionable about the Party was its politics rather than any defined (or definable) criminal behavior,<sup>39</sup> and even when this was not the case:

High-level FBI officials had always been deeply concerned about prosecuting activities. These concerns increased after 1947 as FBI officials became troubled by the effect of prosecution on the FBI's intelligence-gathering capabilities. For example, over one hundred FBI informants had had to be exposed during the various Smith Act trials and Subversive Activities Control Board proceedings. Then, in a series of important rulings in 1956 and 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court imposed major restrictions on uses of FBI reports, challenged the premise that individual liberties must be sacrificed to safeguard the national security, and thereby threatened to close what for the FBI had been an effective means of propagandizing anti-radical fears.<sup>40</sup>

In any event, Hoover provided a briefing report on the progress of COINTELPRO-CP, USA on May 8, 1958. Although much has subsequently been made of the notion that the Bureau's COINTELPROs were conducted on an entirely autonomous basis, and without the knowledge of higher-ups, Hoover's missive to Attorney General William Rogers and Special Assistant to the President Robert Cutler spelled out quite plainly that for nearly two years the FBI had been engaged in an extensive program "designed to promote disruption within the ranks of the Communist Party." Specifically mentioned were tactics of using infiltrators to spark "acrimonious debates" and "increase factionalism" within the CP, and a campaign of anonymous mailings to generate "disillusionment [with] and defection" from the party.<sup>41</sup> This was followed, six months later, on November 8, by Hoover's provision of a personal briefing to Eisenhower's full cabinet concerning his anti-CP opera-

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: August 28, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: CP, USA - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

During its investigation of the Communist Party, USA, the Bureau has sought to capitalize on incidents involving the Party and its leaders in order to foster factionalism, bring the Communist Party (CP) and its leaders into disrepute before the American public and cause confusion and dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members of the CP.

Generally, the above action has constituted harassment rather than disruption, since, for the most part, the Bureau has set up particular incidents, and the attack has been from the outside. At the present time, however, there is existing within the CP a situation resulting from the developments at the Sixth Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union and the Government's attack on the Party externally through prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 which is made to order for an all-out, disruptive attack against the CP from within. In other words, the Bureau is in a position to initiate, on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence program against the CP, not by harassment from the outside, which might only serve to bring the various factions together, but by feeding and fostering from within the internal fight currently raging.

We have been considering possible courses to implement such a program and, at the present time, we are actively working on the following course:

1) The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is making an all-out effort to win over CP members who have become disillusioned with Stalinist communism. SWP members are distributing copies of "The Militant" (SWP publication) at CP rallies and meetings and are contacting individual CP members in an attempt to split

Enclosures

Kickoff: The document which initiated COINTELPRO - CP, USA.

tions. Although the director's exposition could hardly be described as exhaustive, he utilized a classified ("Top Secret") 36-page booklet which described COINTELPRO-CP, USA as follows:

To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United States, we have a...program designed to intensify confusion and dissatisfaction among its members. During the past few years, the program has been most effective. Selective

informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial issues within the Party. In the process, they may be able to advance themselves to high positions. The Internal Revenue Service was furnished the names and addresses of Party functionaries...Based on this information, investigations have been instituted in 262 possible income tax evasion cases. Anticommunist literature and simulated Party documents were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen members.<sup>42</sup>

As Robert Justin Goldstein has observed, "Although the precise results of FBI efforts cannot be determined, between 1957 and 1959, what was left of the CP was virtually destroyed by factional infighting. Even as the CP collapsed into a tiny sect of a few thousand members, FBI COINTELPRO activities increased and expanded."<sup>43</sup> When the political winds blew liberal Democrats back into the executive, replacing Eisenhower's Republicans in 1961, the COINTELPRO *status quo* was maintained. On January 10, 1961 Hoover apprized the incoming Kennedy administration of the anti-CP COINTELPRO by sending identical letters to Secretary of State (designate) Dean Rusk and Attorney General (designate) Robert Kennedy. These read in part that some of the Bureau's "more effective" anti-communist counterintelligence operations included:

...penetration of the Party at all levels with security informants; use of various techniques to keep the Party off-balance and disillusion individual communists concerning communist ideology; investigation of every known member of the CPUSA in order to determine whether he should be detained in the event of a national emergency...As an adjunct to our regular investigative operations, we carry on a carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA...In certain instances, we have been successful in preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate organizations and have discredited others.<sup>44</sup>

Neither Rusk nor Robert Kennedy – nor John F. Kennedy, for that matter – appear to have asked any questions on this matter, or suggested that perhaps the Bureau was exceeding its investigative mandate in launching intentionally disruptive direct action operations against a domestic political formation. The same may be said for President Lyndon B. Johnson. Under his administration, subsequently admitted COINTELPRO operations numbered 230 in 1964, 220 in 1965, 240 in 1966, 180 in 1967, and 123 in 1968.<sup>45</sup> As concerns the CP:

COINTELPRO activities against the CP continued, with such tactics as informing the news media that the son of a CP couple had been arrested for drugs and that the wife of a CP leader had purchased a new car as an example of the "prosperity" of the CP leadership. In 1964, the FBI planted a document in the car of a leading New York CP official that made him appear an informer; subsequently the official (who had been convicted under the Smith Act and ordered to register as a communist by the [Subversive Activities Control Board]) was expelled from the party. A 1965 FBI memo reporting the expulsion stated that the affair "crippled the activities of the New York State communist organization and the turmoil within the party contin-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**Memorandum**

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: HOODWINK  
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

DATE: October 4, 1966

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - [REDACTED]

Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Bishop  
Mr. Casper  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. Felt  
Mr. Gale  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

**PURPOSE:**

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend a long-range counterintelligence program designed to provoke a dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra under the code name of Hoodwink.

**OBJECTIVES:**

A dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra would cause disruption of both groups by having each expend their energies, time, and money attacking the other. This would help neutralize the activities of both groups which are detrimental to this country.

**BACKGROUND:**

La Cosa Nostra has no sympathy for the communists. The Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra come in contact with each other in the labor field where hoodlums operate businesses under "sweatshop" conditions. By making it appear that the Party is attacking hoodlum labor practices, over a period of time we could provoke a bitter dispute between the two organizations.

The New York Office has recommended a specific technique to initiate this program. This technique consists of anonymously forwarding one leaflet to a local La Cosa Nostra leader attacking the labor practices of one of his enterprises. The leaflet would ostensibly be published by a local Party unit. A note with the leaflet would give the impression that it has received wide circulation.

Enclosure - Sent 10-6-66 [REDACTED] MCT-41

1 - Special Investigative (Route through for review)

TJD:jee

SELECTED COPY SENT BY LETTER 12-4-73

REG 10  
MCT-41  
100 - 1045000  
18 OCT 19 1966

SP-11-101  
5-9-67  
[REDACTED]

Memorandum initiating Operation Hoodwink.

ues to this date." The FBI created a fictional organization in 1965 entitled the Committee for Expansion of Socialist Thought in America, which purported to attack the CP from the "Marxist right." As a result of other COINTELPRO activity, an FBI internal memo stated in 1965, "many meeting places formerly used on a regular basis by the Communists have been barred from their use"...Frequently actions which came under the CP COINTELPRO label were directed at non-CP groups and individuals. Thus, the FBI targeted the entire Unitarian Society of Cleveland in 1964 because the minister and some members circulated a petition

1 - DeLoach  
1 - W.C. Sullivan  
10/5/66

SAC, New York

REC 18  
Director, FBI 100-146533-1

1 - Mr. Baumgardner  
1 - [redacted]

**HOODWINK  
(INTERNAL SECURITY)**

18

ReNYlet captioned "Communist Party, USA; Counter-intelligence Program; IS - C; (La Cosa Nostra)," dated 9/22/66. Hoodwink is the code word designated for this program.

New York is authorized to mail the anonymous letter and leaflet set out in relet as the beginning of a long-range program to cause a dispute between La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). To strengthen this alleged attack, add a last sentence to the leaflet: "Let's show the hoodlums and the bosses that the workers are united against sweatshops."

Take the usual precautions to insure this mailing cannot be associated with the Bureau and advise of tangible results. New York should also submit follow-up recommendations to continue this program.

The Party has been the subject of recent bombings, a typical hoodlum technique. Consider a spurious Party statement blaming the LCN for the bombings because of "Party efforts on behalf of the workers." This statement could be aimed at specific LCN members if appropriate.

In developing this program, thought should also be given to initiating spurious LCN attacks on the CPUSA, so that each group would think the other was mounting a campaign against it.

The Bureau very much appreciates New York's careful analysis of this program and the initial "low-key" technique suggested.

1 - Special Investigative (Route through for review) - detail  
TJD:jcs  
(8)

NOTE: See memorandum Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, 10/5/66 captioned as above, prepared by TJD:jcs

3016 - 1966  
OCT 7 1966

Memorandum authorizing Operation Hoodwink. Senior FBI officials could not have helped but be aware that the proposed plan could easily result in the murder of CP leaders and organizers. This became a standard COINTELPRO tactic.

calling for the abolition of HUAC and because the church gave office space to a group the FBI did not like. In 1965, the FBI tried to block a City Council campaign of a lawyer who had defended Smith Act defendants. In 1966, the FBI tried to get the Texas State Alcohol Beverage Control Commission to raid a Democratic Party fundraising affair because two Democratic candidates who would be present had participated in anti-war and anti-HUAC activities.<sup>46</sup>



Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-446533) **CONFIDENTIAL** DATE: 3/22/68  
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-159407) (P)  
 SUBJECT: HOODWINK (INTERNAL SECURITY)

*12-4-73*  
*24/01*  
 [Redacted]

Re New York letters to Bureau, dated 1/30/68 and 2/27/68, and Philadelphia airtels to Bureau, dated 2/14/68 and 3/4/68.

In connection with the anonymous letter sent to Teamster Union locals in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area, as referred to in above-referenced communications, the results of this mailing can be summarized as follows:

*1*  
*CGS*  
*1/8/68*

1. [Redacted]
  2. [Redacted]
  3. [Redacted]
  4. [Redacted]
- W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America, 36 West 17th Street, New York, New York [Redacted] at [Redacted]

*10/27/68*  
*100-159407*  
*NY PH*  
*100-159407*  
*100-159407*

5. [Redacted] (This anonymous letter, in addition to being sent to Teamster Union in Philadelphia, was also sent to Teamster Union [Redacted])

2 - Bureau (RM) EX-110 REC-71  
 2 - Philadelphia (100-49252) (RM)  
 2 - New York (41)  
 (1 - 92-2300-Sub P) (LCN) (221)

JJE:ptp (6)  
 Classified by 17207  
 Exempt from GDS, Category 1  
 Date of Declassification Indefinite  
 MAR 26 1968  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operation Hoodwink continues. As can be seen in this document the FBI was not content with attempting to use only "La Cosa Nostra" to do its dirty work against the CP. From the Bureau perspective, reactionary unions would do just as well. (Memo continues on pages 45 and 46.)

Hence, having received what amounted to concurrence from at least four successive presidents that illegal operations against the CP were "justified," and would therefore be condoned and hushed up, Hoover escalated the level of tactics employed within COINTELPRO-CP, USA to include attempts to orchestrate the assas-

NY 100-159407

[REDACTED] in Philadelphia.)

Inasmuch as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] New York office (NYO) proposes that another anonymous letter be sent to the same above-mentioned Philadelphia Teamster Union Locals.

The NYO requests Bureau permission to prepare the following anonymous letter, Xerox copies of which would be mailed to the same Teamster Union locals in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area which were sent the first anonymous letter:

"March 22, 1968

"Dear Union Boss:

"I'm the loyal union man who wrote you around the end of January and I've got more news for you.

"You'll remember that I told you then that I heard from my Commie brother-in-law that the leaders of his party had been in Moscow and among the instructions they came back with was to try to get rid of the hoodlums in truck and dock unions in this country.

"Well, I was talking with my brother-in-law a few nights ago and he asked me how things were going in my Teamster local and I said O.K. He told me he knew that there were a lot of gangsters in my union but he said things would be changing for the best shortly. He told me that in February some of the leaders of his party were in Hungary meeting party people from other countries and it came up again about how his party is going to clean up the gangster controlled unions in the United States. I told him he was all wet but I didn't use those words.

"I'm afraid these Commies mean business so watch out.

"Thanks to the free use of a copy machine I can get the word around about this.

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sination of "key communist leaders." By 1964, this took the form, as is revealed by the accompanying October 4, 1966 memo from counterintelligence specialist Fred J. Baumgardner to Bureau Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, of "Operation Hoodwink." The plan was to provoke a "dispute" between organized crime and the CP and, as the means by which "La Cosa Nostra" tended to resolve conflicts was rather well known (even to FBI officials), the desired outcome of the scheme is not mysterious. As is readily apparent in the following memo, from Hoover and dated October 10, 1966 the concept was quickly approved and implemented. Finally, as is demonstrated by the third document in this series, from the SAC New York to

NY 100-159407

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 "Don't let the Commies take over."

"A Patriotic American and Union Man"

With respect to the above letter, it is a fact that three leaders of the Communist Party, USA (CP,USA) were in Budapest, Hungary in February and March, 1968 to attend an International Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, and accounts of their scheduled attendance appeared in newspaper articles. Two of these three leaders have since returned to the United States. However, the information in the letter that in Hungary "it came up again about how his party is going to clean up the gangster controlled unions in the United States" has no basis in fact. A few typing errors would also be inserted into this letter.

Should the Bureau approve of this letter for anonymous mailing, it will be typed on commercial stationery, updated, and Xerox copies of this letter would be made on commercial stationery, and it will be mailed from New York City to the same Teamster Union locals in Philadelphia to which the first anonymous letter was sent. The original of this letter would not be sent and it would be retained in instant file.

The NYO is again hopeful that the above letter, though it contains some information without basis in fact, will reach criminal elements in the Teamsters Union and it might serve to start a dispute between these criminal elements and the CP,USA.

- 3 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hoover, dated January 22, 1968, Operation Hoodwink was not only continued over a sustained period, but broadened to include a range of entities outside organized crime as well. Although, unlike COINTELPROs directed against other organizations (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7), there is no evidence that any CP member was actually killed as a result of Operation Hoodwink, this is obviously not for lack of the FBI's having tried to make things turn out otherwise.

Perhaps ironically, it was Hoover's personal obsession with the CP - undoubtedly developed over more than four decades of trying unsuccessfully to destroy it while constructing his personal anti-communist empire - which led him to insist on

PH 49252

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that a Negro Business Agent of Teamsters [REDACTED] had been fairly close to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was in Philadelphia and affiliated with [REDACTED]. He volunteered to make this Business Agent (not identified by name) available for interview. He described this individual as a "weak character" and said he thought "this guy will cop out and maybe even work for you."

Philadelphia will explore the possibilities of interviewing above-described Business Agent and will make appropriate recommendations to the Bureau. It is noted, however, that [REDACTED]

details are being furnished separately to the Bureau and New York under the Counterintelligence Program caption.

New York is requested to review the results of this contact with [REDACTED] as set out under instant caption and under the Counterintelligence Program caption, and to make additional suggestions or recommend appropriate follow-up action.

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

The cultivation of informers, usually of "weak character," was a staple of COINTELPRO - CP, USA and similar FBI undertakings.

going ahead with repression of CP, USA even after it had accomplished its objectives, and to thereby foster a bitter factionalism not only within the target organization, but within the FBI itself. By the second half of the 1960s, the CP had become so debilitated by the combination of unremitting counterintelligence operations aimed at it (in 1975, the Justice Department admitted the FBI had engaged in 1,388 separate COINTELPRO actions against the CP between 1956 and 1971) and its own ideological contradictions that its membership had shrunk from more than 80,000 in 1946 to

less than 2,800. Of these, fully half were categorized as "inactive," while the remainder averaged 49 years of age and were considered "totally ineffectual" by the Bureau's own investigators.<sup>47</sup> William C. Sullivan, under whose immediate authority the COINTELPROs fell, therefore sought to reallocate his resources to focus upon "the mainstream of revolutionary action" in the U.S., a trend he associated (correctly enough) with the Black and *Puertorriqueño* liberation movements and the new left.<sup>48</sup> Hoover adamantly refused, and so, as Sullivan recounts:

Even though the CPUSA was finished we kept after them. Early in 1969 we learned that the Soviet Union planned on sending [CP head Gus] Hall a gift of some expensive stallions and mares which Hall planned to ship to his brother's farm in Minnesota. They expected to breed thoroughbreds and sell the colts to help fill the coffers of the party. On learning about the impending gift to Hall, one of the imaginative men in my division came up with an idea [which Hoover quickly approved]. He contacted a veterinarian, and without telling him what it was about, got the doctor to agree to inject the horses with a substance that would sterilize them before they were taken off the ship in New York.<sup>49</sup>

It was not a disagreement over whether endeavors such as COINTELPRO were warranted or should be pursued, but against whom and by what prioritization. Sullivan had come to view such anti-CP activities as "the horse caper" as being largely childish, nonsensical or misdirected, eventually informing Hoover that, "if there is no longer a Communist problem we should not spend money on it. In fact, I have for some years been taking men off Communist work in the field and here at Headquarters and putting them on some important work."<sup>50</sup> Meanwhile, he had become actively involved in a Nixon administration planning group headed by Tom Huston and intended to bring about greater coordination among U.S. intelligence agencies, "upgrade the effectiveness" of domestic counterintelligence activities, and ultimately to depose "dinosaurs" such as Hoover (this is taken up in more detail in Chapter 6). The director sensed what was going on. Hence, when Sullivan finally went public on October 12, 1970 with his contention that the CP posed "no significant threat to national security,"<sup>51</sup> Hoover used this "insubordination" to force the younger man into retirement.<sup>52</sup> A significant portion of the Bureau supported Sullivan, and there is evidence that only Hoover's timely death on May 2, 1972 ended a process which was rapidly eroding the carefully crafted FBI cohesion the director had built up over the preceding half-century.

## Chapter 3

# COINTELPRO – SWP

As long as [anti-communism] remains national policy, an...important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique, and if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure establishment of this mission.

– The Doolittle Committee Report –  
1954

As with the CP, “modern” FBI counterintelligence against the Socialist Workers Party (SWP, founded in 1938), began at least as early as the beginning of the 1940s. A result was that one of the two Smith Act prosecutions brought by the government on the basis of Bureau-assembled evidence during World War II was against this party.<sup>1</sup> As Howard Zinn frames the matter, “Only one organized socialist group opposed the war unequivocally. This was the Socialist Workers Party. The Espionage Act of 1917 [C 30 Title 1, 40 Stat. 217, *et seq.*], still on the books, applied to wartime statements. But, in 1940, with the United States not yet at war, Congress passed the Smith Act. This took Espionage Act prohibitions against talk or writing that would lead to refusal of duty in the armed forces and applied them to peacetime. The Smith Act also made it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence, or join any group that advocated this, or publish anything with such ideas. In Minneapolis in 1943, eighteen members of the [SWP] were convicted of belonging to a party whose ideas, expressed in its Declaration of Principles, and in the *Communist Manifesto*, were said to violate the Smith Act. They were sentenced to prison terms, and the Supreme Court refused to review their case.”<sup>2</sup>

When the high court finally did get around to considering the Smith Act in 1950, it was in order to allow Justice Robert H. Jackson – fresh from a stint in Nuremberg prosecuting nazis for, among other things, their legalistic persecution of leftists during the 1930s – to articulate America’s “liberal” philosophical alternative in handling “subversives.” Utterly ignoring the act’s proscriptions on anti-draft agitation, Jackson held that “it was no violation of free speech to convict Communists for conspiring to teach or advocate the forcible overthrow of the government, even if no clear and apparent danger [of such overthrow] could be proved. To await the danger becoming apparent, he argued, would mean that “Communist plotting is protected during the period of incubation; its preliminary stages of organization and preparation are immune from the law; the government can move only after imminent action is manifest, when it would, of course, be too late.” Thus, for the supreme court,

“some legal formula that will secure [the] existing order against radicalism” was called for.<sup>3</sup>

The formula Justice Jackson sought was already at hand. In 1948, Republican congressmen Karl Mundt of South Dakota and Richard M. Nixon of California reported a draft bill out of Nixon’s House Un-American Activities Committee, calling for the registration of all CP members as well as other radicals. Liberal Democrats in the Senate objected vociferously, and President Truman ultimately vetoed the legislation. As it turned out, the Democrats’ problem was not with its clear totalitarian implications, but that it hadn’t been heavy-handed *enough* in its original form. Among themselves, senate liberals such as Estes Kefauver and Hubert Humphrey supported an alternate version proposed by Nevada’s reactionary Pat McCarran which included provisions for “the ultimate weapon of repression: concentration camps to intern potential troublemakers on the occasion of some loosely-defined future Internal Security Emergency.”<sup>4</sup> As what became the Internal Security Act of 1950 (also known as the McCarran Act, after its sponsor) went through committee, Humphrey became obsessed that it might be “overly diluted,” grousing openly that those herded into the planned camps might retain even the most elementary rights such as that of *habeas corpus*. Allowing the politically objectionable to retain *any* rights, he felt, would make for a “weaker bill, not a bill to strike stronger blows at the Communist menace, but weaker blows.”<sup>5</sup> He needn’t have worried; the act passed relatively intact, and was sustained over Truman’s veto.<sup>6</sup>

In such a climate, the FBI was able to continue its *ad hoc* counterintelligence operations against the SWP throughout the 1950s.<sup>7</sup> Unlike the situation with the CP, however, these were never consolidated into a formal COINTELPRO during that decade, a situation which seems largely due to J. Edgar Hoover’s personal assessment that the term “socialist” was somewhat less extreme (and therefore less of a priority) than the word “communist.” Nonetheless, by 1961 – with a tacit green light from the newly-installed Kennedy administration on his anti-CP COINTELPRO already in hand – the director determined it would be both timely and appropriate to proceed in the same fashion against the SWP. Hence, on October 12 of that year he dispatched a memorandum to several field offices instructing them to begin the new “disruption program.” The rationale for this, according to Hoover, was that the SWP:

...has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through the running of candidates for public office and strongly directing and/or supporting such causes as Castro’s Cuba and integration problems arising in the South. The SWP has been in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups...It is felt that a disruption program along similar lines [to COINTELPRO-CP,USA] could be initiated against the SWP on a very selective basis. One of the purposes of this program would be to alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels

as interpreted by Leon Trotsky...It may be desirable to expand the program after the effects have been evaluated.<sup>8</sup>

One of the first "tasks" undertaken through COINTELPRO-SWP was to attempt to abort the judicial process in the case of the so-called Monroe defendants, a group of blacks and a white supporter who had followed the leadership of Monroe, North Carolina NAACP leader Robert Williams in adopting a posture of armed self-defense against ku klux klan terror in 1961.<sup>9</sup> The SWP extended its cooperation to the NAACP in establishing a multi-racial "Committee to Aid the Monroe Defendants" (CAMD) to put together a legal effort through which to obtain acquittals on the serious charges resultantly leveled against the accused. The initial expressed purpose of CAMD was "to fight the anticipated extradition order for [Williams' assistant Mae] Mallory, who was in Ohio, and Williams, whose whereabouts were unknown, and to raise bail money for the three defendants in Monroe."<sup>10</sup> As can be readily seen in the accompanying document, dated June 14, 1962, the Bureau immediately set out to break up this emerging support network, and thereby sought to destroy or at least seriously impair the defendants' right to mount an effective legal defense. This aspect of COINTELPRO-SWP was continued in full force after Mallory was extradited and the group went to trial facing capital charges in 1964. Under the circumstances, they were convicted, although this was later overturned on appeal.<sup>11</sup>

On other fronts, "The Bureau would investigate on the slightest pretext. When Lori Paton, a high school student in New Jersey, wrote to the Young Socialist Alliance (the youth branch of the Socialist Workers Party) for information as part of a project for her social studies class, agents visited the high school to ask about her."<sup>12</sup>

Some of the COINTELPRO activities against the SWP - revealed in Bureau documents that were released in 1975 in connection with a lawsuit filed by the Political Rights Defense Fund - were very inventive indeed. In one instance, the Bureau learned that Walter Elliott, scoutmaster of a Boy Scout troop in East Orange, New Jersey, whose wife was a member of the party, had said he considered the Scouts a better way of influencing young minds than joining the SWP. The Newark Field Office, although its files contained "no public source information of a subversive nature concerning Elliott," reacted by persuading the Boy Scouts not to renew his troop's charter.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, COINTELPRO-SWP seems to have focused itself in the educational and electoral arenas. For instance, as is reflected in the accompanying memo from the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Denver to the Director, FBI, dated May 5, 1965, the Bureau produced and sent a phony letter ostensibly signed by "A Concerned Mother" as part of a disinformation campaign designed to ruin the candidacies of SWP members Barbara Taplin and Howard Wallace for the Denver School Board. Again, as is shown in the accompanying October 1, 1968 memo from the Phoenix SAC to the FBI director, the Bureau utilized similar disinformational techniques - in an effort the SAC confused with simultaneous operations being conducted under the rubric of COINTELPRO-New Left - to bring about the dismissal of Arizona State





F B I	
Date: 5/4/65	
To: _____	
Via: AIRTEL _____	
TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM:	SAC, DENVER
SUBJECT:	COMMUNIST PARTY, USA CONFIDENTIAL PARTY PROGRAM INTERNAL SECURITY - C (SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY)
Re Denver letter 4/20/65 and Bureau letter 4/28/65 captioned as above.	
Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy each of articles appearing in the 4/20/65 issue of the "Denver Post" and 5/4/65 issue of the "Rocky Mountain News" concerning upcoming Denver school board election.	
Referenced Denver letter contained information that ALLEN TAPLIN, Branch Organizer of the Denver Branch, SWP, was running for the Denver School Board, which election is being held 5/10/65. However, BARBARA TAPLIN and HOWARD WALLACE, both members of the Denver Branch, SWP, have filed their candidacy for election to the school board instead of ALLEN TAPLIN as previously reported.	
Bureau authority is requested prior to 5/11/65 for Denver to send the revised suggested letter and enclosed newspaper clippings to the President of the Denver School Board in an effort to prevent these people from being elected.	
The suggested letter is as follows:	

COINTELPRO against the SWP in Denver.

party newspaper were stolen from the headquarters of the Michigan [SWP]. A few months later, the home of an [SWP] organizer was robbed. Valuables were ignored, but membership lists and internal party bulletins were stolen. The burglaries remain unsolved...If we ask who might be interested in obtaining the stolen material, a plausible hypothesis suggests itself. The natural hypothesis gains

"Dear Sir:

"Recently while discussing with a friend the various candidates for the upcoming Denver School Board Election, I observed the names of Mrs. Barbara Taplin, 1631 Pearl Street, and Howard Wallace, 1900 Race Street, Denver, Colorado as candidates for the Denver School Board with their political parties listed as SWP.

"I vividly recall that Mr. Allen Taplin who is listed in the 'Post' article dated 4/25/65 as the husband of Mrs. Barbara Taplin, as the unsuccessful Socialist Workers Party candidate for the United States House of Representatives in 1961. In an article of the 'Denver Post' which I am enclosing for your information, this organization is listed as both subversive and on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. The article also hints that Mr. Taplin is a communist.

"Being a conscientious voter and mother of school age children, I feel that someone should do something to prevent persons of this sort from being elected to the school board.

"Although I am much in favor of publicly opposing these people, I feel it best for my family's sake that I withhold my name and leave this situation in your capable hands.

"A Concerned Mother"

If authority is granted to mail this letter, instructions concerning previous approved letter will be followed.

---

**Text of bogus letter targeting Taplin and Wallace (above). Memo initiating action against SWP member Morris Starsky which cost him his faculty position at Arizona State University (facing page).**

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support from the fact that persons whose names appear on the stolen lists were then contacted and harassed by FBI agents, and a personal letter of resignation from the party, apparently stolen from the headquarters, was transmitted by the FBI to the

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ( ) (b) (7)

DATE: 10/1/68

FROM : SAC, PHOENIX ( ) (b) (7)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

Reylet, 7/1/68.

1. Potential Counterintelligence Action

MORRIS J. STARSKY, by his actions, has continued to spotlight himself as a target for counterintelligence action. He and his wife were both named as presidential electors by and for the Socialist Workers Party when the SWP in August, 1968, gained a place on the ballot in Arizona. In addition they have signed themselves as treasurer and secretary respectively of the Arizona SWP. Professor STARSKY's status at Arizona State University may be affected by the outcome of his pending trial on charges of disturbing the peace. He is alleged to have used violent, abusive and obscene language against the Assistant Managing Director of Gammage Auditorium at ASU during memorial services for MARTIN LUTHER KING last April. Trial is now scheduled for 10/8/68 in Justice Court, Tempe, Arizona.

A recommendation for counterintelligence action against STARSKY will be submitted by separate letter.

(b) (7)

Bureau approval is requested to mail a copy of the enclosed anonymous letter to each member of the faculty committee which is hearing the charges against STARSKY. This committee is sitting in the Law School on the ASU campus and is composed of the following faculty members:

1. Dr. ROSS R. RICE, Chairman.
2. JOHN A. COCHRAN
3. RICHARD W. EFFLAND
4. JOHN P. DECKER
5. WALLACE ADAMS, Chairman of the Faculty Assembly.

ANONYMOUS LETTER TO MEMBERS  
OF THE FACULTY COMMITTEE ON  
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE  
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

Dear Sir:

It seems appropriate that you should be informed of one of the most recent activities of Morris J. Starsky. Starsky learned of a suicide attempt by one of his close campus co-workers, David Murphy. Feeling that Murphy could no longer be trusted as a member of the campus socialist group, Starsky demanded that Murphy return all literature and other materials belonging to the socialist group. Murphy refused to give Starsky a quantity of socialist literature in his possession until Starsky would pay him a sum slightly in excess of \$50 which was owed for telephone calls charged by Starsky to Murphy's telephone. Morris Starsky was indignant at Murphy's independent attitude and at 2:00 A. M. on April 5, 1970 he, accompanied by his wife Pamela and two young male associates, invaded Murphy's apartment and under threat demanded return of the socialist literature. When Murphy refused unless Starsky paid the phone bill, Starsky told him that his two associates would beat him unmercifully. Murphy, convalescing from a recent hospital stay, was under great fear of bodily harm or death and surrendered the literature.

I find this episode interesting. Where did Starsky learn of the effectiveness of operating into a person's home at 2:00 A. M.? Also, of utilizing four persons to threaten the health or life of someone? Is this an example of academic socialism? Should the ASU students enjoy the guidance of such an instructor? It seems to me that this type of activity is something that Himmler or Berni could accept with pride. If Starsky did not enjoy the protection and sanctuary of his position, he would be properly punished for such a totalitarian venture. Unfortunately, Murphy is too fearful to testify against Starsky and his associates.

/s/ A concerned ASU alumnus

Text of one of the bogus letters by which Starsky's dismissal was accomplished.

Civil Service Commission. Information that has since been obtained about FBI activities, including burglaries over many years, lends further substantiation to the conclusion that the FBI was engaged in one of its multifarious endeavors to undermine and disrupt activities that fall beyond the narrow bounds of the established political consensus...The Detroit events recall another incident which, with its aftermath, became the major news story of 1974. But it would be misleading to compare the Detroit burglaries to the Watergate caper...[T]he Detroit burglaries are a far more serious matter...[I]n Detroit it was the political police of the national government which, in their official function, were engaged in disrupting the "sanctity of the democratic process," not merely a gang of bunglers working "outside the system."<sup>18</sup>

The FBI's subversion of the electoral process through COINTELPRO-SWP has had a number of effects which go far beyond the question of who was allowed to win in a given race. A classic example concerns the 1966 candidacy of SWP member Judy White for governor of the state of New York. In a memo dated October 24, 1966, the SAC, New York informed Hoover that the New York field office had been successful in undertaking a disinformation campaign which resulted in the state legislature's changing of the New York election laws to preclude anyone under 30 years of age (which White was at the time) not only from being seated as governor, but from campaigning for the governorship as well. The intent of this, from the FBI point of view, was to block the SWP from having a forum.<sup>16</sup> The law, as altered by the Bureau, remains in effect a quarter-century later.

While COINTELPRO-SWP appears never to have entailed anything approaching the level of hoped for violence evident in COINTELPRO-CP, USA's Operation Hoodwink, or the concretely lethal dimension of several other COINTELPROs, there is at least one instance in which the FBI attempted to set an SWP candidate up to suffer physical harm. This concerns the Party's 1968 presidential candidate, Fred Halstead, who incorporated a trip to visit U.S. forces in Vietnam into his campaign. In a memo dated July 23, 1968, the SAC, New York proposed to the FBI director that the Bureau plant inflammatory information in the military press with the idea that this might cause G.I.s to physically attack Halstead upon his arrival.<sup>17</sup> Although the idea was approved on July 25, there is no indication service personnel responded in the desired manner. According to Halstead, he was instead "received in a friendly and courteous way. Never in a hostile way."<sup>18</sup>

Other anti-SWP efforts followed the pattern, established in the CAMD case, of attempting to foil alliances, real or potential, between the Party and other organizations. Notably, this included the spiking of a tentative association between the SWP in New York and the then-emergent Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) headed by Malcolm X in 1965. In a memo dated June 15, 1965, the SAC, New York informed director Hoover that, "SWP influence on the followers of Malcolm X [can] be disrupted by emphasizing the atheism of the SWP as opposed to the basic religious orientation of the [OAAU]." Hoover quickly approved, and by August the New York SAC was reporting that, "It is believed probable that the disintegrating relations between the SWP and [the OAAU] can be attributed to the disruptive tactic authorized...and will result in a continued loss of influence by the SWP among this group of Negroes."<sup>19</sup>

As is evident from the accompanying memo from the SAC, New York to Hoover, dated February 13, 1970, the Bureau also went to considerable lengths - including the pornographic - in using disinformation to undermine coalitions between the SWP and new left anti-war organizations such as the New Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam ("Mobe" or "New Mobe") during the late 1960s and early '70s. As examples of the kind of activity involved:

In August 1968 the New York FBI office sent [an] anonymous letter to 68 "new left

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
*Memorandum*

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI ( )      DATE: 2/13/70

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK ( )

SUBJECT: SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY -  
DISTURBANCE PROGRAM  
IS-SWP

ReNYlet, 12/30/69.

Enclosed for the Bureau is a copy of an unsigned leaflet entitled "Fly United?", mailed this past week to some 250 selected individuals and organizations in New Left and related groups under the COINTELPRO at New York with prior Bureau authority.

The leaflet is designed to cause disruption in the peace movement, primarily in the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and to minimize the growing influence of the SWP in the movement. It is also designed to cause consternation and confusion in the SWP itself.

The enclosed has been marked "Obscene" because of its contents. The copy program on the leaflet has been written in the jargon of the New Left, necessitating the use of a certain amount of profanity.

Copies of the leaflet have been mailed to members of the SWP, its youth group the Young Socialist Alliance, the Student Mobilization Committee, CP USA, DCA and other groups.


No tangible results have been detected at this early date, although one source, [redacted] has attributed the leaflet to dissident elements in the New Mobilization Committee.

The Bureau will be kept advised of reported results.

**Memorandum proposing action to drive a wedge between the SWP and "New Mobe," one of the New Left's array of anti-war organizations.**

groups" and "peace groups." The purpose of the FBI letter was to "widen the split" between the YSA and a prominent anti-war group called the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam ("SMC"). The letter accused the YSA of disrupting the SMC and of opposing the only really effective elements within the SMC. There is testimony to the effect that the letter caused great trouble within the YSA. The trouble related to the suspicion and worry as to who would write such a

# FLY UNITED?



# BALLS!

Bro 14. It's time to pull the chain, brothers and sisters. If the peace movement in America is to survive, the crap influence of the Socialist Worker's Party and its bastard youth group - Young Socialist Alliance - must be flushed from New Mobe base and for all. Slighter zeros like Freddie Halstead and Harry RING, both members of the SWP Nat'l Committee, must be dumped. Let's get rid of the Carol Higgins, Gus Benedikt and the James Manganis along with other SWP shits! NO SWP AND NO SWP BALLS! Write New Mobe today at Suite 509, 1019 Vermont Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

**Write Today!**

**Pornographic cartoon mailed to selected Mobe organizers in order to exacerbate tensions between them and the SWP.**

letter and what its effects would be. In September 1968, to further embarrass the SWP and the YSA, the FBI sent a follow-up anonymous letter. This letter ridiculed these organizations for cowardice in the demonstration at the 1968 Democratic Party convention in Chicago. The letter implored the SWP and YSA to "stay home" on future occasions of this kind...The SWP and YSA participated in an anti-war group called the National Mobilization Committee ("MOBE"). In February 1969 the FBI's



New York office sent out an anonymous letter ridiculing MOBE's activities at the so-called "counter-inaugural" that took place in Washington, D.C. at the same time as President Nixon's inauguration in January 1969. The letter was sent to members of various anti-war groups, including the SWP and YSA. There is testimony that this letter aggravated certain problems within MOBE. MOBE ceased operation in February 1969...The next FBI effort involved an anti-war parade in New York City that took place on April 5, 1969. This parade was jointly sponsored by the SWP, YSA and SMC. Since it was to involve both civilians and military personnel, the sponsors of the parade considered it particularly important to keep the parade peaceful, so as not to draw the military personnel into trouble with the law. Just before the parade, the FBI's New York office distributed an anonymous leaflet entitled "Notes from the Sand Castle" (the latter term being slang for Columbia University), accusing the "SWP-YSA-SMC coalition" of cowardice in not being willing to fight the "pigs" (police) and to accumulate "battle wounds." The FBI's expressed purpose in creating the leaflet was to "disrupt plans for the demonstration and create ill-will between the SWP-YSA and other participating non-Trotskyist groups and individuals." The evidence shows that this communication created difficulties in managing the march...In December 1969 the New York FBI office sent an anonymous obscene leaflet to 230 individuals and organizations urging them to "flush" the SWP and YSA from the successor to MOBE, called New MOBE. From the scope and nature of the operation, the court concludes that it had a disruptive effect of the kind intended by the FBI...In February 1970 the New York FBI office sent a memorandum to various anti-war activists purporting to be written by a member of New MOBE. The FBI's purpose was to "create splits" between the SWP participants and other groups in the New MOBE coalition. The memorandum attacked "the Trotskyites" for taking control of the New MOBE and for resisting the recruitment of blacks. The FBI was aware, through its informant system, of criticism of the SWP about racial imbalance disfavoring blacks. The court concludes that this operation had a disruptive effect of the kind intended by the FBI...The SMC planned a conference at Catholic University, Washington, D.C. in February 1971. An internal FBI memorandum recommended efforts to bring the university's attention to the SWP/YSA's alleged domination of the SMC, and to disrupt the conference. The FBI distributed an anonymous leaflet in advance of the conference date, entitled "Trotskyists Welcomed at Catholic University!" The leaflet questioned whether the Catholic Church had been "duped again," in allowing its facilities to be used by the SMC...This operation was carried out under the COINTELPRO-New Left program. The evidence shows other instances of FBI operations designed to disrupt the SWP [in this regard].<sup>20</sup>

Although COINTELPRO-SWP had been officially terminated by the time its existence was revealed through a court-ordered release of documents to NBC reporter Carl Stern on March 7, 1974,<sup>21</sup> the *New York Times* reported two years later (five years after the "termination") that FBI infiltration and disruption of the Party was continuing unabated.<sup>22</sup> For instance:

An FBI report dated June 20, 1973 [i.e.: after COINTELPRO-SWP supposedly ended], refers to the FBI having obtained "items stolen from the YSA local office."

The reference is to certain file cards removed by [Timothy] Redfearn from a private file box. Redfearn regularly obtained confidential documents from the YSA, so that the FBI could copy them. Redfearn would then return the documents to their original location. In a report dated January 22, 1974, the FBI rated Redfearn as "excellent." On February 3, 1975, Redfearn was arrested by the Denver police for burglaries unrelated to his informant activities. Redfearn requested FBI assistance, but the FBI declined to help him [or so it says]. Redfearn then cooperated with local police and gave them information regarding other persons who were burglars or fences. Redfearn was [allegedly] discontinued as an FBI informant on April 17, 1975. Shortly thereafter he was [unaccountably] given a deferred prosecution [rather than a suspended sentence, or some such, which would be much more usual in the case of a snitch] on the local burglary charges...Redfearn then called the FBI, which reinstated him as an informant on May 28, 1975. Beginning in June 1976 Redfearn started to work at a book store in Denver that was operated by *The Militant*. Redfearn told the FBI that this would give him access to records of both the SWP and the YSA. On July 2, 1976, the SWP headquarters in Denver, located in the book store, was burglarized. A padlock on the door to the book store had been cut, and the contents of a file cabinet and a small box of petty cash were taken. On July 7 Redfearn called his FBI contact agent and showed him a group of SWP files [taken from the cabinet]...After the SWP burglary was reported in the local news media, the FBI claimed no knowledge of the matter. A local FBI agent was called before a grand jury in Denver and denied knowing how Redfearn had obtained the files.<sup>23</sup>

Given this, there is no particular reason to assume such anti-SWP activities on the part of the Bureau have ever really ended. Be this as it may:

[Between 1960 and 1971] the FBI approved and implemented forty-six disruptive COINTELPRO operations against the SWP; in addition, from 1960 to 1966, the FBI conducted over ninety burglaries of SWP offices, and photographed over eight thousand pages of SWP files, including financial records and personal letters.<sup>24</sup>

All of this undoubtedly was intended to quash:

...the threat of intellectual independence and uncontrolled political and social organization [which] has been well contained...Alone among the parliamentary democracies, the United States has had no mass-based socialist party, however mild and reformist [since 1920], no socialist voice in the media, and virtually no departure from centrist ideology within the schools and universities, at least until the pressure from student activism impelled a slight departure from orthodoxy [during the 1960s]. All this is testimony to the effectiveness of the system of controls that has been in force for many years, the activities of the FBI being only the spearhead for far more extensive, substantial, and effective - if more low-keyed - measures enforced throughout American society.<sup>25</sup>

Interestingly, as with its simultaneous operations against the CP, the FBI's COINTELPRO-SWP was probably self-defeating on its own terms. By the 1960s,

both the CP and the SWP were, like most old left organizations, moribund. Left to themselves, they would undoubtedly have simply passed into a well deserved oblivion. Ultimately, "the only thing that seemed to keep organizations like the SWP going was the attention and concern of the FBI; just as their appeal would fade, the Bureau would issue a new warning about how dangerous they were and new recruits would flock to the cause."<sup>26</sup> The situation is made even more interesting by the fact that this largely useless (in its own terms) COINTELPRO ultimately resulted in the Bureau's losing a suit filed against it by the Political Rights Defense Fund on behalf of the SWP on July 18, 1973, under provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2401 [b]).<sup>27</sup> After years of preliminary maneuvering, during which the government resisted plaintiff discovery motions and repeatedly moved for dismissal, the case came to trial in New York on April 2, 1981.<sup>28</sup> Five years after the trial, on August 25, 1986, U.S. District Judge Thomas P. Greisa ruled that the Bureau had indeed violated the basic rights of the plaintiff's over an extended period, through "the FBI's disruption activities, surreptitious entries and use of informants," he awarded the SWP a total of \$246,000 in damages as a result.<sup>29</sup> This was followed, on August 17, 1987, by Judge Greisa's issuance of an unprecedented injunction against the FBI's use of the estimated 1,000,000 pages of investigative documents it had compiled on the SWP and its members since 1940 for any reason whatsoever, without the judge's personal consent, due to the illegal activity which had attended the gathering of the material; the injunction applies to all police and intelligence agencies – federal and local – within the U.S.<sup>30</sup>

Hence, even many of the "intelligence gathering" (as opposed to counterintelligence) activities which are associated with COINTELPRO – the use of infiltrators and informers against political targets, to take a notable example – have at last been declared unconstitutional in a court of law. As the celebrated constitutional attorney Leonard Boudin, who handled the case, has put it, "This lawsuit represented the first wholesale attack upon the entire hierarchy of so-called intelligence agencies that [have] attempted to infiltrate and destroy...lawful political part[ies]... The SWP and the Political Rights Defense Fund have carried to a successful conclusion a case whose victory materially advances the First Amendment rights of speech and association, and the Fourth Amendment Rights against invasion of privacy."<sup>31</sup>

## COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Movement

[Agents of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division] should bear in mind that the attitudes expressed by the President, the Director, and many legislators in Congress, have been to curtail the militant actions...on the part of a significant group of...people in the United States today. The thinking of the Supreme Court of the United States has been along the lines of suppressing the activities of those who openly advocate the overthrow of democratic authority in the United States. In addition the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice has been specifically enlarged and strengthened to deal with these matters.

- J. Edgar Hoover -  
1970

On February 27, 1946, D. Milton Ladd, head of the FBI's Intelligence Division, wrote a memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover recommending the Bureau cut back its operations in Puerto Rico, "specifically excepting" counterintelligence measures aimed at "communists and members of the Nationalist Party" on the island.<sup>1</sup> The memo emerged from the context of relations developed by the U.S. with its small Caribbean neighbor during the period since the former assumed direct "ownership" of the latter in 1899, after the Spanish-American War:

The United States had to make the Spanish feel their loss from the war. Because Spain had no cash left, as [U.S. plenipotentiary] Whitelaw Reid put it, "No indemnity was possible, save in territory." We thought of taking Cuba, but "desolated by twelve years of [its own anti-colonialist] war," the country wasn't worth much. That left Puerto Rico...<sup>2</sup>

Having acquired the island through conquest, the federal government set out to determine how the new possession should be managed:

The result of [more than a year of] congressional debate was the Foraker Act of 1900 [31 Stat. 77, named after Senator Thomas B. Foraker, its sponsor], which was Congress's first essay in crafting the so-called Organic Acts that were to govern Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico became a new constitutional animal, an "unincorporated territory" subject to the absolute will of Congress, a colonial status that was

recognized by the Insular Cases by the Supreme Court...Representative [James D.] Richardson's observations on Hawaii were quoted in the debate on the Foraker Act: "Nations have always acted and should govern themselves at all times upon principles which are entirely different from those which activate individuals...In looking at the question of any foreign territory the only question that should enter into consideration by us is one question: Is it best for the United States? The weal or woe, the misery or happiness, the poverty or prosperity of the foreigner or those to be annexed is not involved."<sup>3</sup>

With this self-enabling legislation in hand, the U.S. next installed a puppet government to administer its new colony. This consisted of "a governor and an Executive Council appointed by the president of the United States, who also appointed all the justices of the Supreme Court."<sup>4</sup> With a government under its total control in place, "the customs duty on Puerto Rican goods was removed [by congress]; dependent for export of its products, free of duty, to the mainland, the island became a regional economy of the United States. Thus, by 1901, the Foraker Act had set the essential framework of the U.S. connection. The political framework might be enlarged in the direction of home rule in an endeavor to remove the stigma of colonialism; the economic bond would work against any final severance of permanent political union with the metropolitan power."<sup>5</sup>

At first, the island response was to follow U.S.-stipulated procedural forms in attempting to alter the politico-economic equation. By 1916, however, *Puertorriqueño* sentiment against the nature of federal rule had risen to a point which caused Washington to reveal just how meaningless its "due process" really was. Concerned that a scheduled "referendum on the imposition of U.S. citizenship and the military draft" might result instead in an overwhelming vote for complete independence, President Woodrow Wilson arbitrarily suspended balloting until July 1917, after passage of the Jones Act (39 Stat. 951) unilaterally conferred citizenship and its attendant obligations upon the island populace, regardless of *Puertorriqueño* desires.<sup>6</sup> As to any prospect of eventual independence, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs proclaimed that "*Our people* have already decided Porto Rico [sic] is forever to remain part of the United States [emphasis added]."<sup>7</sup>

Under such conditions, an increasing number of *Puertorriqueños* turned to non-electoral means of changing their circumstances. Following in the tradition of Ramón Emeterio Betances, one of the few island leaders who openly advocated complete separation from Spain prior to 1898, the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party (NPPR) was founded in 1922; Pedro Albizu Campos became its president in 1930, "injecting it with his radical nationalism."<sup>8</sup> Rejecting elections as "a periodic farce to keep the Puerto Rican family divided," Albizu called for a strategy of direct action to achieve full national sovereignty.<sup>9</sup> The federal response was to launch a campaign of repression against the *independentistas*, a matter for which the government was equipped with an on-site military (primarily naval) presence, the island's national guard, and the local colonial police apparatus working in direct liaison with the FBI (which maintained a field office in San Juan, as well as resident agencies in Ponce,

Aguadilla and Fajardo).<sup>10</sup> Although the Bureau's counterintelligence role in the events occurring in Puerto Rico during the '30s is sketchy at best, Ladd's memo provides firm indication that it was an active one, and that Albizu's followers were a particular target. The island's police commander, Colonel Frank Riggs announced that his men were in a state of "war to the death with all Puerto Ricans."<sup>11</sup>

In the face of this, Albizu proclaimed a *quid pro quo* of sorts: "for every Nationalist killed, a continental American would die."<sup>12</sup> Hence, when the police fired into a crowd of student demonstrators (killing five) from the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras on October 24, 1935, the NPPR replied by assassinating Riggs himself.<sup>13</sup>

Albizu wanted revolution, but the United States tried to prevent one by holding the next face-off, not in the streets but in the courts. On March 7, 1936, federal authorities [read: the FBI] raided nationalist headquarters, collected "compromising evidence," and collected Albizu Campos and seven of his closest colleagues as well. The charge was sedition; the penalty, if convicted, was a long stretch in a mainland – never Puerto Rican – prison.<sup>14</sup>

As Ronald Fernandez has observed, "since eight Americans and four Puerto Ricans failed to reach a consensus, the first trial ended in a hung jury...[so] in the second trial, federal officials took no chances. They stacked the jury with twelve safe people. Ten were Americans, two were Puerto Ricans, and together they produced a verdict which federal prosecutors found 'satisfactory.'"<sup>15</sup> Official opinion held that the two-to-ten year sentences meted out to Albizu and most of the other NPPR leadership "ought to go far to restore order and tranquility on the island."<sup>16</sup> This assessment undoubtedly seemed all the more solid to the government insofar as the prosecution's "need to gather evidence" for the sedition trial had been used as the basis from which to undertake "the first use of Grand Jury proceedings to harass, intimidate, and cripple an organized national liberation movement."<sup>17</sup> Specifically at issue in this regard was the sentencing, on April 2, 1936, "to a year in federal prison of the then Secretary General of the Nationalist Party, Puerto Rican poet Juan Antonio Corretjer, for contempt...in refusing to surrender to [the grand jury] the minutes and list of members of the party."<sup>18</sup> However:

Exactly the opposite occurred. Indeed, after the Federal Court of Appeals upheld Albizu's conviction in February 1937, Puerto Rico witnessed what is quite accurately referred to as a massacre of nationalist supporters. To show solidarity with Albizu, his followers planned a parade in Ponce...[H]eavily armed police blocked off every street in the vicinity...a shot rang out. Within minutes, twenty civilians, some just bystanders, had been killed and more than 150 wounded.<sup>19</sup>

Despite government contentions that the NPPR itself was responsible for the bloodbath, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), after an exhaustive investigation, concluded "[t]he facts show that the affair of March 21, 1937, in Ponce was a massacre...due to the denial by police of the civil rights of citizens to parade

and assemble. This denial was ordered by the [U.S. appointed] Governor of Puerto Rico."<sup>20</sup> Badly battered, the *independentistas* responded with a rapid series of reprisals before withdrawing into an extended period of regroupment:

In June 1937, two nationalists tried to kill the federal judge who presided at Albizu's trial; during a rally at which Puerto Rico's resident commissioner defended the use of the American flag, two nationalists tried to kill him. And, on July 25, 1938, at a parade celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the American takeover, Albizu's followers tried to assassinate Governor Blanton Winship by firing more than eighty shots at the reviewing stand. Somehow Winship escaped injury, but his bodyguard was wounded and a colonel in the National Guard was killed by a stray bullet.<sup>21</sup>

With Albizu in prison – he ultimately served more than 18 years behind federal bars before dying of radiation-induced cancer in 1965<sup>22</sup> – the NPPR underwent a period of intense internal turmoil. The extent to which FBI infiltration facilitated its resultant fragmentation is unclear but, again, Ladd's memo suggests some such involvement. In any event, effectively leaderless and undoubtedly tired of incessant discord and infighting, a significant portion of the membership had, by 1945, drifted toward the softer and "more realistic" position of advocating commonwealth status rather than full independence for Puerto Rico, a posture advanced by the liberal Luis Muñoz Marin and his *Partido Popular Democrático* (PPD), founded in 1938.<sup>23</sup> This erosion was offset to some extent by the formation of a caucus calling itself the *Congreso pro Independentista* (CPI) which, by 1946, had largely merged with Concepcion de García's *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño* (PIP). The general flow away from the NPPR appears to have been what the federal government had in mind at a counterintelligence level, and Ladd's memo suggesting that pressure might be removed from all those other than active communists and/or nationalists should be viewed as a way of "encouraging defection."

By 1948, Muñoz Marin, posing himself as an "alternative to the violence of the *independentistas*," was able to win Puerto Rico's first elected governorship on the basis of a promise that he could negotiate a favorable resolution to the island's political status question with federal policy-makers.<sup>24</sup> "But Congress had absolutely no intention of letting Puerto Rico go. That the United States wanted to retain its colony was made clear to Muñoz on his frequent trips to Washington, and in the end he settled for what Congress was willing to give. Testifying before the House in March 1950, Muñoz [was reduced to] repeatedly telling congressmen what they wanted to hear," that he and the PPD would willingly bow to the authority of their colonizers in exchange for approval of a "constitution" which was itself utterly subordinate to the will of the U.S.<sup>25</sup> By this point, even the mainstream Puerto Rican press was attacking Muñoz as a sell-out.<sup>26</sup>

It was into this scene of perceived betrayal on the part of many *Puertorriqueños* that Pedro Albizu Campos returned after a full decade of incarceration. Immediately, he informed the *independentistas* that, "the Nationalist Party [which he sought to revitalize] is going to dynamite America and expel the Yankees from Puerto Rico...The day always comes when justice arms the weak and puts the giants to

flight. Then another *Te Deum* shall be sung...but it will be preceded by armed struggle."<sup>27</sup>

On October 30, 1950, a group of approximately two thousand nationalists orchestrated uprisings throughout the island...in the mountains, the nationalists not only took over the town of Jayuya, they used it as a temporary capital for the sovereign republic of Puerto Rico...in San Juan, Muñoz was lucky to be alive. Armed with machine guns and Molotov cocktails, five nationalists had entered La Fortaleza, the governor's residence, intent upon killing him and blowing up the structure that had always been a potent symbol of colonialism.<sup>28</sup>

Muñoz Marin's would-be executioners were killed and the revolt put down (with considerable direct U.S. military involvement), but, "two days after the attack on La Fortaleza, two New York nationalists – Oscar Collazo and Grisilio Torresola – took a train to Washington. They meant to kill President Truman, but when they spotted guards at the entrance to Blair House (Truman's temporary residence), Collazo opened fire, and within seconds Torresola and a police officer were dead. Examining Torresola's body, police found letters from Albizu Campos. Although they said nothing explicit about an assassination...they led to Albizu's arrest and imprisonment."<sup>29</sup> This was followed, on March 4, 1954, by four *independentistas* managing to smuggle a gun into the House of Representatives, where they were able to wound five congressmen before running out of ammunition.<sup>30</sup>

As in the late 1930s, the momentum achieved by the NPPR could not be sustained. Exhaustion and factionalism once again took their toll during the late '50s, as the *independentistas* splintered into such smaller student organizations as the *Federación de Universarios Pro Independencia* (FUPI) and *Federación Estudiantil pro Independencia* (FEPI, a high school level group), as well as a proliferating number of sectarian "grouplets" like the *Acción Patriótica Revolucionaria* (APR) and *Movimiento 27 de Marzo*, each committed to continuing the armed struggle on its own terms. As is the case with the 1940s, the precise role of FBI infiltration, disinformation, and so forth in helping this disintegration process along is murky, but subsequent Bureau memoranda allude to the fact that active counterintelligence operations were occurring at some level. Meanwhile, the PIP's increasingly legalistic strategy of "fighting the regime from within the regime," promulgated by party founder Gilberto Concepción de García had come to seem largely irrelevant to a growing number of activists. The slack in radical party politics was taken up, to a certain extent at least, by recruitment of former NPPR members into the *Movimiento por Independencia Puertorriqueño* (MPIPR), headed by the avowed marxist-leninist, Juan Mari Bras, and the emergence of the *Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño* (PSP).<sup>31</sup>

It was at this juncture that the FBI implemented a formal COINTELPRO with the expressed intent of bolstering the U.S. colonial grip on Puerto Rico through the expedient of destroying virtually the entire spectrum of left opposition on the island. In a memorandum to the SAC, San Juan (accompanying text), on August 5, 1960, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover announced that the Bureau was "considering" the new



THE COINTELPRO PAPERS

SAC, San Juan (105-3353) August 4, 1960

Director, FBI (105-66754) PERSONAL ATTENTION

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (SUBVERSIVE CONTROL) - Secret

The Bureau is considering the feasibility of instituting a program of disruption against organizations which seek independence for Puerto Rico through other than lawful, peaceful means.

Because of the increasing boldness apparent in the activities of such organizations, their utter disregard of the will of the Majority, the inevitable communist and/or Soviet effort to embarrass the United States, and the courage given to their cause by Castro's Cuba, we must make a more positive effort, not only to curtail, but to disrupt their activities.

San Juan and New York should give this matter studied consideration and thereafter furnish the Bureau observations, suggestions and recommendations relative to the institution of such a program to reach the Bureau no later than 8-25-60.

In considering this matter, you should bear in mind the Bureau desires to disrupt the activities of these organizations and is not interested in mere harassment. No action should be taken in this program without Bureau authority, at any time.

A copy of this communication is designated for the Chicago Office and a copy for the Washington Field Office for information.

2 - New York (105-32872)  
 1 - Chicago (105-5551)  
 1 - Washington Field  
 1 - 62-7721 (NPPR)

TC/baw/ (9)

4 AUG 10 1960

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

EX 109  
 105-93124-1  
 REC-294  
 AUG 24 1960  
 JTB

Memo initiating COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Movement.

COINTELPRO, and stipulated he was no longer interested in operations which involved "mere harassment." San Juan complied, at least on the level of planting disinformation in the island press, as is indicated in the accompanying letter from Hoover to the SAC, dated November 14 (but referring to a October 26, 1960 communication from San Juan), in which the director critiques a fabricated news story. In the same missive, Hoover recommends gearing up the COINTELPRO, using *already existing* infiltrators within "groups seeking independence for Puerto Rico" in the

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT	
<i>Memorandum</i>	
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI (105-66754)      DATE: 11/15/60
FROM :	SAC, NEW YORK (105-32872)
SUBJECT:	<u>GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE</u> <u>FOR PUERTO RICO (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)</u> <u>SUBVERSIVE CONTROL</u> (OO: San Juan)
Re Bureau letter dated 9/13/60.	
<p>A review of the files of the NYO has been made concerning the activities of Puerto Rican pro-independence groups which seek independence by other than peaceful means, as well as the files on the counterintelligence program as it relates to the Communist Party. It is believed that upon instituting a counterintelligence program in this field, efforts should be directed with the following aims in mind:</p>	
<p>I. Disruption and discord.</p> <p>II. Creating doubts as to the wisdom of remaining in the independence movement.</p> <p>III. Causing defections from the independence movement.</p>	
The suggested means of obtaining these desired ends are as follows:	
1) Exploiting factionalism within an organization.	
<p>Factionalism is a common fault within pro-independence groups and it is believed that this existing element can be developed, enlarged and exploited. As an example, after the demise of the Accion Patriotica</p>	
- P -	
2 - Bureau (105-66754) (RM)	105-93124-5
2 - San Juan (105-3353) (RM)	15 NOV 17 1960
1 - New York (105-32872) (#413)	
337:vcb	
(5)	

EXP. PROC.

New York field office response to COINTELPRO startup.

role of *provocateurs*. The director felt that "carefully selected informants" might be able to raise "controversial issues" within *independentista* formations such as the MPIPR, as they were even then doing within the CP, USA and preparing to do within the SWP. Further, he pointed out that such individuals might be utilized effectively to create situations in which "nationalist elements could be pitted against the communist elements to disrupt some of the organizations, particularly the MPIPR and...FUPI." He also instructed that "the San Juan Office should be constantly alert

SAC, San Juan (105-3353)

November 14, 1960

Director, FBI (105-66754) 47  
REC-28

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE  
FOR PUERTO RICO  
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)

Reurep 10-26-60.

After careful review of the proposed article, it is believed that it would not achieve the results desired; namely, to cause animosity between Juan Mari Bras and Juan Antonio Corretjer, nor would it convey to the readers of the article the dangerousness of the Puerto Rican independence groups. The question of voting or not voting in the general elections in Puerto Rico is not now the type of issue which is sufficiently divisive to accomplish the purpose of this program.

As an alternative, it is suggested San Juan prepare a brief article which would be in the nature of alerting Puerto Ricans to the dangerousness of the various segments of the independence movement in Puerto Rico. Such an article would, of course, have to be interesting enough to interest a newspaper contact to utilize the same and sufficiently informative to develop hostility in the minds of readers towards the elements engaged in the independence movement. The article should be self-sustaining in interest and informative without using confidential information received from our sources, and it should not embarrass the Bureau.

With regard to your request for information relating to counterintelligence tactics and techniques employed against the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) for possible use against the Puerto Rican independence groups, it appears that the exact same tactics would not be applicable.

Some varied forms of the same tactics may undoubtedly be applied; for example;

1 - New York

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Malone \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TC:djw  
(6)

MAILED 27  
NOV 14 1960  
COMM-FBI

NOV 14 1960

EPI - 70:4E

NOV 16 1960

The Bureau's first plan of attack against the independentistas.

for articles extolling the virtues of Puerto Rico's relationship to the United States as opposed to complete separation from the United States, for use in anonymous mailings to selected subjects in the independence movement who may be psychologically affected by such information."

As can be seen in the next document, the New York field office (in cooperation with San Juan) had responded with a concrete "action proposal" within 48 hours. Within months, San Juan was reporting back regularly on the relative success of its various counterintelligence operations (such as in the accompanying November

(1) Security informants operating inside the groups could, under certain circumstances, raise controversial issues at meetings, raise justifiable criticisms against leaders and take other steps which would weaken the organization. In the proposed article you furnished, the question of voting or abstaining from voting, as it was related by two of the top leaders of the Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico (MPIPR), appears to be an issue which would be controversial within the MPIPR.

In connection with our counterintelligence program, any informant operating thereunder must be first approved by the Bureau for such operation and then carefully briefed by the Agent handling him before he engages in controversial discussions or criticisms inside the particular group. If you desire to initiate this type of action through selected informants you should furnish the identities of informants selected, basis for selection and the proposed manner you plan to use them. Our informants operating in the CPUSA have caused disruption without jeopardizing their informant status and, in fact, some have advanced inside the Party primarily because of their forceful acts in criticizing poor leaders and other weaknesses in the Party organization.

(2) The San Juan Office should be constantly alert for articles extolling the virtues of Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States as opposed to complete separation from the United States, for use in anonymous mailings to selected subjects in the independence movement who may be psychologically affected by such information.

(3) It appears the nationalist elements could be pitted against the communist elements to effectively disrupt some of the organizations, particularly the MPIPR and the Federacion de Universitarios Pro Independencia (FUPI), where we have determined there is communist influence. The nationalist elements in Puerto Rico prior to the time Castro obtained power in Cuba have indicated they were anticommunist. The CP in Puerto Rico has never been strong, and today it appears that the influence of international communism has a greater influence on the radical elements within Puerto Rico. In regard to the MPIPR and FUPI, it is noted that these two organizations apparently have the largest membership of any of the independence groups in Puerto Rico.

In the future, San Juan and New York should furnish the identity of the newspaper contact to whom you desire to furnish such articles at the time of the submission of the articles to the Bureau.

Because of the large number of Puerto Ricans residing in New York, and the fact that a number of Puerto Rican independence organizations are active in New York, New York and San Juan should exchange ideas relative to tactics and techniques which may be effective in your divisions.

The nationalists in Puerto Rico within themselves are a threat to the internal security of the United States, and nationalists influenced by international communism can be an even greater threat. The Bureau believes this program can be effective, and continuous attention must be given to it.

1960 memo describing the planting of an editorial in the San Juan daily, *El Mundo* and other actions), and receiving a steady flow of suggestions from Hoover as to how to improve the COINTELPRO's effectiveness (see accompanying document, dated November 21, 1962). By late 1967, the director was positively jubilant in his assessment to the San Juan SAC of the "benefits" accruing from such tactics:

[The COINTELPRO has served to] confuse the independentist leaders, exploit group rivalries and jealousies, inflame personality conflicts, emasculate the...strength of these organizations, and *thwart any possibility of pro independence unity* [emphasis added].<sup>32</sup>

In achieving the results which so delighted the director, the San Juan SAC had first and foremost taken a tip from Hoover that, "the PSI [Public Security Index] is interested in publishing anticommunist articles, particularly those which could expose pro-Cuban and communist influence in the various national independence organizations in Puerto Rico...The purposes of this program are to disrupt the activities and lessen the influence of nationalists and communists who seek to separate Puerto Rico from the United States."<sup>33</sup> The COINTELPRO thus included a full-scale disinformation component by which agents systematically planted articles and editorials (often containing malicious gossip concerning *independentista* leaders' alleged sexual or financial affairs) in "friendly" newspapers, and dispensed "private" warnings to the owners of island radio stations that their FCC licenses might be revoked if pro-independence material were aired.

The articles and editorials...were placed mainly in *El Mundo*, a Spanish language daily dating back to the early part of this century, and owned since the 1960s by Northamerican Mrs. Argentina Hills, the 1977-78 president of the Interamerican Press Association (a U.S. fomented association of newspaper owners in this hemisphere). *El Mundo* is also one of the Knight (U.S.) chain of newspapers...The *San Juan Star*, a Scripps-Howard (U.S.) chain newspaper, and *El Imparcial* in its latter days, after the death of its pro-independence owner, Sr. Ayuso, were also used to plant articles and editorials...Other less prominent newspapers like *El Vigía*, the University of Puerto Rico's Catholic Youth organ, and the so-called *Bohemia Libre Puertorriqueña* – well described by the Bureau as an "anticommunist and anti-Cuban publication" – were also used to disseminate the accusation that FUPI was communist and thus "scare other University students away from joining it."<sup>34</sup>

Concerning radio programming, there is clear evidence that agents "talked to" the owners of radio stations WLEO in Ponce, WKFE in Yauco and WJRS in San Germán about their licensing as early as 1963.<sup>35</sup> One result was cancellation of the one hour daily time-block allotted to "Radio Bandera," a program produced by the APU.<sup>36</sup> Such tactics to deny a media voice to *independentistas* accord well with other, more directly physical methods employed during the 1970s, after COINTELPRO supposedly ended:

[There was] the bombing of *Claridad* [daily paper first of the MPIPR and then the

SAC, San Juan (105-3353)

November 21, 1962

Director, FBI (105-93124)

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM) SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION

It has been noted at the Bureau that Accion Patriotica Unitaria (APU) has increased in membership and activity in recent months, largely through the aggressive leadership of [redacted]. It is desired that ways and means be employed at this time in an effort to curtail and disrupt the activities of APU both in New York and San Juan. Some of the items which might be used are:

(1) Show the Marxist background and leanings of [redacted]

(2) Expose [redacted] desire to push the older more conservative element out of APU in favor of younger men who may be more easily influenced by Marxism and who might be more susceptible to committing acts of violence.

(3) Exploit the obvious dissension existing in the APU over [redacted] insistence in supporting the Cuban revolution.

(4) The split in the Laras Board between APU and the more conservative independence groups might be used.

SEARCHED 25 NOV 21 1962 COMM-FBI

(5) Widen the rift between [redacted] of A.C.

San Juan and New York should give full consideration to counterintelligence measures against APU and submit recommendations to the Bureau as to methods which might be successfully employed in the connection.

2 - New York (105-32872)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_ DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_ Mohr \_\_\_\_\_ Bishop \_\_\_\_\_ Casper \_\_\_\_\_ Callahan \_\_\_\_\_ Conrad \_\_\_\_\_ Felt \_\_\_\_\_ Gale \_\_\_\_\_ Rosen \_\_\_\_\_ Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_ Tavel \_\_\_\_\_ Trotter \_\_\_\_\_ Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_ Holmes \_\_\_\_\_ Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

211 RGLP:ead 53 NOV 16 9 1962

REC-31 105-93124-911 19 NOV 26 1962

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

The FBI's plan of attack against the *independentistas* is refined and developed in this 1962 memo, written when the COINTELPRO was approximately two years old. The tactics involved have continued to be perfected over the years, but show every indication of still being used by the Bureau and other police agencies at the present time (albeit, often without a formal counterintelligence label).

PSP) printing presses which has occurred at least five times in the present decade. Although the MPI [now PSP] usually furnished the police with detailed information as to the perpetrators of these acts, not even *one* trial has ever been held on this island in connection with these bombings, nor even one arrest made. The same holds true for a 1973 bombing of the National Committee of the [PIP].<sup>37</sup>

Operating in this sort of curtailment in exposure of valid *independentista* views, the FBI was able to sow discord and factionalism within and between targeted groups much more effectively, "beginning with FUPI and the [NPPR] in 1960, through the [APU] in 1962 and 1963, [and later] *Ligua Socialista Puertorriqueña*, the MPI[PR] and...the PIP."<sup>38</sup> In order to accomplish this, as the accompanying June 12, 1961 memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover indicates, the Bureau engaged in intensive investigation of *independentista* leaders both on the island and in New York in order to ascertain their (real or arguable) "weaknesses" in terms of "morals, criminal records, spouses, children, family life, educational qualifications and personal activities other than independence activities." The findings, however flimsy or contrived, were pumped into the media, disseminated as bogus cartoons or "political broadsides," and/or surfaced within organizational contexts by *provocateurs*, all with the express intent of setting the leaders one against the other and at odds with their respective organizational memberships.

The Bureau assessed such undertakings as being quite successful, a matter witnessed by the accompanying AIRTEL from Hoover to the SAC, San Juan, dated March 9, 1962, in which distribution of a bogus leaflet accusing the FUPI leadership of "secret links to communism" is discussed. When evidence to support such red-baiting contentions could not be discovered, the FBI's COINTELPRO specialists simply made it up:

MPIPR leaders, cognizant of the basic antipathy of Puerto Ricans, predominantly Roman Catholic, to communism, have consistently avoided, at times through public statements, any direct, overt linkage of the MPIPR to communism...The [San Juan office] feels that the above situation can be exploited by means of a counterintelligence letter, purportedly by an anonymous veteran MPIPR member. This letter would alert MPIPR members to a probable Communist takeover of the organization.<sup>39</sup>

Such methods were routinely employed against all *independentista* organizations, as is shown in the accompanying memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover, dated November 21, 1962 and targeting the APU. Things also assumed a highly personal tone, as when in 1966 an unidentified agent dummied up a letter to MPIPR head Juan Mari Bras "warning" him to "beware the ambitiousness" of a younger colleague.<sup>40</sup> By 1968, such tactics had evolved to the point that Mari Bras was being accused in Bureau-fabricated leaflets and cartoons of "sending young men out to die as members of the *Comandós Armados de Liberación* [CAL, an armed formation whose dedication was often misused by the FBI for such propaganda purposes] while he

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93124)

DATE: MAY 3 1961

FROM : SAC, SAN JUAN (105-3353 Sub 1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO (COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM) SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION

Re San Juan letter to Bureau 1/30/61 concerning publishing of editorial in "El Mundo."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosed are two copies to Bureau and one to New York of translation of an editorial which appeared in "El Mundo" dated 4/27/61, actually published and released on afternoon of 4/25/61. Translation was made by San Juan Office  
Translator: [redacted]

It is noted this editorial is essentially the same as the editorial previously furnished to [redacted] of "El Mundo", with appropriate changes to cover current developments in the FUPI.

For the information of the Bureau and New York the following series of events transpired just prior to the publishing of this editorial and are believed to have created the proper atmosphere for which [redacted] was waiting prior to issuance of this editorial:

- April 13, 1961: FUPI picketed the San Juan Office of the FBI and alleged FBI "persecution of independentist students"
- April 19, 1961: FUPI conducted spontaneous "victory demonstration" in streets of Rio Piedras (section of Metropolitan San Juan) when news received that FIDEL CASTRO had wiped out invading forces. Demonstration ended in violence as a result of clash when anti-CASTRO students and 12 FUPI members were arrested.

2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)  
1-New York (Enc. 1) (RM)  
1-San Juan (Enc. 1) (RM)  
JCB:VW  
(5)

ENCLOSURE  
REC-73  
MAY 15 1961  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 6041  
Exempt from GDS, Category 1  
Date of Declassification Indefinite  
SUBV. CONTROL  
7-547

**Early COINTELPRO memo recapping disinformation tactics employed against *Federación de Universitarios pro Independencia* (FUPI) and the results obtained thereby. Such methods were used against *independentistas* throughout the duration of the COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico.**





SAC, San Juan (105-3353 Sub 1) June 12, 1961

Director, FBI (105-93124) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO  
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)  
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION

In order to appraise the caliber of leadership in the Puerto Rican independence movement, particularly as it pertains to our efforts to disrupt their activities and compromise their effectiveness, we should have an intimate detailed knowledge of the more influential leaders as individuals.

The names of each of the leaders listed below are maintained in the Security Index.

<u>SAN JUAN</u>	<u>NEW YORK</u>
	

Your files will contain descriptive information appropriate to our investigative reporting. We should, however, for the purposes of this program, delve deeply into that part of their lives which do not show on the surface; for example, we must determine their capabilities of influencing others, capabilities of real leadership, why the intense desire for Puerto Rico's independence, what they expect to gain from independence, and the support they have from other leaders and rank-and-file members. We must have information concerning their weaknesses, morals, criminal records, spouses, children, family life, educational qualifications and personal activities other than independence activities.

2 - New York (105-32872) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6080 *W*

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW, PAREC-23. 105-93124-95 *W*

TC:djw  
(6)

JUN 13 1961

TELETYPE UNIT

**Early document delineating plan to discredit selected *independentista* leaders. Such tactics appear to still be in use today.**

remain[ed] protected by his foreign benefactor [supposedly Cuban premier Fidel Castro]."<sup>41</sup>

These methods were used not only to divide *Puertorriqueños* among themselves, but to forestall alliances between any of the various elements of the *independentista* movement and progressive groups on the U.S. mainland. For instance, when the

[redacted] supreme leader for many years in the nationalist movement in Puerto Rico, often disavowed communist influences in the nationalist movement. During the United States war against communism in Korea, [redacted] specifically stated that the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico must avoid being considered in anyway communistic in its views.

Whatever his relationship may have been with communist individuals and regardless of how wrong or right he was, [redacted] was against Soviet communist ideology.

Suppose [redacted] could see his wife, [redacted] and so-called friends, [redacted] together clinging to Fidel Castro's Soviet-type communism like leeches.

Suppose [redacted] knew of the Federation of University Students for Independence joining with international communism, which, if we are indifferent, can eventually destroy the Americas which [redacted] loves.

Suppose [redacted] learns that Juan Mari Bras is attempting to unite nationalists and communists under the banner of the Movimiento Pro-Independencia. Always opposite, the nationalists desire a republic and the communists a socialist state like Soviet Russia.

Suppose [redacted] knew that the Accion Patriótica Unitaria, contemporary descendant of his Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, is almost completely dominated and controlled by the communist [redacted] who directs but never leads.

[redacted] is being betrayed, but more important is the fact that Puerto Rico is being betrayed.

The destiny of Puerto Rico must not include subservience to an atheistic ideology.


Puerto Rico, yes; communism, no!

Text of "anonymous leaflet" circulated in 1962 to discredit Juan Mari Bras.

black liberation journal *Soulbook* published an editorial entitled "The Puerto Rican Revolution" in 1965, arguing that *Puertorriqueños* and mainland Afro-Americans shared both a common heritage and a common oppressor,<sup>42</sup> COINTELPRO experts in New York saw to it that anonymous and thoroughly racist "letters of objection" were immediately dispatched to the MPIPR:

We resent the implication that (name deleted) black nationalist allies in the editor's statement that our people are Negro as was our martyred leader Pedro Albizu Campos. We are proud of our Spanish heritage and culture. Although Negroes are welcome in our movement and may seek refuge in our nation, let it not be said that the majority of [*Puertorriqueños*] are Negro.<sup>43</sup>

On October 23, 1967, the New York SAC also came forth with a plan to



**Fragment of 1964 memo in which the FBI takes credit for the near-fatal heart attack of Juan Mari Bras. Such claims were repeated during the mid-70s in the wake of the assassination of the *independentista* leader's son.**

disseminate a forged leaflet in the name of Juan Mari Bras and designed to misrepresent the MPIPR in such a way as to alienate a number of stateside organizations – Youth Against War and Fascism, the Progressive Labor Party, the Socialist Workers Party, *Movimiento por Independencia*, Casa Puerto Rico, the Worker's World Party and Young Socialist Alliance among them – with which Mari Bras had been attempting to forge a united front.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, the Bureau sought to thwart any possibility of a constructive relationship between *independentistas* and socialist countries or liberation movements located outside the U.S. By 1966, the FBI was preoccupied with “statements made by Mari Bras covering efforts to gain independence for Puerto Rico through the United Nations, support of the Cuban government and the South Viet Nam Liberation Front (Viet Cong).”<sup>45</sup> One response to this “threat” was the preparation and distribution of a cartoon (see page 89) purporting to show Mari Bras and other MPIPR leaders under the direct control of Castro.<sup>46</sup> Other efforts in this vein included a campaign of sexual slander targeting Doña Laura Meneses, wife of Albizu Campos, and Juan Juarbe y Juarbe, NPPR Delegate for External Affairs (both were living in Havana at the time) for purposes of “ridiculing the Puerto Rican independence movement, and the government of Fidel Castro.”<sup>47</sup> By 1971, the Bureau was even undertaking COINTELPRO actions to

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT		
<i>Memorandum</i>		
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93124)	DATE: June 8, 1964
FROM :	SAC, SAN JUAN (105-3353 sub 1) (P)	<b>SECRET</b>
SUBJECT:	GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (SUBVERSIVE CONTROL)  ReSanJuanlet 3/11/64 and Dulet 3/23/64.	
	APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF [Signature] DATE	
<p>The anonymous leaflet proposed in reSJlet and authorized by reBulet was mailed April 13, 1964. The leaflet, printed on cheap stock and enclosed in inexpensive envelopes, was mailed to about 300 persons, most of them taken from our portion of the MPIIR mailing list, and to a few selected independentistas. Reaction to its distribution was immediate and most gratifying.</p>		

**Fragment of typical memo describing use of bogus leaflet to foster factionalism within the *independentista* movement.**

prevent a link-up between the essentially defunct CP,USA on the basis that CP leader Gus Hall had traveled to Puerto Rico, "raised the priority of Puerto Rican independence" for his party, and promised to champion the cause when he traveled to "the USSR and other socialist countries."<sup>44</sup>

Predictably, the sorts of manipulations involved in the COINTELPRO against the Puertorriqueño independence movement entailed more than the fostering of confusion and infighting among *independentistas* and the public at large. There can be no doubt that lethal outcomes were acceptable to, even desired by, the FBI. For example, as the accompanying excerpt from a July 1964 memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover bears out, the Bureau considered Mari Bras' near-fatal heart attack during April of that year to have been brought on, at least in part, by an anonymous counterintelligence letter. Far from expressing regret, or concern that perhaps the FBI was overstepping its intentions in light of these consequences, the SAC concludes by promising to "be on the lookout to exploit [our] *achievements* in this field [emphasis added]" in the future, and to "advise the Bureau of *other positive results* [emphasis added]" of the COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico. The pattern remained evident more than a decade later when, as Mari Bras subsequently testified before the United Nations Commission on Decolonization (after reviewing portions of the 75 volumes of documents the FBI had compiled on him), the Bureau undertook tactics apparently intended to cause him to suffer a second coronary:

[The documents] reflect the general activity of the FBI toward the movement. But some of the memos are dated 1976 and 1977; long after COINTELPRO was [suppos-

SAC, San Juan (105-3353)

8/25/64

Director, FBI (105-93124)

-102-

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
(SUBVERSIVE CONTROL)

ReBulet 8/5/64 which outlined a suggested counterintelligence move against the Federation of University Students for Independence (FUPI).

Your report of 8/7/64 concerning the organization and activities of the Federation of Students for Independence (FEPI) has been reviewed with interest. It is believed that a counterintelligence program against FEPI can be initiated along with the suggested activity against FUPI. It is believed that copies of the flyer which will be prepared showing FUPI's connection with international communism can be effectively used along with an attached flyer in the Spanish language showing FUPI's connection with FEPI.

These documents could be distributed anonymously to some of the school officials and parents and might tend to reduce the influence of this budding youth organization.

Carefully review this matter with Agents of your office handling investigations of FUPI and FEPI submitting your recommendations to the Bureau regarding proposed counterintelligence procedures.

NOTE:

FEPI is a new independence organization presently existing in eight high schools in Puerto Rico. It is the child of FUPI, college age independence group at the University of Puerto Rico which has connected ties with international communism as well as Puerto Rican independence groups.

1 - 105-123380 (FEPI) REC-43

BGLP:all (5)

nil

EX-108

19 AUG 24 1964

AUG 27 1964

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

Counterintelligence from cradle to grave. Document announcing FBI plans to add the high school organization *Federación Estudiantil pro Independencia* (FEPI) to its list of COINTELPRO targets in Puerto Rico. Indications are that the Bureau continued its operations against *Puertorriqueño* juveniles until at least 1971 and in all probability much longer, perhaps through the present moment.

5/11/67

Airtel

1  
1  
1

To: SAC, San Juan (105-3353-Sub 1)

From: Director, FBI (105-99124) — *J.H.*

REC-16

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE EX-103  
FOR PUERTO RICO  
COMMUNTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
(SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION)  
IS - PRN

Reurairtel 5/3/67.

Authority granted to prepare proposed letter in Spanish language and to mail it as set forth on page three of referenced airtel.

Preparation and mailing should be handled under the most secure conditions to protect the Bureau as the source. Advise the Bureau of any information coming to your attention regarding the mailing of this letter.

**Fragment of typical Airtel authorizing the sending of an anonymous letter to foment disputes within the *independentista* movement. Note the concern expressed that it not be discovered the letter originated with the FBI. Hundreds of such letters are known to have been sent.**

edly] ended as an FBI activity...At one point, there is a detailed description of the death of my son, in 1976, at the hands of a gun-toting assassin. The bottom of the memo is fully deleted, leaving one to wonder who the assassin was. The main point, however, is that the memo is almost joyful about the impact his death will have upon me in my Gubernatorial campaign, as head of our party, in 1976.<sup>49</sup>

After this impact expressed itself in the form of an attack of severe depression the same year, the San Juan SAC noted in a memo to FBI headquarters that, "It would hardly be idle boasting to say that *some of the Bureau's activities have provoked the situation of Mari Bras* [emphasis added]."<sup>50</sup> Obviously, one possible interpretation of this language is that the FBI had a hand in orchestrating the murder of the MPIPR leader's son, or at least helped cover the trail of the assassin(s). Given the context established by the Bureau's own statements *vis à vis* Mari Bras, it also seems quite likely that one of the means by which the FBI continued to "exploit its achievements" in "provoking the situation" of the *independentista* leader was to arrange for the firebombing of his home in 1978,<sup>51</sup> in addition to maintaining such normal "inves-

tigative" harassment as obtaining copies of every single deposit slip and check written on his personal account for more than 20 years.<sup>52</sup>

Plainly, the lethal or near-lethal dimension of the Puerto Rico COINTELPRO expanded dramatically during the 1970s, *after* such operations had been allegedly terminated. As Alfredo López recounted in 1988:

[O]ver the past fifteen years, 170 attacks – beatings, shootings, and bombings of independence organizations and activists – have been documented...there have been countless attacks and beatings of people at rallies and pickets, to say nothing of *independentistas* walking the streets. The 1975 bombing of a rally at Mayaguez that killed two restaurant workers was more dramatic, but like the other 170 attacks remains unsolved. Although many right-wing organizations claimed credit for these attacks, not one person has been arrested or brought to trial.<sup>53</sup>

This pattern of seeming ineffectuality on the part of the FBI and cooperating local police agencies when it comes to solving violent crimes against groups or individuals targeted by COINTELPRO is revealing in a way which will be explored more thoroughly in our chapter on the Bureau's anti-AIM operations. Suffice to say that there can be no question that "lack of manpower" accounts for such apparent ineptitude. By the 1970s, the FBI's San Juan field office was rostered with four squads (about 80 agents), with another squad posted to each of the three resident agencies (an additional 60 agents, overall), exclusive of a steady flow of technicians from the mainland brought in to perform one or another "special task," *all* interlocked tightly with the island's substantial local police force.<sup>54</sup> Further, the Bureau is known to have customarily shared information and coordinated activities on the island with the CIA, Secret Service, Naval Intelligence Service, 771st Military Intelligence Detachment, the State Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, all of which maintain facilities and appreciable numbers of personnel on site in Puerto Rico.<sup>55</sup> All of this adds up to an incredible saturation of agents on a small Caribbean island with an aggregate population of only 3.5 million. And, while the Bureau can't seem to muster the wherewithal to apprehend *any* of the perpetrators of the beatings and bombings of *independentistas*, it has always had ample resources available to engage in anti-*independentista* gossip and editorializing, keeping track of Mari Bras' checkbook, and arresting numerous FUPI students engaged in distributing pro-independence literature on such weighty charges as "possessing marijuana cigarettes."<sup>56</sup>

In those few instances when the FBI did actually become involved in the investigation of the murders of *independentistas* during the '70s, the results have been bizarre. For example, when Teamster activist Juan Caballero disappeared in 1977, the Bureau atypically joined in the search for him. On October 25, a body was found in the El Yunque rain forest, badly decomposed and trussed up in electrical wire. This, the FBI announced, was Caballero, who had probably been killed by "associates" who suspected him of having been a "police informant." No such suspicion had existed prior to the Bureau's announcing it. Then, mysteriously, it was discovered that the dental structure of the corpse failed to match that of Caballero. Further

## Memorandum

DISTRIBUTION, FBI (105-93124)

DATE: 5/23, 69

SAC, SAN JUAN (105-3353 Sub I) (P)

subject: GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO  
 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 IS-PM

Sources of the San Juan Office have for a period of time advised of romantic interests existing between JUAN MARI BRAS, head of the Movimiento Pro-Independencia de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rican Independence Movement) (MPIPR), and [redacted] a one time Federación Universitaria de Puerto Rico (Federación of University Students for Independence) (FUPI) member and estranged wife of [redacted] a member of the MPIPR recently arrested for [redacted] in an attempt to bomb a Texaco Oil Facility in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico.

San Juan proposes that a letter, prepared in the Spanish language on plain unwatermarked paper, be sent to [redacted] and [redacted] his brother and head of the [redacted] in San Juan, Puerto Rico, pointing out the above and indicating that the situation should be revealed before the press is advised and it becomes known how the MPIPR, through the actions of its leader, rewards faithful advocates of independence. The letter may be worded as follows:

"MARI continues to be seen with [redacted] If you are too much of a fool to recent being a dickhead, I as a friend will not allow it to go on. If you will not stop this I will expose this fat clown to all, including our friend [redacted] of the press."

[redacted] referred to above is [redacted] a daily San Juan Spanish language newspaper and a long-time enemy of MARI BRAS and the MPIPR.

2-Bureau (RM)  
 2-San Juan  
 GPC:cab  
 (4)

REC-119

14 JUN 4 1969

**COINTELPRO continues. Ongoing disinformation operation against Mari Bras and the MPIPR in 1969. Note sexual innuendos.**

tests revealed that the body lacked evidence of a bone fracture in the right hand the ostensible victim was known to have suffered. The fingers of a hand were then severed and shipped to the FBI crime lab in Washington, D.C., for fingerprint identification. The lab promptly "lost" the fingers. The fate of Juan Caballero thus remains unknown, as does the identity of the individual actually murdered in El Yunque.<sup>57</sup>



Equally novel have been the techniques by which the Bureau has amassed "evidence" of alleged *independentista* violence. Take, for instance, the case of the "hopping fingerprint" after the shooting of North American attorney Allen Randall in September 1977.<sup>58</sup> Shortly after the killing, a communique was supposedly received from a "worker's commando," taking credit for the action and explaining the rationale underlying it. A follow-up communique was said to have been received within a matter of hours. Two days later, local police, acting on information provided by the FBI, arrested island Teamster head Miguel Cabrera and several other key union organizers. Cabrera's fingerprint, the Bureau said, had been found on the first communique. At a pretrial hearing during January of 1978, however, the prosecution produced Bureau-provided evidence that Cabrera's fingerprint was on the second communique rather than the first, thus producing the joke among the defendants that the print was busily hopping from document to document in the FBI crime lab. During the trial in 1979, police records were subpoenaed by the defense which showed that the Bureau had requested a set of Cabrera's prints prior to receiving *any* evidence in the case, a matter which strongly suggested the crime lab's conclusions had been predetermined. As a result, Cabrera and his colleagues were acquitted.<sup>59</sup>

A much clearer instance of direct FBI involvement in anti-*independentista* violence is the "Cerro Maravilla Episode" of July 25, 1978. On that date, two young activists, Arnaldo Dario Rosado and Carlos Soto Arrivi (son of the distinguished *Puertorriqueño* novelist, Pedro Juan Soto), accompanied a *provocateur* named Alejandro González Molavé, were lured into a trap and shot to death by police near the mountain village. Official reports claimed the pair had been on the way to blow up a television tower near Cerro Maravilla, and had fired first when officers attempted to arrest them. A taxi driver who was also on the scene, however, adamantly insisted that this was untrue, that neither *independentista* had offered resistance when captured, and that the police themselves had fired two volleys of shots in order to make it sound from a distance as if they'd been fired upon. "It was a planned murder," the witness said, "and it was carried out like that."<sup>60</sup> What had actually happened became even more obvious when a police officer named Julio Cesar Andrades came forward and asserted that the assassination had been planned "from on high" and in collaboration with the Bureau.<sup>61</sup> This led to confirmation of González Molavé's role as an infiltrator reporting to both the local police and the FBI, a situation which prompted him to admit "having planned and urged the bombing" in order to set the two young victims up for execution.<sup>62</sup> In the end, it was shown that:

Dario and Soto [had] surrendered. Police forced the men to their knees, handcuffed their arms behind their backs, and as the two *independentistas* pleaded for justice, the police tortured and murdered them.<sup>63</sup>

None of the police and other officials involved were ever convicted of the murders and crimes directly involved in this sordid affair. However, despite several

FBI

Date 6/8/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-35754)  
FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN (105-3353)

SUBJECT: GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE  
FOR PUERTO RICO  
IS - 105-3353

*[Handwritten initials]*

The Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rican Pro Independence Movement) (MPIPR) (Bufile 105-75715) presently consists of two groups, the MPIPR and the MPIPR Youth, each of which maintains their own slate of officers, although they share the same meeting halls, printing facilities, etc.

There have been recent indications that MPIPR (Bufile 105-75715) San Juan file 100-8319), of the MPIPR Youth, has been working in contact with the various top leaders of the MPIPR, who receive such "spoils" as are available to MPIPR leaders, while the MPIPR Youth does most of the work.

JUN 19 1967

of the MPIPR Youth, as a result of this, and the San Juan Office feels that if the Youth can be split from the MPIPR at this time, enough of the MPIPR Youth members would be sufficiently confused and disgruntled to effectively neutralize the MPIPR during the critical period just prior to the plebiscite scheduled for July 23, 1967.

ST-110

REC 46/35-72 12/4

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - 105-93124 (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
- 2 - San Juan
- 1 - 105-3353 Sub. 1 (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)

*[Vertical handwritten note]*

*[Handwritten signatures and stamps]*

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

1967 Airtel from SAC, San Juan to J. Edgar Hoover describing a portion of the COINTELPRO methods to be used in subverting the 1967 United Nations plebiscite to determine the political status of Puerto Rico.

years of systematic coverup by the FBI and U.S. Justice Department, working in direct collaboration with the guilty cops, ten of the latter were finally convicted on multiple counts of perjury and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 30 years apiece.<sup>64</sup> Having evaded legal responsibility for his actions altogether, *provocateur* González Molavé was shot to death in front of his home on April 29, 1986, by "party or parties unknown."<sup>65</sup> This was followed, on February 28, 1987, by the government's payment of \$575,000 settlements to both victims' families, a total of \$1,150,000 in acknowledgment of the official misconduct attending their deaths and the subsequent investigation(s).<sup>66</sup>

At about the same time that Dario and Soto were summarily executed (August 28 – September 1, 1978), the FBI was hosting an international conference on "counter-terrorism" in San Juan. Among the participants in this three-day event were:

Anthony Quinton (then head of the State Department's Office on Combatting Terrorism), British General Richard Clutterbuck (a specialist in counterinsurgency theory and author of several books on the subject), Uruguayan General Manuelo Querrolo (head of the 1960s campaign that destroyed the *Tupamaros* guerrillas), Reinhard Rupprecht (a head of the West German *Bundeskriminalamt* and responsible for pursuit of the Red Army Fraction [RAF]), Robin Borne (Canadian head of the campaign to repress the Québec Liberation Movement), Inspector Ronald McIntyre of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada's FBI), Jay Mallin (editor for "Terrorism and Latin America" with *Soldier of Fortune* magazine), Dr. Aaron Katz (of the Center for the Study of Human Behavior, a RAND-type think tank devoted to counterinsurgency research), and Louis O. Giuffrida (a "private sector" specialist involved in delivering counter-terrorist, counterinsurgency and SWAT training to law enforcement personnel). In addition, the meeting was attended by several high-ranking FBI men, including COINTELPRO specialist Richard Wallace Held, then Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Bureau's San Juan Field Office.<sup>67</sup>

One result of the conference seems to have been the designation of a mainland formation of the *independentista* movement, the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN), along with three other national liberation organizations (the Republic of New Afrika [RNA], *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Mexico* [MLNM], and the American Indian Movement) as "the most significant current internal security threats to the United States."<sup>68</sup> A more concrete outcome was a massive island-wide raid conducted by more than 300 SWAT-equipped agents, beginning before dawn on the morning of August 30, 1985. Operating out of the Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, the raiders invaded scores of homes and offices, arresting nearly 50 *independentistas* on "John Doe" warrants in which charges were not specified. Considerable personal property was destroyed, impounded or "lost."<sup>69</sup> The raid was initially "justified" by San Juan SAC Richard W. Held on the basis of "anti-terrorism" evidenced in the arrest of 11 *independentistas* – including Filiberto Ojeda Ríos, a leader of *Los Macheteros*, a clandestine organization – said to have been involved in



COINTELPRO cartoon distributed to discredit MPIPR leader Juan Mari Bras (depicted at left) just before the 1967 plebescite. The fraud was attributed to other *independentistas*.

the expropriation of \$7.1 million from a Wells Fargo facility in West Hartford, Connecticut on September 12, 1983.<sup>70</sup>

The cover story, which in any event failed to explain why 37 other *independentistas* – none of whom were accused of specific criminal acts – had been rounded up in the raid, was quickly belied by the U.S. Attorney in Puerto Rico. “You have to remember,” he said at a press conference, “there were two simultaneous investigations going on. There was the West Hartford investigation *and the one going on down here* [emphasis added].” His boss, U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, was even more straightforward: “We are sending a message to terrorists that their bloody acts will not be tolerated.”<sup>71</sup> Thus mere public advocacy of independence for Puerto Rico was converted into “terrorism” and utilized as the basis for the continuation of COINTELPRO under the rhetorical veneer of “counter-terrorist” operations. What had happened was seen quite plainly on the island by nearly everyone, including

relatively establishment-oriented politicians. PIP leader Rubén Berríos Martínez, for instance, termed the whole affair "a frontal attack on an entire movement and an entire set of ideals. It is virtually an act of war upon our people's will, determination and rights."<sup>72</sup> Even Governor Carlos Barceló Romero, no friend of the *independentistas*, formally protested the trampling upon Puerto Rico's constitution inherent to the Bureau's brand of counterintelligence activity.<sup>73</sup>

The governor was saying more than he intended. Inevitably, the FBI's concerted efforts to repress the *independentista* perspective in Puerto Rico's political life has served to deform the *Puertorriqueño* political process as a whole. And, as was the case with COINTELPRO-SWP, this appears to have been quite conscious and intentional. But, in Puerto Rico, the implications extend rather further. Not only did the Bureau's systematic denial of media access to, spreading of disinformation about, and fostering of factionalism within the *independentista* movement have the effect of negating much of the movement's electoral potential within the island arena itself, such tactics also subverted other initiatives to resolve the issue of Puerto Rico's colonial status in a peaceful fashion. This concerns in particular a plebescite called for July 23, 1967. During the ten months prior to the scheduled referendum to determine the desires of the *Puertorriqueño* public with regard to the political status of their island, the Bureau went far out of its way to spread confusion. The COINTELPRO methods used included creation of two fictitious organizations – *Grupo pro-Usó Voto del MPI* (roughly, "Group within the MPIPR in Favor of Voting to Achieve Independence") and the "Committee Against Foreign Domination of the Fight for Independence" – as the medium through which to misrepresent *independentista* positions "from the inside."<sup>74</sup> One outcome was that *Puertorriqueño* voters increasingly shied away from the apparently jumbled and bewildering *independentista* agenda and "accepted" continuation of a "commonwealth" status under U.S. domination which satisfied virtually none of the populace.

With this accomplished, the Bureau set about seeing to it the *independentistas* remained artificially discredited (and the overall *Puertorriqueño* option to mount a coherent effort to protest or reconvene the plebescite truncated) by shifting responsibility for the disaster onto its foremost victims:

It might be desirable to blame the communist bloc and particularly Cuba for the failure of the United Nations and to criticize Mari Bras and others for isolating the Puerto Rican independence forces from the democratic countries.<sup>75</sup>

Since 1967, although Mari Bras and other *independentistas* have made an annual pilgrimage to the UN Committee on Decolonization, and in 1978 managed to achieve formal international recognition that the island remains a colony despite designation as a commonwealth,<sup>76</sup> the U.S. has been able to shunt off the issue. U.S. diplomats routinely argue that the 1967 referendum "permanently reaffirmed by popular consent" the "domestic status" of Puerto Rico accepted by Muñoz Marín in 1953. This, according to the diplomats, represents the "exercise of self-determina-



More Bureau art work. Cartoon purporting to show that Mari Bras (center) and other MPIPR leaders were under the control of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in 1967. The cartoon was distributed in the name of the *Grupo pro-Uso Voto del MPI*, a fictitious *independentista* entity invented by the FBI for such purposes. The fabrication was circulated immediately prior to the U.N. plebescite.

tion" by *Puertorriqueños*, and renders the island's affairs an "internal concern of the United States" rather than a matter of international jurisdiction.<sup>77</sup> And, just in case the utterly contrived nature of the U.S. position failed to prove sufficiently convincing to Third World nations, "[U.S. United Nations] Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick made it clear to nonaligned nations that...a vote against the United States would carry penalties" when the *independentistas* finally managed to bring their questions to the General Assembly in 1981.<sup>78</sup>

With literally every avenue of "due and democratic process" sealed off by the extralegal methods of their colonizers, the *independentistas* have been left with essentially no recourse but armed struggle. Some realized this as early as the 1930s, others much later. For its part, the FBI seems to have understood from the outset that this would be the result of its mission in keeping Puerto Rico firmly within the U.S. orbit. Hence, the Bureau's early undertaking of counterintelligence operations against the NPPR and the evolution of these activities into the much more inclusive anti-*independentista* COINTELPRO beginning in 1960. Such an assessment also accounts for the apparent escalation of the sort of counterintelligence tactics used against the *independentistas* after 1971, when COINTELPRO was supposedly a thing of the past. As the events of 1985 abundantly demonstrate, in Puerto Rico the essentials of COINTELPRO remain very much alive. And, under the conditions which now prevail, its continuation promises to be more treacherous and violent than ever.

## COINTELPRO – Black Liberation Movement

Predictably, the most serious of the FBI's disruption programs [between 1956 and 1971] were those directed at "Black Nationalists." These programs...initiated under liberal Democratic administrations, had as their purpose "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters"...Agents were instructed to "inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant." Specifically, they were to undertake actions to discredit these groups both within the "responsible Negro community" and to "Negro radicals," and also "to the white community, both the responsible community and to 'liberals' who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalists..."

– Noam Chomsky –  
COINTELPRO

Although the FBI's COINTELPRO against the black liberation movement was not formally initiated until issuance of J. Edgar Hoover's August 25, 1967 memo quoted above by Noam Chomsky (see accompanying document), the roots of the Bureau's anti-black counterintelligence operations extend much deeper into U.S. history. As was documented in the introduction to this volume, Hoover was engaged at least as early as 1918 in plans to destroy black nationalist leader Marcus Garvey under the guise of "criminal proceedings." This occurred in the context of "the infamous race riot that first engulfed East St. Louis in July 1917, taking the lives of thirty-nine blacks and nine whites and the explosion that occurred less than two months later in Houston, Texas, in which two black soldiers and seventeen white men lost their lives."<sup>1</sup> Such violence was part of the process by which the U.S. national order, in which blacks as an overall population lived under near-total political disenfranchisement, economic prostration, and super-exploitation of their labor by the Euroamerican *status quo*, was intended to be preserved. In the aftermath of World War I, blacks had begun to mount the first serious challenge to such circumstances since the Reconstruction period immediately following the Civil War; Hoover and his proto-FBI organization, in kind with white vigilante formations, seem to have seen one of their primary missions as keeping blacks "in their place" by what ever repressive means were available.<sup>2</sup>



SAC, Albany

August 25, 1967

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ALL OFFICES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
INTERNAL SECURITY

- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately establish a control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for following and coordinating this new counterintelligence program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent well versed in investigations relating to black nationalist, hate-type organizations. The field office control file used under this program may be maintained in a pending inactive status until such time as a specific operation or technique is placed under consideration for implementation.

The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder. The activities of all such groups or intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a continuous basis so we will be in a position to promptly take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and to inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The pernicious background of such groups, their duplicity, and devious maneuvers must be exposed to public scrutiny where such publicity will have a neutralizing effect. Efforts of the various groups

- 2 - Atlanta
- 2 - Baltimore
- 2 - Boston
- 2 - Buffalo
- 2 - Charlotte
- 2 - Chicago
- 2 - Cincinnati
- 2 - Cleveland
- 2 - Detroit
- 2 - Jackson
- 2 - Los Angeles
- 2 - Memphis
- 2 - Newark
- 2 - New Orleans
- 2 - New York
- 2 - Philadelphia
- 2 - Phoenix
- 2 - Pittsburgh
- 2 - Richmond
- 2 - St. Louis
- 2 - San Francisco
- 2 - Washington Field Office

MCT-34  
REC 34  
448006  
19 AUG 29 1967

MAILED 2  
AUG 25 1967  
COMM-FBI

56 SEP 19 1967 (53)  
RYAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE.

Memo initiating COINTELPRO - Black Liberation Movement

It was into this disturbed atmosphere, further disturbed by the painful experiences of black soldiers during the [World War I] mobilization, that a new generation of radical black spokesmen, calling themselves "the New Negro" stepped... Buoyed by a wide array of spirited newspapers and militant journals that helped shape the black community's political consciousness, the New Negro radicals represented a new and startling breed... [offering] radical, some might even say revolutionary, prescriptions for overturning the status quo of white supremacy.<sup>3</sup>

Letter to SAC, Albany  
 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents must be frustrated. No opportunity should be missed to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations. When an opportunity is apparent to disrupt or neutralize black nationalist, hate-type organizations through the cooperation of established local news media contacts or through such contact with sources available to the Seat of Government, in every instance careful attention must be given to the proposal to insure the targeted group is disrupted, ridiculed, or discredited through the publicity and not merely publicized. Consideration should be given to techniques to preclude violence-prone or rabble-rouser leaders of hate groups from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media.

Many individuals currently active in black nationalist organizations have backgrounds of immorality, subversive activity, and criminal records. Through your investigation of key agitators, you should endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds. Be alert to determine evidence of misappropriation of funds or other types of personal misconduct on the part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or warranted counterintelligence may be instituted.

Intensified attention under this program should be afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam. Particular emphasis should be given to extremists who direct the activities and policies of revolutionary or militant groups such as Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown, Elijah Muhammad, and Maxwell Stanford.

At this time the Bureau is setting up no requirement for status letters to be periodically submitted under this program. It will be incumbent upon you to insure the program is being afforded necessary and continuing attention and that no opportunities will be overlooked for counterintelligence action.

This program should not be confused with the program entitled "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C," (Bufile 100-3-104), which is directed

Development of this "new racial awareness on the part of blacks led to a sharp increase in the number of lynchings after 1917 - seventy-six blacks were lynched in 1919 alone - and the simultaneous unprecedented wave of violent racial clashes, culminating in the summer of 1919 (known as 'Red Summer'), that must be seen largely as the attempt by whites to restore the racial *status quo ante*...In trying to contain the movement, the U.S. government chose to respond by launching a massive surveillance campaign to counter the influence of black leaders. Spear-headed by the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation, forerunner of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence services tended to view the newly awakened black militancy through the tinted prism of the Red Scare (*i.e.*, as an offshoot of communist agitation), leading them to adopt against blacks many of the same repressive measures employed against so-called subversives...What the official evidence now discloses is the apprehension by authorities of a parallel 'Black Scare.'"<sup>4</sup>

In this regard, Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) were a primary target. When the FBI was able, after five solid years of intensive effort, to arrange for Garvey's indictment and subsequent conviction on extremely dubious "fraud" charges, "he was jailed without even one day to arrange for UNIA's future." Instead, he was surrounded by "heavily armed federal agents who conducted him to the Tombs prison [in New York City], from which he was taken [straight] to the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary in February 1925," as if he were a public menace rather than – at worst – the perpetrator of an offense devoid of physical violence.<sup>5</sup> As a result:

By the summer of 1926 [UNIA] was no longer a coordinated unit, even though it still had hundreds of thousands of members, perhaps a million. The official Universal Negro Improvement Association was still there, and there was one last gigantic international convention in 1929, but the organization was no longer what it had been before Garvey entered prison.<sup>6</sup>

Nor was Garvey alone in being accorded "special attention" by the Bureau. For instance, during the massive railroad strikes in the 1920s, the FBI – as part of its much broader anti-labor and anti-black endeavors – went out of its way to topple A. Philip Randolph, black head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Union.<sup>7</sup> At about the same time, Hoover's agents initiated a "close surveillance" (a term usually associated with infiltration) of W.E.B. DuBois' National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the name of knowing "what every radical organization in the country was doing."<sup>8</sup> The monitoring continued throughout the 1920s and '30s although it was not until 1940 that Hoover offered a definition of what the FBI meant by the term "subversive activities" with which he "justified" such activities. It included:

[T]he holding of office in...Communist groups; the distribution of literature and propaganda favorable to a foreign power and opposed to the American way of life; agitators who are adherents of foreign ideologies who have for their purpose the stirring of internal strike [*sic*], class hatreds and the development of activities which in time of war would be a serious handicap in a program of internal security and national defense.<sup>9</sup>

This bald assertion of the political interests of the status quo was utilized as the rationale by which to step up investigation of possible CP "contamination and manipulation of the NAACP," a process which was "continued for twenty-five

years despite FBI's failing to uncover any evidence of subversive domination of the [black organization]."<sup>10</sup>

The [escalated] FBI investigation of the NAACP, begun in 1941, continued until 1966. Although the FBI prepared massive reports on the NAACP, including information on the group's political and legislative plans, the Bureau never uncovered any evidence of subversive domination or sympathies. In 1957, the New York field office of the FBI prepared a 137-page report on NAACP activities during the previous year, based on information supplied by 151 informers or confidential sources. From 1946 to 1960, the FBI used about three thousand wiretaps and over eight hundred "bugs," and obtained membership and financial records of [such] dissident groups.<sup>11</sup>

Notwithstanding its tangible lack of success in linking the NAACP to the CP or any other "foreign dominated" organization, the FBI lobbied to have it included among the groups covered by the Communist Control Act of 1954, and a cluster of corresponding state laws.<sup>12</sup> Only a series of Supreme Court decisions prevented the entire NAACP membership from being forced to register as "subversives," or going to prison for refusing to do so.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, the Bureau also began to focus its attention upon the recently-formed Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an entirely reformist and philosophically nonviolent black civil rights advocacy organization established in 1957 by the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and "several dozen other southern black ministers."<sup>14</sup>

### *The FBI and Martin Luther King*

The stated objective of the SCLC, and the nature of its practical activities, was to organize for the securing of black voting rights across the rural South, with an eye toward the ultimate dismantlement of at least the most blatant aspects of the southern U.S. system of "segregation" (apartheid). Even this seemingly innocuous agenda was, however, seen as a threat by the FBI. In mid-September of 1957, FBI supervisor J.G. Kelly forwarded a newspaper clipping describing the formation of the SCLC to the Bureau's Atlanta field office – that city being the location of SCLC headquarters – informing local agents, for reasons which were never specified, the civil rights group was "a likely target for communist infiltration," and that "in view of the stated purpose of the organization you should remain alert for public source information concerning it in connection with the racial situation."<sup>15</sup>

The Atlanta field office "looked into" the matter and ultimately opened a COMINFIL investigation of the SCLC, apparently based on the fact that a single SWP member, Lonnie Cross, had offered his services as a clerk in the organization's main office.<sup>16</sup> By the end of the first year of FBI scrutiny, in September of 1958, a personal file had been opened on King himself, ostensibly because he had been approached on the steps of a Harlem church in which he'd delivered a guest sermon by black CP member Benjamin J. Davis.<sup>17</sup> By October 1960, as the SCLC call for

desegregation and black voting rights in the south gained increasing attention and support across the nation, the Bureau began actively infiltrating organizational meetings and conferences.<sup>18</sup> In less than a year, by July of 1961 FBI intelligence on the group was detailed enough to recount that King had been affiliated with the Progressive Party in 1948 (while an undergraduate at Atlanta's Morehouse College), and that executive director Wyatt Tee Walker had once subscribed to a CP newspaper, *The Worker*.<sup>19</sup> Actual counterintelligence operations against King and the SCLC more generally seem to have begun with a January 8, 1962 letter from Hoover to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, contending that the civil rights leader enjoyed a "close relationship" with Stanley D. Levison, "a member of the Communist Party, USA," and that Isadore Wofsy, "a high ranking communist leader," had written a speech for King.<sup>20</sup>

On the night of March 15-16, 1962, FBI agents secretly broke into Levison's New York office and planted a bug; a wiretap of his office phone followed on March 20.<sup>21</sup> Among the other things picked up by this ELSURS surveillance was information that Jack O'Dell, who also had an alleged "record of ties to the Communist party," had been recommended by both King and Levison to serve as an assistant to Wyatt Tee Walker.<sup>22</sup> Although none of these supposed communist affiliations were ever substantiated, it was on this basis that SCLC was targeted within the Bureau's ongoing COINTELPRO-CP,USA, beginning with the planting of five disinformational "news stories" concerning the organization's "communist connections" on October 24, 1962.<sup>23</sup> By this point, Martin Luther King's name had been placed in Section A of the FBI Reserve Index, one step below those individuals registered in the Security Index and scheduled to be rounded up and "preventively detained" in concentration camps in the event of a declared national emergency;<sup>24</sup> Attorney General Kennedy had also authorized round-the-clock ELSURS surveillance of all SCLC offices, as well as King's home.<sup>25</sup> Hence, by November 8, 1963, comprehensive telephone taps had been installed at all organizational offices, and King's residence.<sup>26</sup>

The reasons for this covert but steadily mounting attention to the Reverend Dr. King were posited in an internal monograph on the subject prepared by FBI counterintelligence specialist Charles D. Brennan at the behest of COINTELPRO head William C. Sullivan in September 1963. In this 11-page document, Brennan found that, given the scope of support it had attracted over the preceding five years, civil rights agitation represented a clear threat to "the established order" of the U.S., and that "King is growing in stature daily as the leader among leaders of the Negro movement...so goes Martin Luther King, and also so goes the Negro movement in the United States."<sup>27</sup> This accorded well with Sullivan's own view, committed to writing shortly after King's landmark "I Have a Dream" speech during the massive civil rights demonstration in Washington, D.C., on August 28 of the same year:

We must mark [King] now, if we have not before, as the most dangerous Negro in the future of this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and

national security...it may be unrealistic to limit [our actions against King] to legalistic proofs that would stand up in court or before Congressional Committees.<sup>28</sup>

By 1964, King was not only firmly established as a preeminent civil rights leader, but was beginning to show signs of pursuing a more fundamental structural agenda of social change. Correspondingly, as the text of the accompanying memo from Sullivan to Joseph A. Sizoo makes plain, the Bureau's intent had crystallized into an unvarnished intervention into the domestic political process, with the goal of bringing about King's replacement with someone "acceptable" to the FBI. The means employed in the attempt to accomplish this centered in continued efforts to discredit King, maintaining a drumbeat of mass media-distributed propaganda concerning his supposed "communist influences" and sexual proclivities, as well as the triggering of a spate of harassment by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).<sup>29</sup> When this strategy failed to the extent that it was announced on October 14 of that year that King would receive a Nobel Peace Prize as a reward for his work in behalf of the rights of American blacks, the Bureau – exhibiting a certain sense of desperation by this juncture – dramatically escalated its efforts to neutralize him.

Two days after announcement of the impending award, Sullivan caused a composite audio tape to be produced, supposedly consisting of "highlights" taken from the taps of King's phones and bugs placed in his various hotel rooms over the preceding two years. The result, prepared by FBI audio technician John Matter, purported to demonstrate the civil rights leader had engaged in a series of "orgiastic" trysts with prostitutes and, thus, "the depths of his sexual perversion and depravity." The finished tape was packaged, along with the accompanying anonymous letter (prepared on unwatermarked paper by Bureau Internal Security Supervisor Seymore F. Phillips on Sullivan's instruction), informing King that the audio material would be released to the media unless he committed suicide prior to bestowal of the Nobel Prize. Sullivan then instructed veteran COINTELPRO operative Lish Whitson to fly to Miami with the package; once there, Whitson was instructed to address the parcel and mail it to the intended victim.<sup>30</sup>

When King failed to comply with Sullivan's anonymous directive that he kill himself, FBI Associate Director Cartha D. "Deke" DeLoach attempted to follow through with the threat to make the contents of the doctored tape public:

The Bureau Crime Records Division, headed by DeLoach, initiated a major campaign to let newsmen know just what the Bureau [claimed to have] on King. DeLoach personally offered a copy of the King surveillance transcript to *Newsweek* Washington bureau chief Benjamin Bradlee. Bradlee refused it, and mentioned the approach to a *Newsday* colleague, Jay Iselin.<sup>31</sup>

Bradlee's disclosure of what the FBI was up to served to curtail the effectiveness of DeLoach's operation, and Bureau propagandists consequently found relatively few takers on this particular "story." More, in the face of a planned investigation of

## THE COINTELPRO PAPERS

1/8  
J. A. Sizoo

Date: December 1, 1964  
 To: Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
 From: J. A. Sizoo  
 Subject: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Reference is made to the attached memorandum DeLoach to Mohr dated 11/27/64 concerning DeLoach's interview with [redacted] and to your infernal memo, also attached.

[redacted] stated to DeLoach that he was faced with the difficult problem of taking steps to remove King from the national picture. He indicates in his comments a lack of confidence that he, alone, could be successful. It is, therefore, suggested that consideration be given to the following course of action:

That DeLoach have a further discussion with [redacted] and offer to be helpful to [redacted] in connection with the problem of the removal of King from the national scene;

That DeLoach suggest that [redacted] might desire to call a meeting of Negro leaders in the country which might include, for instance, 2 or 3 top leaders in the civil rights movement such as James Farmer and A. Philip Randolph; 2 or 3 top Negro judges such as Judge Parsons and Judge Hasty; 2 or 3 top reputable ministers such as Robert Johnson, Moderator of the Washington City Presbytery; 2 or 3 other selected Negro officials from public life such as the Negro Attorney General from one of the New England states. These men could be called for the purpose of learning the facts as to the Bureau's performance in the fulfillment of its responsibilities under the Civil Rights statute, and this could well be done at such a meeting. In addition, the Bureau, on a highly confidential basis, could brief such a group on the security background of King [redacted] the use of a tape, such as contemplated in your memorandum, together with a transcript for convenience in following the tape, should be most convincing.

The inclusion of U.S. Government officials, such as Carl Rowan or Ralph Bunche, is not suggested as they might feel a duty to advise the White House of such a contemplated meeting. It is believed this would give us an opportunity to outline to a group of influential Negro leaders what our record in the enforcement of civil rights has been. It would also give them, on a confidential basis, information concerning King which would convince them of the danger of King to the over-all civil rights movement. [redacted] is already well aware of this. This group should include such leadership as would be capable of removing King from the scene if they, of their own volition, decided this was the thing to do after such a briefing. The group should include strong enough men to control a man like James Farmer and make him see the light of day. This might have the effect of increasing the stature of [redacted] who is a capable person and is ambitious.

There are refinements which, of course, could be added to the above which is set forth in outline form for possible consideration.

KING,

King, look into your heart. You know you are a complete fraud and a great liability to all of us Negroes. White people in this country have enough frauds of their own but I am sure they don't have one at this time that is any where near your equal. You are no clergyman and you know it. I repeat you are a colossal fraud and an evil, vicious one at that.

King, like all frauds you are in a position. You could have been our greatest leader.

But you are done. Your "honorary" degrees, your Nobel Prize (what a great irony) and other awards will not save you. King, I repeat you are done.

The American public, the church organizations that have been helping - Protestant, Catholic and Jews will know you for what you are - an evil, abnormal beast. So will others who have backed you. You are done.

King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific reason, it is definite practical significant. You are done. There is but one way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation.

**Memo (left) proposing the sending of an anonymous letter (above) to Martin Luther King in an unsuccessful attempt to convince him to commit suicide.**

electronic surveillance by government agencies announced by Democratic Missouri Senator Edward V. Long, J. Edgar Hoover was forced to order the rapid dismantling of the ELSURS coverage of both King and the SCLC, drying up much of the source material upon which Sullivan and his COINTELPRO specialists depended for "authenticity." Hoover's "weakness" on this matter appears to have infuriated Sulli-



**ROUTE IN ENVELOPE**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**Memorandum**

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *S/S*      DATE: May 22, 1968

FROM : Mr. G. C. Moore *GM*

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(POOR PEOPLE'S CAMPAIGN)

Tolson  
 DeLoach  
 Mohr  
 Bishop  
 Casper  
 Callahan  
 Conrad  
 Felt  
 Gale  
 Rosen  
 Sullivan  
 Tavel  
 Trotter  
 Tele. Room  
 Holmes  
 Gandy

*14*

This is to recommend an item regarding the Poor People's Campaign be given a cooperative news media source on a confidential basis by the Crime Records Division. A source has advised that some leaders of the Poor People's Campaign (PPC) feel that the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker group, is trying to dominate the PPC in Washington, D. C. The AFSC has assisted the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in various phases of this campaign. This situation is so serious that Fred C. Bennette, in charge of security for the PPC, refuses to go to the campaign office in Washington because of the presence of AFSC representatives.

An item has been prepared, copy attached, to show this jealousy on the part of PPC leaders. It is felt this should be given a cooperative news media source on a confidential basis by the Crime Records Division.

ACTION:

That attached item regarding the Poor People's Campaign be furnished a cooperative news media source on a confidential basis by Crime Records.

Enclosure (8) *Handwritten initials*

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop  
 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore  
 1 - (Mass Media)  
 1 - (Mass Media)  
 1 -

JUN 5 1968  
*Handwritten signatures and initials: W.C., D.R., A.B., etc.*

van, who seems to have felt that congress should simply have been defied, setting in place a permanent rift between the two senior FBI officials.<sup>33</sup>

Still, the Bureau's counterintelligence operations against King continued apace, right up to the moment of the target's death by sniper fire on a Memphis hotel balcony on April 4, 1968.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, as the accompanying memo from Sullivan to George C. Moore (head of the Bureau's "racial intelligence" squad) on May 22 of the

REC-24

"FRIENDS" TOO FRIENDLY FOR  
LEADERS OF POOR PEOPLE'S CAMPAIGN

Leaders of the "Poor People's Campaign" in Washington, D. C., are not exactly grateful for the assistance of the American Friends Service Committee on the campaign. They feel this help is a subtle effort to dominate the campaign.

One campaign leader is so irritated with the "Friends" that he refuses to go to the campaign office at 1401 U Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., because of the "Friends" there. He claims the representatives of the American Friends Service Committee that are at the campaign office are uncooperative.

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - (Mass Media)
- 1 - Mr. (Mass Media)
- 1 -

(9)

NOTE:

See memo G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned as above, dated May 22, 1968, prepared by

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_

43 1469

ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED FROM  
SEP 1968  
FBI

**Memo (left) proposing anonymous letter to disrupt the Poor People's Campaign. Text of letter appears above.**

same year amply demonstrates, certain of King's projects - such as the Poor People's Campaign - remained the focus of active COINTELPRO endeavors even after their leader's assassination. By 1969, as has been noted elsewhere, "[FBI] efforts to 'expose' Martin Luther King, Jr., had not slackened even though King had been dead for a year. [The Bureau] furnished ammunition to conservatives to attack King's memory, and...tried to block efforts to honor the slain leader."<sup>35</sup>

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT	
<i>Memorandum</i>	
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)      DATE: 1/22/69
FROM :	SAC, CHICAGO (157-2209) (P)
SUBJECT:	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (NATION OF ISLAM)
ReBulet, 1/7/69; Chicago letters 12/24/68 and 1/14/69.	
<p>ReBulet has been thoroughly studied and discussed by the SAC, the Supervisor, and Agents familiar with facets of the NOI which might indicate trends and possible future direction of the organization. The Bureau's concern is most understandable and suggestions appreciated.</p>	
<p>Over the years considerable thought has been given, and action taken with Bureau approval, relating to methods through which the NOI could be discredited in the eyes of the general black populace or through which factionalism among the leadership could be created. Serious consideration has also been given towards developing ways and means of changing NOI philosophy to one whereby the members could be developed into useful citizens and the organization developed into one emphasizing religion - the brotherhood of mankind - and self improvement. <u>Factional disputes have been developed - the most notable being MALCOLM X LITTLE.</u> Prominent black personages have publicly and nationally spoken out against the group - U.S. District Court Judge JAMES HENTON PARSONS being one example. The media of the press has played down the NOI. This appears to be a most effective tool as individuals such as MUHAMMAD assuredly seek any and all publicity be it good or bad; however, if the press is utilized it would appear it should not concentrate on such aspects as the alleged strength of the NOI, immoral activities of the leadership, misuse of funds by these officials, etc. It is the opinion of this office that such exposure is ineffective, possibly creates interest and maybe envy among the lesser educated black man causing them out of curiosity to attend meetings and maybe join, and encourage the opportunist to seek personal gain - physical or monetary - through alignment with the group. At any rate it is felt such publicity in the case of the NOI is not overly effective.</p>	
<p>2 - Bureau (RM) 1 - Chicago (RM) JBS: bab (8)</p> <p>REC 14      6 JAN 22 1969</p> <p>Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan</p>	

**Memo taking credit for the assassination of Malcolm X, killed in an FBI-provoked factional dispute on February 14, 1965.**

King and the SCLC were, of course, hardly the only objects of the Bureau's *de facto* COINTELPRO against the emerging black liberation movement during this period. As Manning Marable has pointed out, the FBI also went after the Student

Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an affiliated but rather more radical civil rights organization than the SCLC, very early on: "In late 1960, FBI agents began to monitor SNCC meetings. [President Lyndon] Johnson's Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach, gave approval for the FBI to wiretap all SNCC leaders' phones in 1965...Hoover ordered the extensive infiltration and disruption of SNCC."<sup>36</sup> Another instance concerns the Nation of Islam (NoI) or "Black Muslim" movement headed by Elijah Muhammad (s/n: Elijah Poole):

The Bureau began wiretap surveillance of Elija Muhammed's [sic] Chicago residence in 1957...on the grounds that members of the NoI "disavow allegiance to the United States" and "are taught not to obey the laws of the United States"...When Elija Muhammed bought a winter home in Arizona in 1961, a wiretap and microphone were installed there. Both forms of surveillance continued for years...[The FBI] played assorted COINTEL tricks on the organization as early as the late 1950s.<sup>37</sup>

As was documented in Chapter 3, when Malcolm X, one of Elijah Muhammad's principle lieutenants, broke away from the NoI in March of 1964 to establish a separate church, the Muslim Mosque, Inc., and a consciously political black organization, the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), the Bureau undertook concerted COINTELPRO actions to block the development of alliances between the OAAU and white radical organizations such as the SWP. By the point of Malcolm's assassination during a speech in Harlem on the night of February 14, 1965, the FBI had compiled at least 2,300 pages of material on the victim in just one of its files on him, the NoI and the OAAU.<sup>38</sup> Malcolm X was supposedly murdered by former colleagues in the NoI as a result of the faction-fighting which had led to his splitting away from that movement, and their "natural wrath" at his establishment of a competing entity. However, as the accompanying January 22, 1969 memo from the SAC, Chicago, to the Director makes clear, the NoI factionalism at issue didn't "just happen." Rather, it had "been developed" by deliberate Bureau actions – through infiltration and the "sparking of acrimonious debates within the organization," rumor-mongering, and other tactics designed to foster internal disputes – which were always the standard fare of COINTELPRO.<sup>39</sup> The Chicago SAC, Marlin Johnson, who would shortly oversee the assassinations of Illinois Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, makes it quite obvious that he views the murder of Malcolm X as something of a model for "successful" counterintelligence operations.

Nor was it necessary for black spokespersons to be heading or forming political organizations in order to be targeted for elimination by the FBI's "informal" counterintelligence methods. As the accompanying May 15, 1968 memo from Director Hoover to the Chicago SAC reveals, even independent activists such as the writer/comedian Dick Gregory came in for potentially lethal treatment. In Gregory's case, these assumed the form – *à la* COINTELPRO–CP, USA's Operation Hoodwink (see Chapter 2) – of attempting to provoke "La Cosa Nostra" into dispensing with him. A considerable body of circumstantial evidence suggests – although docu-

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago

Director, FBI (100-448006)

1 -

MAY 15, 1968

1 -

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ST  
P

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - RACE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(RICHARD CLAXTON GREGORY)

Rebulet 4/23/68.

Chicago airtel and LHM dated 5/2/68 and captioned "Richard Claxton Gregory" concern a speech by Gregory on 4/29/68 wherein he noted that "Syndicate hood's [are] living all over. They are the filthiest snakes that exist on this earth." Referenced Bulet instructed you to develop counter-intelligence action concerning militant black nationalist Dick Gregory.

Consider the use of this statement in developing a counterintelligence operation to alert La Cosa Nostra (LCN) to Gregory's attack on LCN. It is noted that other speeches by Gregory also contain attacks on the LCN. No counterintelligence action should be taken without Bureau authority.

TJD:pag/mrn  
(5) - 1/21/68

NOTE:

Teletype from New Orleans to Director, 5/30/68, captioned "Richard Claxton Gregory" reported speech by Gregory referring to the Director and FBI Agents in derogatory terms. The Director noted, on the informative note of 5/11/68 teletype which said we would recommend counterintelligence action against Gregory when indicated, "Right."

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAY 23 1968

MAY 24 1968 TELETYPE UNIT 

REC-7 100

11 MAY 15 1968

Proposal to provoke the murder of comedian/activist Dick Gregory by "La Cosa Nostra" à la COINTELPRO - CP,USA's Operation Hoodwink.

ments have yet to be released - that the Bureau undertook comparably Machiavelian efforts to achieve the neutralization of a number of other black leaders during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These ranged from the Reverend Ralph Abernathy (King's replacement in SCLC) to Georgia Senator Julian Bond.

## *The War Against Black Liberation*

As the 1960s unfolded, the true extent of official resistance to even the most moderate improvements in the status of blacks – and concomitant alterations in the balance of social, economic and political power in the U.S. – became increasingly apparent. This recalcitrance on the part of the *status quo* was signified but hardly encompassed by the repressive activities of the FBI *vis à vis* figures such as King. This official posture gave rise to a spiral of frustration on the part of those whose objectives had initially been merely the obtaining of such elemental rights as the ballot, equal pay for equal work, use of public facilities and the like. In turn, this frustration both led to broad acceptance of increasingly radical analyses of U.S. society on the part of black activists and theorists. By the mid-60s, the primacy of those such as King who had developed a mass following on the basis of appeals for “equal rights” was being rapidly supplanted by that of younger leaders such as SNCC’s Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, who espoused a much more militant vision of “black power.”<sup>40</sup>

At the same time, not only conscious black power adherents, but the black community as a whole, showed increasing signs of abandoning the posture of “principled nonviolence” which had all along marked the SCLC performance. This was manifested not only in Carmichael’s and Brown’s oversight of a change in SNCC’s name from Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to Student *National* Coordinating Committee, but much more concretely, “in the streets.”<sup>41</sup> This corresponded with the rise of a generalized perception among blacks that, far from being restricted to the former Confederate states of the “Old South,” the problems they confronted were fully national in scope:

Even before the assassination of Malcolm, many social critics sensed that non-violent direct action, a tactic of protest used effectively in the South, would have little appeal in the Northern ghetto. Far more likely were a series of urban social upheavals which could not be controlled or channeled by the civil rights leadership...In the spring and summer months of 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, massive black rebellions swept across almost every major US city in the Northeast, Middle West and California. In Watts and Compton, the black districts of Los Angeles, black men and women took to the streets, attacking and burning white-owned property and institutions. The [1965] Watts rebellion left \$40 million in private property damage and 34 persons killed. Federal authorities ordered 15,000 state police and National Guardsmen into Detroit to quell that city’s uprising of 1967. In Detroit 43 residents were killed; almost 2,000 were injured; 2,700 white-owned businesses were broken into, and 50 per cent of these were gutted by fire or completely destroyed; fourteen square miles of Detroit’s inner city were torched; 5,000 black persons were left without homes. Combining the total weight of socio-economic destruction, the ghetto rebellions from 1964 to 1972 led to 250 deaths, 10,000 serious injuries, and 60,000 arrests, at a cost of police, troops, and other coercive measures taken by the state and losses to business in the billions of dollars.<sup>42</sup>

Given this, it is fair to say that, by 1967 at the latest, black Americans were in a

state of open insurgency against the Euroamerican society to whose interests they had all along been subordinated. Established order in the U.S. was thereby confronted with its most serious internal challenge since the period of the First World War. The response of the *status quo* was essentially twofold. On the one hand, the government moved to defuse the situation through a series of cooptive gestures designed to make it appear that things were finally changing for the better. The executive branch, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, declared "war on poverty" and launched a series of tokenistic and soon to be forgotten programs such as "Project Build."<sup>43</sup> Congress cooperated in this exercise in damage control by quickly enacting bits of legislation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and revision of the Civil Rights Act in 1968, structured in such a way as to convey a superficial impression of "progress" to disgruntled blacks while leaving fundamental social relations very much intact.<sup>44</sup>

On the other hand, key government figures were astute enough to perceive that the ghetto rebellions were largely spontaneous and uncoordinated outpourings of black rage. Costly as the ghetto revolts were, real danger to the *status quo* would come only when a black organizational leadership appeared with the capacity to harness and direct the force of such anger. If this occurred, it was recognized, mere gestures would be insufficient to contain black pressure for social justice. Already, activist concepts and rhetoric had shifted from demands for black power within American society to black liberation from U.S. "internal colonialism."<sup>45</sup> The task thus presented in completing the federal counterinsurgency strategy was to destroy such community-based black leadership before it had an opportunity to consolidate itself and instill a vision of real freedom among the great mass of blacks. In this, of course, the FBI assumed a central role. President Johnson publicly announced, in the wake of the 1967 uprisings in Detroit and Newark, that he had issued "standing instructions" that the Bureau should bring "the instigators" of such "riots" to heel, by any means at its disposal,<sup>46</sup> while his attorney general, Ramsey Clark, instructed Hoover by memo to:

[U]se the [FBI's] maximum resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.<sup>47</sup>

The attorney general's memo further suggested the FBI expand or establish "sources or informants" within "black nationalist organizations" such as SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and "other less publicized groups" in order to "determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups, and also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might be involved" in their activities.<sup>48</sup> As was shown at the outset of this chapter, Hoover responded by launching a formal anti-black liberation COINTELPRO in August 1967. By early 1968, as the accompanying Airtel from G.C. Moore to William C. Sullivan demonstrates, the counterintelligence operation was not only in full swing across the

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 23, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore *gcm/1/7*

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*gcm*  
*Disarm*

**PURPOSE:**

To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to 41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black nationalist activity in this country.

**BACKGROUND:**

By letter dated August 25, 1967, 23 field offices were advised of a new Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of a leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone elements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability and prevent the growth of these groups among America's youth.

**CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:**

In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field. Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic progress letters to stimulate thinking in this area.

REC 18

Attached airtel also reminds the field that counterintelligence suggestions to expose these militants or neutralize them must be approved by the Bureau.

6 MAR 11 1968

**ACTION:**

That attached airtel expanding this program, defining goals and instructing periodic progress letters be submitted be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.

Enclosure *5-3-68*

TJD:rrm (6)

*TJD*

*Dick*

*Mark of [unclear]*

*5-T80*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE.

Memorandum expanding COINTELPRO - Black Liberation Movement to fully National scope.





Airtel to SAC, Albany  
 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

BACKGROUND

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

Albany	Memphis
Atlanta	Newark
Baltimore	New Orleans
Boston	New York
Buffalo	Philadelphia
Charlotte	Phoenix
Chicago	Pittsburgh
Cincinnati	Richmond
Cleveland	St. Louis
Detroit	San Francisco
Jackson	Washington Field
Los Angeles	

Each of the above offices was to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam (NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black

- 2 -

These last explicitly include the blocking of coalitions between radical black political organizations, the targeting of key leaders such as "Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elija Muhammed" for special attention by the Bureau, the "neutralizing" - by unspecified means - of both organizations and selected leaders, the undertaking of propaganda efforts to "discredit" targeted groups and individuals in order to deny them "respectability" within their own communities and, hence, "prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth." Elsewhere, Hoover called upon his operatives to intervene directly in blocking free speech and access by black radicals to the media: "Consid-

Airtel to SAC, Albany  
 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligence, to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each Agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

#### GOALS

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Mao Mau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position. Elijah Muhammad is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled tactically in three ways. You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community,

eration should be given to preclude [black] rabble-rouser leaders of these hate groups from spreading their philosophy publicly or through the communications media."<sup>49</sup>

Over the first year of its official anti-black COINTELPRO, the FBI developed a network of some 4,000 members, assembled from what had previously been code-named the TOPLEV ("Top Level" Black Community Leadership Program) BLACPRO ("Black Program") efforts as well as new recruits, called the "Ghetto Informant Program."<sup>50</sup> It also used the information thus collected to go after the incipient black liberation movement, hammer and tong:

Airtel to SAC, Albany  
 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information.

#### TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the:

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),  
 Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),  
 Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM),  
 Nation of Islam (NOI)

Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, H. Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhammad of NOI, should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

#### INSTRUCTIONS

The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.

#### NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned as above dated 2/25/68, prepared by TJD:ram.

CR-5

In August 1967, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered the extensive infiltration and disruption of SNCC, as well as other...formations, such as the militant Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons of Defense, and CORE...FBI agents were sent to monitor [Stokely] Carmichael and [H. Rap] Brown wherever they went, seeking to elicit evidence to imprison them. Brown was charged with inciting a race riot in Maryland, and was eventually sentenced to five years in a federal penitentiary for carrying a rifle across state lines while under criminal indictment. [SNCC leader Ralph] Featherstone and...activist Ché Payne were murdered on 9 March 1970, when a bomb exploded in their automobile in Bel Air, Maryland. [SNCC leader Cleveland] Sellers was indicted for organizing black students in South Carolina and for [himself] resisting the draft.<sup>51</sup>

As has been noted elsewhere, "the FBI had between 5,000 and 10,000 active cases on matters of race at any given time nationwide. In 1967 some 1,246 FBI agents received...racial intelligence assignments each month. By [1968] the number had jumped to 1,678...Hoover [also ordered William Sullivan] to compile a more refined listing of 'vociferous rabble rousers' than provided by the Security Index. [He] hoped the first edition of the new Rabble Rouser Index of 'individuals who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord' would facilitate target selection for the new black nationalist counterintelligence program...Everything was computerized."<sup>52</sup>

Although Hoover contended the Bureau's COINTELPRO tactics were necessitated by the "violence" of its intended victims, his March 4 memo negates even this flimsy rationalization by placing King's purely pacifistic SCLC among its primary targets from the beginning, adding King himself in February 1968, shortly before the civil rights leader's assassination.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, he included SNCC, still calling it by its long-standing descriptor as a *nonviolent* entity. Even in the case of Maxwell Sanford's Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), which had never offered professions of pacifist intent, Hoover was forced to admit that his agents had turned up no hard evidence of violence or other criminal activities. Rather, the director points with pride to an anti-RAM COINTELPRO operation undertaken during the summer of 1967 in which RAM members were "arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail" and consequently "spent most of the summer in jail," even though there had never been any intent to take them to trial on the variety of contrived offenses with which they were charged.<sup>54</sup> Hoover recommended this campaign of deliberate false arrest as being the sort of "neutralizing" method he had in mind for black activists, and then ordered each of the 41 field offices receiving his memo to assign a full-time coordinator to such COINTELPRO activities within 30 days.

The nature of the actions triggered by Hoover's instructions varied considerably from field office to field office. In St. Louis, for example, agents undertook a series of anonymous letters – the first of which is proposed in the accompanying February 14, 1969 memo from the St. Louis SAC to the director, and approved in the accompanying reply from Hoover on February 28 – to ensnare the Reverend Charles

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448 006)

DATE: 2-14-69

FROM : SAC, ST. LOUIS (157-5818) P

SUBJECT: COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
(BLACK LIBERATORS)

*Pollin*

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for Springfield one copy of a letter to [redacted]

The following counter-intelligence activity is being proposed by the St. Louis Division to be directed against [redacted]. He is [redacted] and [redacted]

The activity attempts to alienate him from his wife and cause suspicion among the BLACK LIBERATORS that they have a dangerous troublemaker in their midst.

BACKGROUND:

[redacted] who [redacted] He occasionally sends her money and she appears to be a faithful, loving wife, who is apparently convinced that her husband is performing a vital service to the Black world and, therefore, [redacted] must endure this separation without bothering him. [redacted] is, to all indications, an intelligent, respectable young mother, [redacted]

Her husband, on the other hand, considers himself a "BOMB" and he frequently enjoyed the bedroom affection of various Sisters of the BLACK LIBERATORS, including [redacted]

How [redacted] actually feels about his wife is a matter of conjecture, but it is highly probable that he wants no problems at home that would detract from his Black Nationalist Work, or cast a reflection upon him with the white ministers in the area who are sympathetic and previously helpful to him.

1 - 206 D m level.  
2 - Bureau (Encl. 2) RM  
2 - Springfield (Encl. 1) RM  
1 - St. Louis  
JAF:vaa  
(5)

REC 44

727



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo proposing COINTELPRO against the Reverend Charles Koen in St. Louis

Koen, a long-time SNCC activist, in a web of sexual innuendo and/or outright slander (much the same approach as had been used against King). Koen was perceived by the Bureau, correctly enough, as the galvanizing figure in the then-occurring transformation of the Black Liberators, a black street gang in the St. Louis/

SL: 157-5818

EXPLANATION OF LETTER:

The enclosed letter was prepared from a penmanship, spelling, and vocabulary style to imitate that of the average Black Liberator member. It contains several accusations which should cause [redacted] great concern. The letter is to be mailed in a cheap, unmarked envelope with no return address and sent from St. Louis to [redacted] residence in Cairo. Since her letters to [redacted] are usually sent via the Black Liberator Headquarters, any member would have access to getting her address from one of her envelopes. This address is available to the St. Louis Division.

Her response, upon receipt of this letter, is difficult to predict and the counter-intelligence effect will be nullified if she does not discuss it with him. Therefore, to insure that [redacted] and the Black Liberators are made aware that the letter was sent, the below follow-up action is necessary:

St. Louis will furnish Springfield with a machine copy of the actual letter that is sent. Attached to this copy will be a neat typed note saying:

[redacted]

"A mutual friend made this available without [redacted] knowledge. I understand she recently received this letter from St. Louis. I suggest you look into this matter.

God Bless You! "

This note would give the impression that somehow one of [redacted] close friends, probably a minister, obtained a copy of the letter and made it available to [redacted]. The above material is to be mailed by the Springfield Division at Cairo, Ill., anonymously in a suitable envelope with no return address to:

[redacted]

Although [redacted] is now living in E. St. Louis, Ill., he did use the above address when arrested in St. Louis in Jan., 1969, and it was printed in local newspapers. Mail will reach him at the above address since it is the residence of [redacted] a close associate of his.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS:

The following results are anticipated following the execution of the above-counter-intelligence activity:

1. Ill feeling and possibly a lasting distrust will be brought about between [redacted]. The concern over what to do about it may detract from his time spent in the plots and plans of the SNCC. He may even decide to spend more time with his wife and children and less time in Black Nationalist activity.
2. The Black Liberators will waste a great deal of time trying to discover the writer of the letter. It is possible that their not-too-subtle investigation will lose present members and alienate potential ones.
3. Inasmuch as Black Liberator strength is ebbing at its lowest level, this action may well be the "death-blow."

ROUTE 1 ENVELOPE

SAC, St. Louis (157-5512)

2/28/69

REC 44  
Director, FBI (100-448006) - 727

1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(BLACK LIBERATORS)

Reurlet 2/14/69.

St. Louis is authorized to send anonymous letter set out in relet and Springfield is authorized to send the second anonymous letter proposed in relet. Use commercially purchased stationery and take the other precautions set out to insure this cannot be traced to this Bureau.

The Bureau feels there should be an interval between the two letters of at least ten days. St. Louis should advise Springfield of date second letter should be mailed.

St. Louis and Springfield should advise the Bureau of any results.

2 - Springfield

TJD:chl  
(8)

NOTE:

MAILED 10  
FEB 28 1969  
COMM-FBI

3  
[Handwritten initials]

The Black Liberators are a black extremist group in St. Louis. [REDACTED] of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) for the Midwest. SNCC is also a black extremist group. St. Louis recommends anonymous letters be sent and his wife regarding [REDACTED] extramarital activities.

The letters might cause Koen to spend more of his time at home since [REDACTED] will know his wife is aware of his activities. Since [REDACTED] and his wife are separated, the letters cannot hurt the wife but might draw [REDACTED] back to his wife.

St. Louis also feels that the Black Liberators will try to discover the writer within the organization which will help neutralize new and potential members. Since the letters are to be sent anonymously, there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. St. Louis has prepared the first anonymous letter using the penmanship and grammar of the typical member of the Black Liberators.

Based on data furnished by St. Louis, it appears this separation is due to [REDACTED] organization work among black extremists and not because of marital discord, however, it is known [REDACTED] has had extramarital affairs.

The COINTELPRO against Koen continues (above) and, in a May 26, 1969 memo (excerpt right) it is expanded to include a bogus underground newspaper, *The Blackboard* to spread disinformation within the St. Louis black community.



BLACKBOARD UNDERGROUND NEWSPAPER

Pursuant to Bureau authority received in letter from the Bureau to St. Louis on 4/14/69, the St. Louis Division prepared 200 copies of BLACKBOARD, an alleged underground newspaper of the black students of Southern Illinois University (SIU). It was mailed anonymously by Special Agents of the St. Louis Division at Edwardsville, Ill., and copies of it were sent to virtually every black activist organization and Black Nationalist leader in the bi-state area.

The following results were noted by the St. Louis Division:

Page 10 of the 4/24/69 issue of the "St. Louis American", a weekly newspaper published in St. Louis, Mo., and oriented to the black community, contains a column by FARLEY WILSON, a black columnist for that newspaper. Midway through his column and recitation of various local events, WILSON said, "There is an absolutely scandalous 'underground' sheet floating around both sides of the river that devotes an entire section of its first page to some real dangerous allegations about a few of our 'blacker' black brothers and sisters and some so-called 'bad mating' sure hope that whoever is printing that jazz is prepared to back it up."

[REDACTED] provided a carbon copy of BLACKBOARD to the St. Louis Field Office and advised that copies of it were all over St. Louis and East St. Louis. He stated that his sources have advised that

[REDACTED] stated that although no one could publicly speak out against the [REDACTED] "the word was out" that [REDACTED] would be punished for his participation in it. [REDACTED] also advised that [REDACTED] was extremely angry about the newspaper, and he had told several people that he was going "to get" [REDACTED] was so angry about it that he attempted to get a local Negro radio station to give him radio time to answer the charges in BLACKBOARD.

On 5/14/69, Detective [REDACTED]

advised that his sources stated that [REDACTED] had been told to "get out of town" by several black leaders as a result of his tirades against the BLACKBOARD newspaper and his outburst at the ACTION meeting.

On 5/14/69, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the Springfield Division that [REDACTED] is still very angry with [REDACTED] for publicizing in BLACKBOARD [REDACTED] previous connections with the Zulu 1200, a black extremist organization in St. Louis, Mo., which is now defunct. [REDACTED] confronted [REDACTED] in person about this recently, and although [REDACTED] attempted to deny any connection with BLACKBOARD, [REDACTED] did not believe [REDACTED] denial. [REDACTED] had no information as to any specific future action which black militants in the East St. Louis, Ill. area might take against [REDACTED]

The St. Louis Division feels, on the basis of the above, that the publication of BLACKBOARD was a most successful counterintelligence endeavor. It is felt that the effectiveness of [REDACTED] has been blunted, and it is unlikely that they will ever be able to regain their former stature. [REDACTED] have probably also lost some degree of influence as a result of BLACKBOARD's publication.

East St. Louis area, into a politicized social action organization. He was also known to be a key leader in black community attempts - through formation of a "United Front" - to resist Ku Klux Klan terror in nearby Cairo, Illinois. It was foreseen that his neutralization would lead to a virtual collapse of black political activity throughout southern Missouri and Illinois. By May 26, 1969, as the accompanying memo from the St. Louis SAC to Hoover shows, the letter campaign against Koen was not only well developed, but disinformation activities had been broadened to include production and distribution of *The Blackboard*, a bogus "underground" newspaper aimed mainly at spreading allegations of sexual impropriety about a broadening circle of black community leaders and activists. By 1970, the resulting interpersonal jealousies and animosities had sown a discord sufficient to cause a general disintegration of effectiveness within the black liberation movement in the target area.

Similarly, in New York, the Bureau "placed the fifteen or twenty members of Charles 37X Kenyatta's Harlem Mau Mau on the COINTELPRO target list."<sup>55</sup> Although the details of the operations directed against the group remain murky, they may well have played into the April 1973 murder of Malcolm X's brother, Hakim Jamal (s/n: Allen Donaldson), by a Roxbury, Massachusetts affiliate dubbed "De Mau Mau."<sup>56</sup> In any event, the death of Jamal prompted the Boston FBI office to file a request that headquarters "delete subject from the [Black] Extremist Photograph Album," indicating that he too had been a high-priority COINTELPRO target.<sup>57</sup>

Meanwhile, in southern Florida, as the accompanying August 5, 1968 memo from Hoover to the SAC, Albany, bears out, a more sophisticated propaganda effort had been conducted. Working with obviously "friendly" media representatives, local COINTELPRO specialists oversaw the finalization of a television "documentary" on both the black liberation movement and the new left in the Miami area. The program, which was viewed by a mass audience, was consciously edited to take the statements of key activists out of context in such a way as to make them appear to advocate gratuitous violence and seem "cowardly," and utilized camera angles deliberately selected to make those interviewed come off like "rats trapped under scientific observation." After detailing such intentionally gross distortion of reality - passed off all the while as "news" and "objective journalism" - Hoover called upon "[e]ach counterintelligence office [to] be alert to exploit this technique both for black nationalists and New Left types." Overall, it appears that most field offices complied with this instruction to the best of their respective abilities, a matter which perhaps accounts for much of the negativity with which the black liberation movement came to be publicly viewed by the end of the 1960s.

In Detroit, COINTELPRO operatives set out to destroy the recently-founded Republic of New Afrika (RNA) by targeting its leader, Imari Abubakari Obadele (s/n: Richard Henry). At first they used, as the accompanying memos dated November 22 and December 3, 1968 reveal, a barrage of anonymous letters in much the same fashion as those employed against Koen in St. Louis, albeit in this case they charged financial rather than sexual impropriety. When this approach failed to achieve the

1 - D. DeLoach  
1 - C. Sullivan  
1 - E. Bishop  
1 - G.C. Moore

8/5/68

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI (100-448006)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Bureau wants to bring a highly successful counterintelligence operation to the attention of all counterintelligence offices, so that all offices will be aware of the type of results that can be obtained in this program.

The Miami Division developed a source at a local television station and the source produced a news special on black nationalists and on the New Left. Miami requested Bureau authority to furnish the source background data of a public source nature when the source indicated an interest in producing a show exposing these groups.

2 - Atlanta  
2 - Baltimore  
2 - Birmingham  
2 - Boston  
2 - Buffalo  
2 - Charlotte  
2 - Chicago  
2 - Cincinnati  
2 - Columbia  
2 - Cleveland  
2 - Denver  
2 - Detroit  
2 - Houston  
2 - Indianapolis  
2 - Jackson  
2 - Jacksonville  
2 - Kansas City  
2 - Los Angeles  
2 - Memphis  
2 - Miami  
2 - Milwaukee

2 - Minneapolis  
2 - Mobile  
2 - Newark  
2 - New Haven  
2 - New Orleans  
2 - New York  
2 - Omaha  
2 - Philadelphia  
2 - Phoenix  
2 - Pittsburgh  
2 - Portland  
2 - Richmond  
2 - Sacramento  
2 - San Diego  
2 - San Francisco  
2 - Seattle  
2 - Springfield  
2 - St. Louis  
2 - Tampa  
2 - WFO

MAILED 11  
AUG 13 1968

REC-34  
EX-102  
100-448006-2  
AUG 14 1968

TELETYPE UNIT

SENT DIRECTOR FOR APPROVAL  
8-5-68

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 3

274  
AUG 19 1968

TELETYPE UNIT

8 03 9m

**Shaping the news. Memo establishing model of COINTELPRO media techniques utilized against the new left and black liberation movement.**

desired result, the Bureau escalated, setting out to bring about their target's imprisonment. In the view of involved agents, "If Obadele can be kept off the streets, it may prevent further problems with the RNA inasmuch as he completely domi-

Letter to SAC, Albany  
 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 100-448006

The Bureau authorized <sup>Show APPROVED 7/7/68</sup> furnishing the source data on a confidential basis and the ~~show~~ A great deal of research was done by Miami Agents and it resulted in an excellent program. The show, which ended with quotes from the Director on the nature of the New Left, was so well received that the television station received requests for a film of the show by local civic groups.

As you are aware publicity about New Left and black nationalist groups, especially television coverage, sometimes enhances the stature of these groups. At the same time, Miami has demonstrated that a carefully planned television show can be extremely effective in showing these extremists for what they are. Local New Left and black nationalist leaders were interviewed on the show and seemed to have been chosen for either their inability to articulate or their slithering and stupid appearance.

Miami furnished a film of this show for Bureau review and it was apparent that the television source used the very best judgment in editing comments by these extremists. He brought out that they were in favor of violent revolution without their explaining why. But he also brought out that they, personally, would be afraid to lead a violent revolution, making them appear to be cowards. The interview of black nationalist leaders on the show had the leaders seated, ill at ease, in hard chairs. Full-length camera shots showed each movement as they squirmed about in their chairs, resembling rats trapped under scientific observation.

Each counterintelligence office should be alert to exploit this technique both for black nationalists and New Left types. Miami learned from sources that those who appeared on the show realized that it presented them in a most unfavorable light. One even complained to the television station about it. This counterintelligence operation will be of great value in the South Florida area and the Bureau hopes these results can be duplicated in other offices. Success in this case resulted from hard work and acumen on the part of the Agents who handled the matter. Especially important was the choice of individuals interviewed as they did not have the ability to stand up to a professional newsman. The fine job of interviewing and editing done by the news people involved was also most important.

Each office should be alert to the possibility of using this technique. No counterintelligence action should be taken without Bureau authority. For your information operations of this type must be handled through reliable, established sources and must be set up so that the FBI is not revealed as the source.

NOTE:

See memorandum G.C. Moore to Mr. W.C. Sullivan, captioned as above, dated 8/1/68, prepared by [redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 11/22/68

FROM : SAC, DETROIT (157-3214)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA)

Re Bureau airtel to Detroit, dated  
10/31/68.

Per suggestion set forth in re Bureau airtel, Detroit requests mailing letters prepared on commercially purchased paper to various members of the Republic of New Africa (RNA) with the exception of RICHARD HENRY, signed by a concerned RNA brother.

The letter will read as follows:

Dear Brother and Sister:

Lately I have been concerned about the lack of funds of the RNA. I know that many brothers and sisters have paid taxes and have donated on various occasions to the Republic. Where has the money gone, and why haven't we purchased our land with it?

I do not make any direct accusation at any brother or sister but I would like to know how Brother Imari owns a house, supports a family, and travels all over the country when he is not even working. I think we all deserve an explanation of the use of the RNA money, and I think we are foolish to donate and pay taxes to support one man, when the Republic is in such dire need of money. I think this question should be raised at the next Wednesday meeting. I'm not signing my name because I do not want to create a personal conflict among us.

A Concerned Brother

This letter will be mailed to Detroit members of the RNA only and if a favorable response is received, a similar letter will be prepared for nationwide RNA member circulation.

Detroit requests Bureau approval.

**Memo initiating COINTELPRO against the Republic of New Afrika by targeting its leader, Imari Abubakari Obadele (s/n: Richard Henry), shortly after the organization's founding in 1968.**

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Detroit (157-3214)

December 3, 1962

REC-126

Director, FBI (100-446006) //

1 - Mr. Tunstall  
1 - Mr. Deakin

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA)

Reurlet 11/22/68.

Detroit is authorized to send the anonymous letter set out in relet to selected members of the Republic of New Africa (RNA) using commercially purchased stationery.

Insure this mailing cannot be traced to the Bureau and advise of results. If results are favorable, consider submitting a recommendation for circulating this letter to other RNA members in other cities.

TJD:ekw  
(5)

NOTE:

This anonymous letter criticizes Richard Henry (brother Imari), an RNA officer who allegedly is using RNA funds for personal expenses. This has been a matter of discussion with enough RNA members so as to protect our sources. Criticism of leaders of black nationalist extremist groups, such as the RNA, for misusing funds, is an effective method of neutralizing these leaders. Since this is an anonymous letter, there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau.

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
wep  
J...  
M...  
TJD

Memo authorizing COINTELPRO against Imari Obadele and the RNA.

nates the organization and all members follow his instructions." Hence, when the RNA leader moved south to consummate an organizational plan of establishing a "liberated zone" in the Mississippi River delta, near Jackson, Mississippi, the FBI moved to provoke a confrontation which could then be used to obtain a conviction. First, as is shown in the accompanying December 12, 1970 memo from the SAC,

Since March, 1968, the Republic of New Africa (RNA) has been attempting to start a separate black nation in five southern states, starting with Mississippi. In this regard, the RNA has been trying to buy and lease land in Mississippi in the Jackson Division on several past occasions. (Counter-intelligence measures has been able to abort all RNA efforts to obtain land in Mississippi.)

In late July, 1970, RICHARD HENRY, aka Brother Inari, leader of the RNA, came to Jackson, Mississippi, accompanied by many out-of-state supporters to hold a national RNA meeting "on the land of the nation in Mississippi". This conference was disruptive and ineffective due to Jackson Division, Bureau-approved counterintelligence measures.

In mid-September, 1970, Brother IMARI and a few close associates of his came to look at land which was for sale in rural Hinds County, Mississippi, near Jackson; this land was owned by a Negro male who was retiring and owned over 560 acres. Jackson informants advised Bureau Agents of developments regarding this land and the fact that the owner of the land, [redacted], N/M, had advised Brother IMARI he will lease or sell him ten to twenty acres. RNA leaders, including Brother IMARI, were delighted over this land purchase or leasing prospect. Jackson informants were directed by contacting Agents to approach [redacted] privately and indicate to him that his selling land to Brother IMARI would not be a wise endeavor. Additionally, on 10/9/70, [redacted] was interviewed by Bureau Agents and advised of the true nature and violence potential of the RNA and its leaders. The interview lasted 1 1/2 hours; following the interview, [redacted] indicated he would reconsider whether he would sell or lease any land to the RNA; on 10/21/70, Bureau Agents interviewed [redacted] who was assisting the RNA in their dealings with [redacted] regarding the land. The true nature and violence potential of the RNA and its leaders was explained to [redacted].

As a result of the above counterintelligence efforts, the land which the RNA had almost finalized plans regarding purchasing or leasing in rural Hinds County, Miss., has not been sold or leased to them. Jackson has maintained contact with [redacted] and he has advised he has no plans to lease or sell any land to the RNA in the immediate future. There have been no recent visits by top officials of the RNA to Mississippi regarding the land, it being noted they made several visits in September, 1970, when their prospects for the land purchase or leasing was good.

As a result of the above, intensive efforts of the RNA to obtain land in Mississippi over the past two and one-half years are still totally unsuccessful.

**Excerpt from a December 2, 1970 report detailing the COINTELPRO operations in Mississippi which resulted in the case of the RNA 11.**

Jackson (Elmer Linberg), to Hoover, agents intervened to block the perfectly legal sale of a land parcel to Obadele. SA George Holder and his associates undertook by word of mouth to foster a marked increase in anti-RNA sentiment in the Klan-ridden Jackson area. Finally, they coordinated an early morning assault on RNA facilities in the city involving some 36 heavily armed agents and local police headed by SAC Linberg - as well as an armored car - on August 18, 1971.

In the resultant firefight, one police officer, William Skinner, was killed and an agent, William Stringer, was wounded. Imari Obadele and 10 other RNA members were arrested – thereby becoming the “RNA 11” – and charged with murder, assault, sedition, conspiracy, possession of illegal weapons, and “treason against the state of Mississippi.”<sup>59</sup> Tellingly, the original charges, which had ostensibly provided a basis for the massive police raid, were never brought to court. In the end, eight of the accused were convicted, but only of conspiracy to assault federal officers, assault, illegal possession of a nonexistent automatic weapon, and having used weapons in the commission of these other “felonies.”<sup>60</sup> This is to say they were imprisoned for having defended themselves from the armed attack of a large number of FBI agents and police who could never show any particular reason for having launched the assault in the first place. Obadele received a twelve year sentence, served seven, and the entire operation undoubtedly entered the annals of “successful” COINTELPROs.

### *COINTELPRO Against the Black Panther Party*

By the fall of 1968, the FBI felt it had identified the organization most likely to succeed as the catalyst of a united black liberation movement in the U.S. This was the Black Panther Party (BPP), originally established as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in the San Francisco Bay area city of Oakland by Merritt College students Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale (a former RAM member) during October of 1966. On September 8, 1968, J. Edgar Hoover let it be known in the pages of the *New York Times* that he considered the Panthers “the greatest [single] threat to the internal security of the country.”<sup>61</sup> Shortly thereafter, William Sullivan sent the accompanying memo to George C. Moore, outlining a plan by which already-existing COINTELPRO actions against the BPP might “be accelerated.”

Although Sullivan utilized the habitual Bureau pretense that targets of such attention were “violence-prone” and making “efforts to perpetrate violence in the United States,” the party’s predication – as evidenced in its Ten-Point Program – was in some ways rather moderate and, in any event, entirely legal.<sup>62</sup> Far from conducting “physical attacks on police,” as Sullivan claimed, the Panthers were well-known to have anchored themselves firmly in the constitutional right to bear arms and effect citizen’s arrests in order to curtail the high level of systematic (and generally quite illegal) violence customarily visited upon black inner city residents by local police.<sup>63</sup> More to the point, but left unmentioned by the FBI assistant director, was that the entire thrust of BPP organizing – reliance on the principle of armed self-defense included – went to forging direct community political control over and economic self-sufficiency within the black ghettos.<sup>64</sup> As has been noted elsewhere, “In late 1967, the Panthers initiated a free breakfast programme for black children, and offered free health care to ghetto residents.”<sup>65</sup> By the summer of 1968, these undertakings had been augmented by a community education project and an anti-heroin campaign. The party was offering a coherent strategy to improve the realities



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**Memorandum**

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(BLACK PANTHER PARTY)

DATE: 9/27/68

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

PURPOSE:

To obtain authority for the attached letter to those field divisions having Black Panther Party (BPP) activity instructing that the counterintelligence program against this organization be accelerated and that each office submit concrete suggestions as to future action to be taken against the BPP.

The extremist BPP of Oakland, California, is rapidly expanding. It is the most violence-prone organization of all the extremist groups now operating in the United States. This group has a record of violence and connections with foreign revolutionaries. It puts particular emphasis on not only verbal attacks but also physical attacks on police.

OBSERVATIONS:

The information we are receiving from our sources concerning activities of the BPP clearly indicates that more violence can be expected from this organization in the immediate future. It therefore, is essential that we not only accelerate our investigations of this organization, and increase our informants in the organization but that we take action under the counterintelligence program to disrupt the group. Our counterintelligence program may bring about results which could lead to prosecution of these violence-prone leaders and active members, thereby thwarting their efforts to perpetrate violence in the United States.

Enclosure  
100-448006

JCD:rmw (7)

REC-15

5. [Signature]

128608A

Memo initiating COINTELPRO - BPP.

- both spiritual and material - of ghetto life. Consequently, black community perceptions of the BPP were radically different from those entertained by the police establishment (which the Panthers described as an "occupying army").

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
 RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
 (BLACK PANTHER PARTY)

**SCOPE OF PROPOSED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM:**

As stated above, the attached letter will instruct the field to submit positive suggestions as to actions to be taken to thwart and disrupt the BPP. Instructions are and will be reiterated that no action is to be taken without prior Bureau authority.

These suggestions are to create factionalism between not only the national leaders but also local leaders, steps to neutralize all organizational efforts of the BPP as well as create suspicion amongst the leaders as to each others sources of finances, suspicion concerning their respective spouses and suspicion as to who may be cooperating with law enforcement. In addition, suspicion should be developed as to who may be attempting to gain control of the organization for their own private betterment, as well as suggestions as to the best method of exploiting the foreign visits made by BPP members. We are also soliciting recommendations as to the best method of creating opposition to the BPP on the part of the majority of the residents of the ghetto areas.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That attached letter, in accordance with the above, be approved.

*WCS*

A significant measure of the Black Panthers' success was described in racist terms by Sullivan who noted that membership was "multiplying rapidly." Beginning with a core of five members in 1966, the BPP had grown to include as many as 5,000 members within two years, and had spread from its original Oakland base to include chapters in more than a dozen cities.<sup>66</sup> This seems due, not only to the appeal inherent in the Panthers' combination of standing up for basic black rights in the face of even the most visible expressions of state power with concrete programs to upgrade inner city life, but to the party's unique inclusiveness. Although the conditions for acceptance into the BPP were in some ways quite stringent, Newton and Seale had from the outset focused their recruiting and organizing efforts on

what they termed "the lumpen" – a cast of street gangs, prostitutes, convicts and ex-cons typically shunned by progressive movements – with an eye towards forming a new political force based upon this "most oppressed and alienated sector of the population" and activating its socially constructive energies.<sup>67</sup>

Also of apparent concern to the Bureau was the Panthers' demonstrated ability to link their new recruitment base to other important sectors of the U.S. opposition.<sup>68</sup> One of the party's first major achievements in this regard came when Chairman Bobby Seale and Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver managed to engineer the merger of SNCC with their organization, an event signified at a mass rally in Oakland on February 17, 1968 when Stokely Carmichael was designated as honorary BPP Prime Minister, H. Rap Brown as Minister of Justice and James Forman as Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>69</sup> As is demonstrated in the accompanying October 10, 1968 memo from Moore to Sullivan, the FBI quickly initiated a COINTELPRO effort to "foster a split between...the two most prominent black nationalist extremist groups" through the media.

The SNCC leadership was also targeted more heavily than ever. H. Rap Brown was shortly eliminated by being "charged with inciting a race riot in Maryland," allowed to make bail only under the constitutionally dubious proviso that he not leave the Borough of Manhattan in New York, "and was eventually sentenced to five years in a federal penitentiary [not on the original charge, but] for carrying a rifle across state lines while under criminal indictment."<sup>70</sup> Stokely Carmichael's neutralization took a rather different form. Utilizing the services of Peter Cardoza, an infiltrator who had worked his way into a position as the SNCC leader's bodyguard, the Bureau applied a "bad jacket," deliberately creating the false appearance that Carmichael was himself an operative.<sup>71</sup> In a memo dated July 10, 1968, the SAC, New York, proposed to Hoover that:

...consideration be given to convey the impression that CARMICHAEL is a CIA informer. One method of accomplishing [this] would be to have a carbon copy of an informant report supposedly written by CARMICHAEL to the CIA carefully deposited in the automobile of a close Black Nationalist friend...It is hoped that when the informant report is read it will help promote distrust between CARMICHAEL and the Black Community...It is also suggested that we inform a certain percentage of reliable criminal and racial informants that "we have it from reliable sources that CARMICHAEL is a CIA agent. It is hoped that the informants would spread the rumor in various large Negro communities across the land."<sup>72</sup>

Pursuant to a May 19, 1969 Airtel from the SAC, San Francisco, to Hoover, the Bureau then proceeded to "assist" the BPP in "expelling" Carmichael through the forgery of letters on party letterhead. The gambit worked, as is evidenced in the September 5, 1970 assertion by BPP head Huey P. Newton: "We...charge that Stokely Carmichael is operating as an agent of the CIA."<sup>73</sup>

Meanwhile, according to the New York SAC, his COINTELPRO technicians had followed up, using the target's mother as a prop in their scheme:

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: October 10, 1968

FROM : Mr. G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(BLACK PANTHER PARTY)

PURPOSE:

To recommend attached item be given news media source on confidential basis as counterintelligence measure to help neutralize extremist Black Panthers and foster split between them and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

BACKGROUND:

There is a feud between the two most prominent black nationalist extremist groups, The Black Panthers and SNCC. Attached item notes that the feud is being continued by SNCC circulating the statement that:

"According to zoologists, the main difference between a panther and other large cats is that the panther has the smallest head."

This is biologically true. Publicity to this effect might help neutralize Black Panther recruiting efforts.

ACTION:

That attached item, captioned "Panther Pinheads," be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division on a confidential basis. We will be alert for other ways to exploit this item.

Enclosure  
100-448008

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. T.E. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. G.C. Moore

[Redacted distribution list]

610 (top of page)

Memo outlining tactic to split the BPP and SNCC.

On 9/4/68, a pretext phone call was placed to the residence of STOKELY CARMICHAEL and in absence of CARMICHAEL his mother was told that a friend was calling who was fearful of the future safety of her son. It was explained to Mrs. CARMICHAEL the absolute necessity for CARMICHAEL to "hide out" inasmuch

It is suggested that consideration be given to convey the impression that CARMICHAEL is a CIA informant.

One method of accomplishing the above would be to have a carbon copy of informant report reportedly written by CARMICHAEL to the CIA carefully deposited in the automobile of a close Black Nationalist friend. The report should be so placed that it will be readily seen.

It is hoped that when the informant report is read it will help promote distrust between CARMICHAEL and the Black Community. It is suggested that carbon copy of report be used to indicate that CARMICHAEL turned original copy into CIA and kept carbon copy for himself.

It is also suggested that we inform a certain percentage of reliable criminal and racial informants that "we heard from reliable sources that CARMICHAEL is a CIA agent". It is hoped that these informants would spread the rumor in various large Negro communities across the land.

Excerpt from July 10, 1968 memo proposing the bad-jacketing of SNCC/BPP leader Stokely Carmichael.

as several BPP members were out to kill him. Mrs. CARMICHAEL appeared shocked upon hearing the news and stated she would tell STOKELY when he came home.<sup>74</sup>

Although there is no evidence whatsoever that a Panther "hit team" had been assembled to silence the accused informer, Carmichael left the U.S. for an extended period in Africa the following day, and the SNCC/Panther coalition was effectively destroyed.

As all this was going on, Cleaver was developing another highly visible alliance, this one with "white mother country radicals," which he and Seale had initiated in December 1967.<sup>75</sup> This was with the so-called Peace and Freedom Party, which planned to place Cleaver – not only in his capacity as a leading Panther, but as the celebrated convict-author of *Soul on Ice*<sup>76</sup> and parolee editor of *Ramparts* magazine – on the California ballot as a presidential candidate during the 1968 election; his vice presidential candidate was slated to be SDS co-founder Tom Hayden, while Huey P. Newton was offered as a congressional candidate from his prison cell.<sup>77</sup> The ensuing campaign resulted in a wave of positive exposure for the BPP which the authorities were relatively powerless to counteract. Hence, Cleaver – the powerful writer and speaker at the center of it all – was targeted for rapid elimination.

On April 6 [1968], two days after Martin Luther King was killed, Cleaver was in the *Ramparts* office in the late afternoon, dictating his article, "Requiem for Nonviolence." In a matter of hours he and other Panthers would be involved in a shootout with the Oakland police. Seventeen-year-old Bobby Hutton died, shot in the back moments after he and Eldridge, arms above their heads, stumbled out of the

building where they'd taken refuge. Cleaver, who was wounded in the leg, was taken first to Oakland's Highland Hospital; then to the Alameda County Courthouse where police made him lie on the floor while he was being booked; and finally, that same night, to San Quentin Hospital where a guard pushed him down a flight of stairs. He was brought to the state medical facility at Vacaville and confined in the "hole."<sup>78</sup>

Although Cleaver was never convicted of any charge stemming from the firefight, and it soon became apparent that Ray Brown's Oakland Panther Squad had deliberately provoked the incident, his "parole was quickly revoked, and for two months he sat at Vacaville. The [California] Adult Authority had exercised its authority to suspend or revoke parole without notice or hearing, basing its actions solely on police reports. Three parole violations were listed: possession of firearms, associating with individuals of bad reputation, and failing to cooperate with the parole agent."<sup>79</sup> But, when Charles Garry, Cleaver's attorney, petitioned for a writ of *habeas corpus*, it was granted by state Superior Court Judge Raymond J. Sherwin, in Solano County (where Vacaville is located).

Judge Sherwin almost immediately dismissed the claim that Cleaver had associated with persons of "bad reputation," noting that the adult authority had been unable to even list who was supposedly at issue. The noncooperation claim was also scuttled when Garry introduced evidence that the parole officer in question had consistently assessed Cleaver in written reports as "reliable" and "cooperative" since his release from prison. The state's weapons possession claim also fell apart when the judge found that, "Cleaver's only handling of a firearm [a rifle] was in obedience to a police command. He did not handle a hand gun at all."<sup>80</sup> The judge concluded that:



It has to be stressed that the uncontradicted evidence presented to this Court indicated that the petitioner had been a model parolee. The peril to his parole status stemmed from no failure of personal rehabilitation, but from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals, goals which were offensive to many of his contemporaries. Not only was there absence of cause for the cancellation of his parole, it was the product of a type of pressure unbecoming, to say the least, to the law enforcement paraphernalia of the state.<sup>81</sup>

With that, Judge Sherwin ordered Cleaver's release, a ruling which was immediately appealed by the adult authority to the state appellate court. The higher court, refusing to hear *any* evidence in the matter, simply affirmed "the arbitrary power of the adult authority to revoke parole."<sup>82</sup> Consequently, despite having been shown to have engaged in no criminal activity at all, Cleaver was ordered back to San Quentin as of November 27, 1968. Under such conditions, he opted instead to go into exile, first in Cuba, then Algeria and, eventually, France.<sup>83</sup> The immediacy of his talents, energy and stature were thus lost to the BPP - along with the life of Bobby Hutton, one of its earliest and most dedicated members - while the stage was set for a future COINTELPRO operation.

<i>Memorandum</i>		RECEIVED 6 11/25/68
TO :	SAC, Baltimore	DATE: 11/25/68
FROM :	Director, FBI	
SUBJECT:	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BLACK NATIONALIST WHITE GROUPS RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (BLACK PANTHER PARTY)	
<p>For the information of recipient offices a serious struggle is taking place between the Black Panther Party (BPP) and the US organization. The struggle has reached such proportions that it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals.</p> <p>In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences as well as to exploit all avenues of creating further dissension in the ranks of the BPP, recipient offices are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP.</p> <p>Commencing December 2, 1968, and every two-week period thereafter, each office is instructed to submit a letter under this caption containing counterintelligence measures aimed against the BPP. The bi-weekly letter should also contain accomplishments obtained during the previous two-week period under captioned program.</p> <p>All counterintelligence actions must be approved at the Bureau prior to taking steps to implement them.</p>		

**Memo initiating the lethal COINTELPRO which pitted the US organization against the BPP. Note the similarity in method to that of Operation Hoodwink.**

Anti-Panther COINTELPRO activities were directed not only at blocking or destroying the party's coalition-building. They were, as the accompanying November 25, 1968 memo from Hoover to the SAC, Baltimore, bears out, also devoted to exacerbating tensions between the BPP and organizations with which it had strong ideological differences. In the case of the so-called United Slaves (US), a black cultural nationalist group based primarily in southern California, this was done despite - or because of - "The struggle...taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisal." What was meant by the Bureau "fully capitalizing" on the situation is readily attested by the accompanying November 29 memo to Hoover from the SAC, Los Angeles, proposing the sending of an anonymous letter - attributed to the Panthers - "revealing" a fictional BPP plot to assassinate US head Ron Karenga. The stated objective was to provoke "an US and BPP vendetta." A number of defamatory cartoons - attributed to both US and the



**Samples of the sorts of cartoons produced and distributed by the FBI in southern California to provoke violence between US and the BPP.**

BPP, with each side appearing to viciously ridicule the other - were also produced and distributed within local black communities by the Los Angeles and San Diego FBI offices.



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 11/29/68

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-1751) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

*Nichols*  
*W. J. Jones*  
*11/29/68*

Re Los Angeles letter to Bureau dated 9/25/68.

I. OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

The Los Angeles Office is currently preparing an anonymous letter for Bureau approval which will be sent to the Los Angeles Black Panther Party (BPP) supposedly from a member of the "US" organization in which it will be stated that the youth group of the "US" organization is aware of the BPP "contract" to kill RON KARENGA, leader of "US", and they, "US" members, in retaliation, have made plans to ambush leaders of the BPP in Los Angeles.

It is hoped this counterintelligence measure will result in an "US" and BPP vendetta.

Investigation has indicated that the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) has been furnishing the BPP with financial assistance. An anonymous letter is being prepared for Bureau approval to be sent to a leader of PFP in which it is set forth that the BPP has made statements in closed meetings that when the armed rebellion comes the whites in the PFP will be lined up against the wall with the rest of the whites.

It is felt that this type of a letter could cause considerable disruption of the association between the BPP and the PFP.

In order to cause disruption between the BPP of Oakland, California, and the BPP of Los Angeles, an envelope is being prepared for Bureau approval which appears

2 - Bureau (RM)  
1 - Los Angeles  
LWS/dld  
(3)

REC-9

406  
10 REC  
111

Portion of memo highlighting continuing efforts to foster violence between US and the BPP. Note simultaneous operations being conducted to split the BPP from its support base in the Peace and Freedom Party as well as to foment discord among the Panthers themselves.

### III. TANGIBLE RESULTS

The BPP Breakfast Program appears to be floundering in San Diego due to lack of public support and unfavorable publicity concerning it. It is noted that it has presently been temporarily suspended. Therefore, it was felt that placing the above mentioned anonymous call to the Bishop at this particular time might be a significant factor in precluding the resumption of the program. The information to the Bishop appeared to be favorably received and he seemed to be quite concerned over the fact that one of his Priests was openly involved in utilization of church facilities for this purpose. This matter, of course, will be closely followed for further anticipated developments concerning the Breakfast Program.

Shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this over-all situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program.

In view of the recent killing of BPP member SYLVESTER BELL, a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US. This cartoon, or series of cartoons, will be similar in nature to those formerly approved by the Bureau and will be forwarded to the Bureau for evaluation and approval immediately upon their completion.

**Excerpt from an August 20, 1969 report summarizing the "accomplishments" and plans for the BPP/US COINTELPRO in San Diego.**

On January 17, 1969, these tactics bore their malignant fruit when Los Angeles BPP leaders Alprentice "Bunchy" Carter and Jon Huggins were shot to death by US members George and Joseph Stiner, and Claude Hubert, in a classroom at UCLA's Campbell Hall. Apparently at the FBI's behest, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) followed up by conducting a massive raid – 75 to 100 SWAT equipped police participated – on the home of Jon Huggins' widow, Ericka, on the evening of his death, an action guaranteed to drastically raise the level of rage and frustration felt by the Panthers assembled there. The police contended that the rousting of Ericka Huggins and other surviving LA-BPP leaders was intended to "avert further violence," a rationale which hardly explains why during the raid a cop placed a loaded gun to the head of the Huggins' six-month-old baby, Mai, laughed and said "You're next."<sup>84</sup> In the aftermath, southern California COINTELPRO specialists assigned themselves "a good measure of credit" for these "accomplishments," and proposed distribution of a new series of cartoons – including the accompanying examples – to "indicate to the BPP that the US organization feels they are ineffectual, inadequate, and riddled with graft and corruption."<sup>85</sup>

The idea was approved and, as is shown in the accompanying excerpts from an August 20, 1969 report by the San Diego SAC to Hoover, obtained similar results.

## ROUTE ON ENVELOPE

SAC, Newark (100-49654)

10/2/69

REQ 17


EX-105  
Director, FBI (100-448006) / 3961 - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIT

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

ReNKlet 9/18/69.

Authority is granted Newark to mail the cartoon submitted in referenced letter. The cartoon, which was drawn by the Newark Office, is satisfactory and needs no duplication. In reproducing this cartoon, Newark should insure that the paper and envelopes used do not contain any traceable markings. When mailing this cartoon, care should be taken so that the Bureau is not disclosed as the source and strict security is maintained. Newark should advise of any results received from this mailing.

The BPP/US COINTELPRO continued in the east.

Among the “tangible results” which the SAC found to be “directly attributable to this program” were “shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest...in the ghetto area.” At another point, he noted that one of the shootings had resulted in the death of Panther Sylvester Bell at the hands of US gunmen on August 14 (another San Diego Panther, John Savage, had also been murdered by US on May 23), and announced that, apparently on the basis of such a resounding success, “a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between the BPP and US.”

The Newark field office also joined in the act, as is attested by the accompanying October 2, 1969 memo from the SAC in that city to Hoover, and the cartoon which corresponds to it. Newark credited the COINTELPRO with three other Panther murders as of September 30, 1969, when it sent an anonymous letter to the local BPP chapter warning them to “watch out: Karenga’s coming,” and listing a national “box score” of “US – 6, Panthers – 0.”<sup>66</sup> While this seems to have been the extent of the fatalities induced through the COINTELPRO operation – a bodycount which in itself would not have proven crippling to either side of the dispute – such FBI activities did, as cultural nationalist leader Amiri Baraka (s/n: LeRoi Jones) has pointed out, help solidify deep divisions within the radical black community as a whole which took years to overcome, and which effectively precluded the possibility of unified political action within the black liberation movement.<sup>67</sup>

As has been noted elsewhere, one “of the FBI’s favorite tactics was to accuse the Panthers and other black nationalists of anti-Semitism, a tactic designed to destroy the movement’s image ‘among liberal and naive elements.’ Bureau interest in anti-Semitism grew during the summer of 1967 at the National Convention for a New Politics, when SNCC’s James Forman and Rap Brown led a floor fight for a resolution condemning Zionist expansion. The convention’s black caucus introduced the resolution, and SNCC emerged as the first black group to take a public stand against Israel in the Mid-East conflict.”<sup>68</sup> In New York, as is revealed in the accompanying September 10, 1969 memo, this assumed the form of sending anonymous letters to Rabbi Meir Kahane of the neo-fascistic Jewish Defense League in hopes that the “embellishment” of “factual information” within the missives might provoke Kahane’s thugs “to act” against the BPP.

Comparable methods were used in Chicago, where BPP leader Fred Hampton was showing considerable promise in negotiating a working alliance with a huge black street gang known as the Blackstone Rangers (or Black P. Stone Nation). As is demonstrated in the accompanying January 30, 1969 letter from Hoover to Marlin Johnson, the Chicago SAC (see page 138), this “threat” prompted the local COINTELPRO section to propose – and Hoover to approve – the sending of an anonymous letter to Ranger head Jeff Fort, falsely warning that Hampton had “a hit [murder contract] out on” him as part of a Panther plot to take over his gang. What the Bureau expected to result from the sending of this missive had already been outlined by Johnson in a memo to Hoover on January 10:

It is believed that the [letter] may intensify the degree of animosity between the two

MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)      DATE: 9/10/69

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161140) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

Re NY report of [REDACTED], captioned "JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE, RACIAL MATTERS", NY file 157-3463; Bu letter to NY, 7/25/69.

Referenced report has been reviewed by the NYO in an effort to target one individual within the Jewish Defense League (JEDEL) who would be the suitable recipient of information furnished on an anonymous basis that the Bureau wishes to disseminate and/or use for future counter-intelligence purposes.

NY is of the opinion that the individual within JEDEL who would most suitably serve the above stated purpose would be Rabbi MEIR KAHANE, a Director of JEDEL. It is noted that Rabbi KAHANE's background as a writer for the NY newspaper "Jewish Press" would enable him to give wide-spread coverage of anti-Semitic statements made by the BPP and other Black Nationalist hate groups not only to members of JEDEL but to other individuals who would take cognizance of such statements.

In order to prepare a suggested initial communication from the anonymous source to Rabbi KAHANE which would establish rapport between the two, it is felt that this contact should not be limited to the furnishing of factual information of interest to the aims of JEDEL because the NYO does not feel that JEDEL could be motivated to act as called for in referenced Bureau letter if the information gathered by the NYO concerning anti-semitism and other matters were furnished to that organization without some embellishment.

## Memo proposing anonymous letter to provoke conflict between the Jewish Defense League and the BPP. Text of letter appears on the next page.

groups and occasion Forte [sic] to take retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership...Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the BPP alleging a Ranger plot against the BPP leadership; however, it is not felt that this would be productive principally because the BPP...is not believed to be as violence prone as the Rangers, to whom violent type activity - shooting and the like - is second nature [emphasis added].

The FBI's concern in the matter was not, as Hoover makes abundantly clear in his letter, that someone might be killed as a consequence of such "disruptive

For example it is felt that JEDEL is aware of the majority of information concerning the factual views of the BPP and other Black Nationalist groups through public sources of information such as the BPP newspaper, "The Black Panther", and to furnish such information from an "anonymous source" would either be dismissed by JEDEL as trivial or attributed to some other party who may have an interest in causing JEDEL to act against such groups as the BPP.

In view of the above comments the following is submitted as the suggested communication to be used to establish rapport between the anonymous source and the selected individual associated with JEDEL:

"Dear Rabbi Kahape:

I am a Negro man who is 48 years old and served his country in the U.S. Army in WW2 and worked as a truck driver with "the famous red-ball express" in Gen. Eisenhower's Army in France and Nazi Germany. One day I had a crash with the truck I was driving, a 2 1/2 ton truck, and was injured real bad. I was treated and helped by a Jewish Army Dr. named "Rothstein" who helped me get better again.

Also I was encouraged to remain in high school for two years by my favorite teacher, Mr. Katz. I have always thought Jewish people are good and they have helped me all my life. That is why I become so upset about my oldest son who is a Black Panther and very much against Jewish people. My oldest son just returned from Algiers in Africa where he met a bunch of other Black Panthers from all over the world. He said to me that they all agree that the Jewish people are against all the colored people and that the only friends the colored people have are the Arabs.

I told my child that the Jewish people are the friends of the colored people but he calls me a Tom and says I'll never be anything better than a Jew boy's slave.

Last night my boy had a meeting at my house with six of his Black Panther friends. From the way they talked it sounded like they had a plan to force Jewish store owners to give them money or they would drop a bomb on the Jewish store. Some of the money they get will be sent to the Arabs in Africa.

They left books and pictures around with Arab writing on them and pictures of Jewish soldiers killing Arab babies. I think they are going to give these away at Negro Christian Churches.

I thought you might be able to stop this. I think I can get some of the pictures and books without getting myself in trouble. I will send them to you if you are interested.

I would like not to use my real name at this time.

A friend"

It is further suggested that a second communication be sent to Rabbi KAHANE approximately one week after the above described letter which will follow the same format, but will contain as enclosures some BPP artifacts such as pictures of BOBBY SEALE, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, a copy of a BPP newspaper, etc. It is felt that a progression of letters should then follow which would further establish rapport with the JEDEL and eventually culminate in the anonymous letter writer requesting some response from the JEDEL recipient of these letters.

SAC, Chicago (157-2209)

1/30/69

17

Director, FBI (100-440066) 597  
REC-121

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Reurlet 1/13/69.

Authority is granted to mail anonymous letter to Jeff Fort, as suggested in relet, in care of the First Presbyterian Church, 6401 South Kimbark, Chicago, Illinois.

Utilize a commercially purchased envelope for this letter and insure that the mailing is not traced to the source.

Advise the Bureau of any results obtained by the above mailing.

WDD:ums  
(4)

NOTE:

MAILED 10  
JAN 29 1969  
COMM-FBI

Jeff Fort is the leader of the Blackstone Rangers, a black extremist organization. Chicago advises that so long as Fort continues as the leader of the Rangers, a working arrangement between the BPP and the Rangers may be effected on Ranger terms. Chicago has recommended the anonymous mailing of the following letter in anticipation that its receipt by Fort will intensify the degree of animosity existing between these two black extremist organizations:

Handwritten initials and scribbles, possibly "TBI" and "W...".

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_


"Brother Jeff:

"I've spent some time with some Panther friends on the west side lately and I know what's been going on. The brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you. I'm not a Panther, or a Ranger, just black. From what I see these Panthers are out for themselves not black people. I think you ought to know what their up to, I know what I'd do if I was you. You might hear from me again."

"A black brother you don't know"

Letter authorizing sending of bogus letter to Chicago gang leader Jeff Fort in hopes that it will provoke violent retaliation against city BPP head Fred Hampton.

activities," but that a properly nondescript envelope be employed in the mailing of the bogus letter in order that "any tangible results obtained" could not be "traced back to" the Bureau.<sup>99</sup> Similar tactics were employed to block or "destabilize"



**Floor plan of Hampton's apartment provided by FBI infiltrator William O'Neal in order to pinpoint targets during the Panther leader's assassination.**

emerging alliances between the Chicago BPP and another black gang, the Mau Maus (unrelated to Kenyatta's Harlem-based organization), as well as the already politicized *Puertorriqueño* Young Lords, a white street gang called the Young Patriots, and even SDS, the white radical organization.<sup>90</sup> The letter-writing COINTELPRO had a significant impact in preventing Hampton from consolidating the city-wide "Rainbow Coalition" he was attempting to establish at the time, but it failed to bring about his physical liquidation.

Hence, in mid-November 1969, COINTELPRO specialist Roy Mitchell met with William O'Neal, a possibly psychopathic infiltrator/*provocateur* who had managed to become Hampton's personal bodyguard and chief of local BPP security, at the Golden Torch Restaurant in downtown Chicago. The agent secured from O'Neal the accompanying detailed floorplan of Hampton's apartment, including the disposition of furniture, and denotation of exactly where the BPP leader might be expected to be sleeping on any given night. Mitchell then took the floorplan to Richard Jalovec, overseer of a special police unit assigned to State's Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan; together, Mitchell and Jalovec met with police sergeant Daniel Groth, operational commander of the unit, and planned an "arms raid" on the Hampton residence.<sup>91</sup>



On the evening of December 3, 1969, shortly before the planned raid, infiltrator O'Neal seems to have slipped Hampton a substantial dose of secobarbital in a glass of kool-aid. The BPP leader was thus comatose in his bed when the fourteen-man police team – armed with a submachinegun and other special hardware – slammed into his home at about 4 a.m. on the morning of December 4.<sup>92</sup> He was nonetheless shot three times, once more-or-less slightly in the chest, and then twice more in the head at point-blank range.<sup>93</sup> Also killed was Mark Clark, head of the Peoria, Illinois, BPP chapter. Wounded were Panthers Ronald "Doc" Satchell, Blair Anderson and Verlina Brewer. Panthers Deborah Johnson (Hampton's fiancée, eight months pregnant with their child), Brenda Harris, Louis Truelock and Harold Bell were uninjured during the shooting.<sup>94</sup> Despite the fact that no Panther had fired a shot (with the possible exception of Clark, who may have squeezed off a single round during his death convulsions) while the police had pumped at least 98 rounds into the apartment, the BPP survivors were all beaten while handcuffed, charged with "aggressive assault" and "attempted murder" of the raiders, and held on \$100,000 bond apiece.<sup>95</sup>

A week later, on December 11, Chicago COINTELPRO section head Robert Piper took a major share of the "credit" for this "success" in the accompanying memo, informing headquarters that the raid could not have occurred without intelligence information, "not available from any other source," provided by O'Neal via Mitchell and himself. He specifically noted that "the chairman of the Illinois BPP, Fred Hampton," was killed in the raid and that this was due, in large part, to the "tremendous value" of O'Neal's work inside the party. He then requested payment of a \$300 cash "bonus" to the infiltrator for services rendered, a matter quickly approved at FBI headquarters.<sup>96</sup>

The Hampton-Clark assassinations were unique in that the cover stories of involved police and local officials quickly unraveled. Notwithstanding the FBI's best efforts to help "keep the lid on," there was a point when the sheer blatancy of the lies used to "explain" what had happened, the obvious falsification of ballistics and other evidence, and so on, led to the indictment of State's Attorney Hanrahan, Jalovec, and a dozen Chicago police personnel for conspiring to obstruct justice. This was dropped by Chicago Judge Phillip Romitti on November 1, 1972 as part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement in which remaining charges were dropped against the Panther survivors. The latter then joined the mothers of the deceased in a \$47 million civil rights suit against not only the former state defendants, but a number of Chicago police investigators who had "cleared" the raiders of wrongdoing, and the FBI as well.<sup>97</sup>

The Bureau had long-since brought in ace COINTELPRO manager Richard G. Held, who replaced Marlin Johnson as Chicago SAC, in order to handle the administrative aspects of what was to be a monumental attempted cover-up. But even his undeniable skills in this regard were insufficient to gloss over the more than 100,000 pages of relevant Bureau documents concerning Hampton and the Chicago BPP he claimed under oath did not exist. Finally, after years of resolute perjury and

12/11/69

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI ~~██████████~~  
 FROM: SAC, CHICAGO ~~██████████~~  
 SUBJECT: ~~██████████~~

Re: Bureau airtel 12/8/69 and Chicago letter 11/24/69.

Information set forth in Chicago letter and letterhead memorandum of 11/21/69, reflects legally purchased firearms in the possession of the Black Panther Party (BPP) were stored at 2337 West Monroe Street, Chicago. A detailed inventory of the weapons and also a detailed floor plan of the apartment were furnished to local authorities. In addition, the identities of BPP members utilizing the apartment at the above address were furnished. This information was not available from any other source and subsequently proved to be of tremendous value in that it subsequently saved injury and possible death to police officers participating in a raid at the address on the morning of 12/4/69. The raid was based on the information furnished by informant. During the resistance by the BPP members at the time of the raid, the Chairman of the Illinois Chapter, BPP, FRED HAMPTON, was killed and a BPP leader from Peoria, Illinois, was also killed. A quantity of weapons and ammunition were recovered.

It is felt that this information is of considerable value in consideration of a special payment for informant requested in re Chicago letter.

~~██████████~~  
 1 - Chicago

**Airtel recommending cash bonus be paid infiltrator O'Neal for services rendered in the Hampton-Clark assassinations. The money was quickly approved.**

stonewalling by the FBI and Chicago police, as well as *directed* acquittals of the government defendants by U.S. District Judge J. Sam Perry (which had to be appealed and reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court), People's Law Office attorneys Flint Taylor, Jeff Haas and Dennis Cunningham finally scored. In November 1982, District Judge John F. Grady determined that there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to deprive the Panthers of their civil rights to award the plaintiffs \$1.85 million in damages.<sup>95</sup>

The Hampton-Clark assassinations were hardly an isolated phenomenon. Four days after the lethal raid in Chicago, a similar scenario was acted out in Los Angeles. In this instance, the FBI utilized an infiltrator named Melvin "Cotton" Smith who, like O'Neal, had become the chief of local BPP security. Like O'Neal, Smith provided

the Bureau with a detailed floorplan – albeit, in the form of a cardboard mock-up rather than a mere diagram – of the BPP facility to be assaulted. Forty men from the LAPD SWAT squad were employed, along with more than 100 regular police as “backup” in the 5:30 a.m. attack on December 8, 1969. This time, however, the primary target, LA Panther leader Elmer “Geronimo” Pratt, was not in his assigned spot. Unbeknownst to the police, he had decided to sleep on the floor alongside his bed on the night of the raid; consequently, the opening burst of gunfire which was apparently supposed to kill him missed entirely.<sup>100</sup> Another major difference between the events in Chicago and those in LA was that, in the latter, a sufficient number of Panthers were awake when the shooting started to mount an effective resistance.<sup>100</sup>

The Panthers chose to defend themselves, and for four hours they fought off the police, refusing to surrender until press and public were on the scene. Six were wounded. Thirteen were arrested. Miraculously, none of them were killed.<sup>101</sup>

As in Chicago, the raiders were headed, not by a SWAT or regular police commander, but by a coordinator of the local police Red Squad. The Los Angeles raid was led by Detective Ray Callahan, a ranking member of the LAPD Criminal Conspiracy Section (CCS), a Panther-focused “subversives unit” tightly interlocked with the local FBI COINTELPRO section, headed by Richard Wallace Held, son of Chicago SAC Richard G. Held.<sup>102</sup> Also as in Chicago, the Panthers were immediately charged with “assaulting the police,” an accusation which received considerable media play until it was quietly dropped when the matter was finally decided by a jury – and the defendants acquitted on December 23, 1971.<sup>103</sup> Pratt, meantime, spent a solid two months in the LA County Jail in the wake of the firefight, until his \$125,000 bond money could be raised.<sup>104</sup>

As the U.S. Attorney in San Francisco put it at the time, pointing to a special “Panther unit” created by the Justice Department specifically to assist federal/local “cooperation” in “containing” the black liberation movement, “Whatever they say they’re doing, they’re out to get the Panthers.”<sup>105</sup> Hence, although many anti-Panther actions around the country appeared to be purely local police initiatives, most were actually coordinated by the FBI’s COINTELPRO operatives in each locality. By 1969, a uniform drumbeat of anti-BPP repression was readily apparent across the nation:

From April to December, 1969, police raided Panther headquarters in San Francisco, Chicago, Salt Lake City, Indianapolis, Denver, San Diego, Sacramento and Los Angeles, including four separate raids in Chicago, two in San Diego and two in Los Angeles. Frequently Panthers were arrested during these raids on charges such as illegal use of sound equipment, harboring fugitives, possessing stolen goods and flight to avoid prosecution, and later released. In September, 1969, alone, police across the nation arrested Panthers in forty-six separate incidents [at least 348 were arrested during the whole year]...Police raids frequently involved severe damage to Panther headquarters. Thus during a raid in Sacramento in June, 1969, in search of

an alleged sniper who was never found, police sprayed the building with teargas, shot up the walls, broke typewriters and destroyed bulk food the Panthers were distributing free to ghetto children. Sacramento Mayor Richard Marriot said he was “shocked and horrified” by the “shambles” he reported police had left behind. During raids on Panther headquarters in Philadelphia in September, 1970, police ransacked the office, ripped out plumbing and chopped up and carted away furniture. Six Panthers were led into the street, placed against a wall and stripped as Police Chief [later mayor] Frank Rizzo boasted to newsmen, “Imagine the big Black Panthers with their pants down.”<sup>106</sup>

Even in the “out back” of Nebraska, the story was the same:

In August 1971, FBI agents and local police arrested two Black Panthers in Omaha...David Rice and Ed Poindexter, on charges of killing a local policeman. In subsequent investigations by Amnesty International and other human rights agencies, it was revealed that the FBI had collected over 2000 pages of information on the Omaha chapter of the Black Panthers, and that the actual murderer of the police officer was a former drug addict who was soon released by authorities, and who subsequently “disappeared.” Both Rice and Poindexter were convicted, however, and still remain in federal penitentiaries.<sup>107</sup>

The pressure placed upon the party through such “extralegal legality” was enormous. As Panther attorney Charles Garry observed in 1970,

In a period of two years – December, 1967 to December, 1969 – the Black Panther Party has expended in bail-bond premiums alone – just the premiums, that is, money that will never be returned – a sum in excess of \$200,000! How many breakfasts or lunches for hungry children, how much medical attention sorely needed in the ghetto communities would that \$200,000 have furnished?...In the same two-year period, twenty-eight Panthers were killed...Let me cite some additional statistics, though for a complete record, I would recommend you consult the special issue of *The Black Panther* (February 21, 1970) entitled, “Evidence and Intimidation of Fascist Crimes by U.S.A.” Between May 2, 1967 and December 25, 1969 charges were dropped against at least 87 Panthers arrested for a wide variety of so-called violations of the law. Yet these men and women were kept in prison for days, weeks and months even though there was absolutely no evidence against them, and they were finally released. At least a dozen cases involving Panthers have been dismissed in court. In these cases, the purpose has clearly been to intimidate, to frighten, to remove from operation and activities the Panthers, and to hope the [resultant public] hysteria against the Black Panther Party would produce convictions and imprisonments.<sup>108</sup>

By 1970, what was occurring was evident enough that Mayor Wes Uhlman of Seattle, when his police were approached by agents in the local FBI office about rousting the city’s BPP chapter, publicly announced that, “We are not going to have any 1932 Gestapo-type raids against anyone.”<sup>109</sup> Even SAC Charles Bates in San Francisco had attempted to protest at least the extent of what the Bureau was doing

May 27, 1969

Airtel

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To: SAC, San Francisco (157-601)

From: Director, FBI (100-448006)

C  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)  
BUDED: 6/9/69

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ResFairtel 5/14/69.

A review has been made of referenced airtel which contains your thoughts on the Counterintelligence Program (CIP). Your reasoning is not in line with Bureau objectives as to our responsibilities under the CIP. C

You state that while the Department of Justice considers the BPP as a violence-prone organization seeking to overthrow the Government by revolutionary means, "There seems to be little likelihood of this." All information developed to date leads to the obvious conclusion that this group is dedicated to the principle of violent overthrow and will go to any length to further this aim.

You point out that the activities of the BPP have reached the black and white communities as evidenced by their weekly newspaper which has reached a circulation of 45,000. You have previously been instructed to review your files concerning this newspaper to determine whether we could disrupt the mailings of the publication. Your answer stated that you were not in a position to do this. You must immediately take positive steps to insure that we will be in a position to accomplish CIP objectives including the disruption of the mailing of their publications. You must develop adequate informant coverage to insure that we are in a position to accomplish all of our objectives, which include steps to counteract the impact this group has made.

You state that local and national newspapers continue to publicize information concerning the BPP. This fact automatically lends itself toward mass media disseminations to capitalize on this eagerness and to isolate the organization from the majority of Americans, both black and white. The dissemination of mass media information to selected and trusted newspapermen, pointing out the violent and dangerous nature of a group, has contributed measurably to the decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States. Newspapers will print derogatory information much easier than they will print commendatory information, especially if the organization is by its nature violence-prone. For your information the San Diego Office has waged an effective CIP against the BPP which has measurably resulted in declining activities and considerable disruption.

It is noted that BPP leader Bobby Seale speaks in schools and universities and receives fees of up to \$1,000. This raises counterintelligence opportunities, among which are anonymous disseminations of derogatory information to universities and misuse of funds received.

As it concerns the BPP, you point out that results achieved by utilizing counterintelligence ideas such as publicizing the evils of violence, the lack of morals, the widespread use of narcotics and anonymous mailings, have not been outstanding. This is because atypical black supporter of the BPP is not disturbed by allegations which would upset a white community. You must recognize that one of our primary aims in counterintelligence as it concerns the BPP is to keep this group isolated from the moderate black and white community which may support it. This is most emphatically pointed out in their Breakfast for Children Program, where they are actively soliciting and receiving support from uninformed whites and moderate blacks. In addition, we have received information from San Francisco and other offices indicating that BPP officials are extremely suspicious of each other as to monies received. This also is a fertile ground for CIP and should be explored.

ReSFairtel states that nation-wide mailings to BPP chapter offices would automatically indicate that the FBI was the source. Mailings originating from Oakland, California, would logically be attributed to someone either at national headquarters of the BPP or a dissident who has recently resigned and had access to the records.

You state that the Bureau under the CIP should not attack programs of community interest such as the BPP "Breakfast for Children." You state that this is because many prominent "humanitarians," both white and black, are interested in the program as well as churches which are actively supporting it. You have obviously missed the point. The BPP is not engaged in the "Breakfast for Children" program for humanitarian reasons. This program was formed by the BPP for obvious reasons, including their efforts to create an image of civility, assume community control of Negroes, and to fill adolescent children with their insidious poison. An example of this is set forth in the May 11, 1969, issue of "The Black Panther." Page seven contains an article captioned "Black Panther Revolutionary Wedding." The article points out that two members of the Panthers were married at a church in Oakland, California, which is participating in the Breakfast Program. The crowd consisted mostly of Panther members and children from the Breakfast Program. Instead of a Bible, Bobby Seale used the "Red Book Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung" to perform the marriage. After the ceremony, the children sang "We Want a Pork Chop Off the Pig."

The CIP in the San Francisco Office must be re-evaluated. During the reevaluation, give thorough consideration to the adequacy of the personnel assigned. Insure that you are utilizing the best personnel available in this program. Advise the Bureau of the results of your reevaluation by June 9, 1969.

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Airtel from J. Edgar Hoover reprimanding the San Francisco office for its lack of vigor in pursuing COINTELPRO operations against the BPP.

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to the Panthers. For his trouble, Bates received the accompanying May 27, 1969 Airtel from Hoover informing him that he had "obviously missed the point" and that his outlook was "not in line with Bureau objectives." The director also used the opportunity to order Bates to target the BPP Breakfast for Children Program in the Bay Area. Hoover then unleashed William Sullivan to pull Bates' office back in line:

Sullivan gave Bates two weeks to assign his best agents to the COINTELPRO desks and get on with the task at hand: "Eradicate [the Panthers'] 'serve the people' programs...So [Charles] Gain, [William] Cohendet, and the other four agents assigned to the BPP squad supervised the taps and bugs on Panther homes and offices; mailed a William F. Buckley, Jr., column on the Panthers to prominent citizens in the Bay area; tipped off *San Francisco Examiner* reporter Ed Montgomery to Huey Newton's posh Oakland apartment overlooking Lake Merritt; disrupted the breakfast-for-children program "in the notorious Haight-Ashbury District" and elsewhere by spreading a rumor "that various personnel in [Panther] national headquarters are infected with venereal disease;" tried to break up Panther marriages with letters to wives about affairs with teenage girls; and assisted with a plan to harass the Panthers' attorney, Charles Garry...They carried out dozens of other counterintelligence operations as well.<sup>110</sup>

As should be obvious from the Rice, Poindexter and other cases already mentioned, spurious criminal prosecution was a favorite tactic used in neutralizing the BPP leadership. For instance, in 1969 Black Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was charged along with seven other Chicago conspiracy defendants, "although he had only the most tangential connection with the demonstrations during the Democratic Convention in Chicago during August of 1968 [which precipitated a major police riot in full view of national television, and for which the conspiracy charges were ostensibly brought], having been flown in at the last moment as a substitute speaker, given two speeches and left."<sup>111</sup> Predictably, the charges came to nothing, but not before Seale was denied the right to represent himself at trial, and the country was treated to the spectacle of a major Panther leader bound to his chair and gagged in open court.<sup>112</sup>

Meanwhile, on August 21, 1969—before the Chicago trial even began—Seale was arrested in California in connection with the alleged New Haven, Connecticut torture-slaying of Alex Rackley, a Panther recruit from New York. Eleven other Panthers (mostly members of the New Haven BPP chapter) were indicted as well.<sup>113</sup> The main witness against Seale and the others turned out to be one of the defendants, George Sams, a police infiltrator and former psychiatric patient who had worked his way into a position in the Panther security apparatus before being expelled from the party by Seale.<sup>114</sup> As it turned out, Sams had accused Rackley of being an informer and had himself carried the bad-jacketing effort through a week-long interrogation during which the young recruit was chained to a bed and scalded with boiling water. Sams had then killed him, dumping the body in a swampy area where it was soon discovered by fishermen.<sup>115</sup>

In the aftermath, one New Haven Panther, Warren Kimbro, pled guilty to

second degree murder, not for having killed Rackley, but for not having prevented his death; he was sentenced to life in prison.<sup>116</sup> A second, Lonnie McLucas, was tried alone, convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced to 15 years.<sup>117</sup> Sams, the actual killer, was also eventually given a life sentence, despite his various police connections.<sup>118</sup>

Although it was plain that the culprits in this ugly matter had been dealt with – even New Haven Police Chief James F. Ahern stated publicly that there was no evidence that Bobby Seale had been involved in Rackley's death<sup>119</sup> – the state proceeded to bring Seale, along with Ericka Huggins (widow of assassinated LA Panther leader Jon), another "notable," to trial. Apparently, the hope was that the earlier confession and convictions would have tempered public sentiment against the BPP to such an extent that these defendants would be found guilty on the basis of party membership alone. In this the government was disappointed when the "jury in the trial was ready to acquit Seale but...two jurors refused to vote for acquittal unless [Ericka Huggins] was convicted. [Judge Harold M. Mulveny then] ordered both cases dismissed [on May 24, 1971] when the jury reported it was hopelessly deadlocked."<sup>120</sup> State apologists promptly claimed "justice" had been served, but by then Seale had served more than two years in maximum security lockup without bail, much of it in solitary confinement, without ever having been convicted of anything at all, and was never really able to resume his former galvanizing role in the party.<sup>121</sup>

While this was going on, in "August, 1969, three Black Panthers were arrested while riding in a car with a New York City undercover agent, Wilbert Thomas, and charged with a variety of offenses including conspiracy to rob a hotel, attempted murder of a policeman and illegal possession of weapons. During the trial, it developed that Thomas had supplied the car, had drawn a map of the hotel – the only tangible evidence tying the Panthers to the robbery scheme – and had offered to supply the guns. The Panthers were eventually convicted only of a technical weapons charge, based on the fact that a shotgun, which the Panthers said had been planted by Thomas, was found in the car."<sup>122</sup>

Moving ahead, the "FBI pressured the Justice Department to get on with the conspiracy prosecutions," either in federal court or by assisting local prosecutors.<sup>123</sup> One result was that: "In May, 1971, the so-called 'Panther Twenty-One' were acquitted in New York City of charges of having conspired to bomb department stores, blow up police stations and murder policemen; a number of the defendants had been held in jail for over two years under \$100,000 bails."<sup>124</sup> This was the 10% cash requirement associated with total bonds of \$1,000,000 per defendant, making their aggregate bond a staggering \$21,000,000! They had been indicted on April 2, 1969, largely on the basis of accusations tendered by three police infiltrators, Eugene Roberts, Carlos Ashwood (aka: Carl Wood) and Ralph White (aka: Sudan Yedaw). Their testimony literally fell apart in court.<sup>125</sup> The jury deliberated "less than an hour" in acquitting the defendants of all 156 charges levied against them by New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan and Assistant District Attorney Joseph



A. Phillips on the basis of "evidence" provided by "New York police officers and FBI agents."<sup>126</sup> But, as had been the case with Seale, the Panther 21 had been held under maximum security conditions – many in solitary confinement – for months on end, even though they were ultimately shown to have been innocent of the accusations leveled against them.<sup>127</sup> The New York BPP chapter virtually disintegrated during the extended mass incarceration of its entire leadership.

By the beginning of 1970, "the Black Panther Party had been severely damaged by arrests, trials, shootouts and police and FBI harassment which had jailed, killed or exiled most of the top leadership of the party. Nevertheless, in March 1970, the FBI initiated what the Senate Intelligence Committee has labelled a 'concerted program' to drive a permanent wedge between two factions in the party, one supporting Eldridge Cleaver [exiled in Algeria]...and the other supporting [Huey P.] Newton, then still in jail."<sup>128</sup> As can be seen in the accompanying May 14, 1970 memo from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, this was approached in a quite deliberate fashion through the use of forged and/or anonymous letters and the like. And, as is brought out clearly in the accompanying September 16, 1970 Airtel (see page 150) from the director to three SACs, the Bureau considered it "immaterial whether facts exist to substantiate" the sorts of charges it was introducing into the BPP communications network.

The sorts of repression which had already been visited upon the BPP had inevitably engendered among party members a strong sense of being in a battle for sheer physical survival, a matter lending potentially lethal implications to FBI-fostered rumors that given individuals or groups of Panthers were, say, police agents. That Hoover and his men were well aware these sorts of tactics could have fatal results for at least some of those targeted is readily discernable on the second page of the September 16 Airtel. As may be seen rather plainly, Hoover disapproved the sending of a particular anonymous letter only because, if it were traced back to its source, its wording might "place the Bureau in the position of aiding and abetting in a murder by the BPP." His instructions were simply to reword the letter in such a way as to accomplish the same result while leaving the FBI a window of "plausible deniability" in the event a homicide did in fact result. While there is no evidence that David Hilliard ever actually responded to COINTELPRO manipulation by attempting to have Newton killed, murders *did* result:

[In New York] Robert Weaver, a Cleaverite, was shot dead on a Harlem street corner in early March [1971]. A month later persons unknown entered the Queens County office of the Black Panther Party, a Newtonite enclave, bound up Samuel Napier, circulation manager of *The Black Panther*, taped his eyes and mouth, laid him face down on a cot, and shot off the back of his head.<sup>129</sup>

At least three other murders, all in California, seem likely to have been directly related to this aspect of the FBI's anti-BPP COINTELPRO. These were the execution of LA-BPP member Fred Bennett at some point in early 1970 (Bennett's body was never found), Sandra Lane "Red" Pratt (Geronimo Pratt's wife) in LA on January 13,

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
**Memorandum**

**ROUTE IN ENVELOPE**

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tolson	_____
Felt	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : G. C. Moore *AC*

DATE: May 14, 1970

- 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

*5-DAY*  
*EX-114*  
*1/1/70*  
*at 1/1/70*  
*myself*

This is to recommend that the Counterintelligence Program against black extremists be continued.

The Counterintelligence Program against black extremist organizations and individuals was initiated August 25, 1967, and on March 4, 1968, it was expanded from 27 to 42 participating field divisions. The goals of this program are to prevent violence by black extremists, to prevent the growth and/or unification of extremist groups, and to prevent extremist groups from gaining respectability in the Negro community. Some of the excellent results of counterintelligence action during the past year are set out below:

To create friction between Black Panther Party (BPP) leader Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers and BPP Headquarters, a spurious letter concerning an internal dispute was sent Cleaver, who accepted it as genuine. As a result, the International Staff of the BPP was neutralized when Cleaver fired most of its members. Bureau personnel received incentive awards from the Director for this operation.

To show the criminal nature of the BPP a write-up concerning the convictions of its members was prepared and received publicity in a Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith syndicated column of March 31, 1970. Previously we exposed the BPP Breakia For Children Program in these writers' column of June 14, 1969.

Articles concerning the BPP based on information furnished by a news media source in Mississippi resulted in the closing of a BPP Chapter in Cleveland, Mississippi.

Counterintelligence action against other extremist organizations has also been effective. In San Diego, California, an anonymous telephone call to the landlord of the US organization resulted in the group being evicted from its Headquarters. In Florida, a television source was helped in the preparation of a program exposing the Nation of Islam. The excellent results of this program were contained in a memorandum from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, October 21, 1969, on which the Director noted "Excellent".

*1820*

100-448008  
97 JUN 10 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE.

25 JUN 1970  
CONTINUED - OVER

Memo reporting on the progress of a COINTELPRO utilizing disinformation and anonymous letters to foment a split between the international section of the BPP, headed by Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers, and Huey P. Newton's organization based in Oakland, California. The operation was continued with lethal results.

Concerning the first proposal submitted by Detroit, counterintelligence action by San Francisco to capitalize on Huey P. Newton's favorable stand toward homosexuals has already been authorized by the Bureau. The second Detroit proposal to consider directing an anonymous communication to Newton accusing David Hilliard of stealing BPP funds and depositing them in foreign banks does have merit and the Bureau does not concur with San Francisco's observation that this would have little effect since there is no record that Hilliard is skimming large amounts of money. Purpose of counterintelligence action is to disrupt BPP and it is immaterial whether facts exist to substantiate the charge. If facts are present, it aids in the success of the proposal but the Bureau feels that the skimming of money is such a sensitive issue that disruption can be accomplished without facts to back it up.

Accordingly, Detroit immediately furnish Bureau and San Francisco with specific suggestions and wording to this effect and San Francisco should then review same and submit specific proposal in this regard for approval by Bureau.

With respect to two anonymous letters proposed by Los Angeles, Bureau concurs with San Francisco that to include the card of a member of a rival black extremist group in a letter to Hilliard indicating Newton is marked for assassination could place the Bureau in the position of aiding or initiating a murder by the BPP. Accordingly, Los Angeles' proposal identified as "Letter A" is not approved. Los Angeles should reword this letter to convey the same thought without directly indicating that it is from a specific member of a rival group. The letter could imply that the writer would soon get in touch with Hilliard to see what he would pay to have Newton eliminated. Resubmit the revised letter to the Bureau for approval.

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Excerpt from a September 16, 1970 Airtel from Hoover informing his COINTELPRO operatives that outright lies were appropriate content for anonymous letters, and that murder was an appropriate outcome to such an operation so long as the cause could not be traced back to the Bureau.

---

1972, and the execution-style slaying of former Newton bodyguard Jimmy Carr by LA Panthers Lloyd Lamar Mims and Richard Rodriguez in San Francisco on April 6, 1972.<sup>130</sup> In the case of Fred Bennett, rather than conducting any serious investigation into his death the Bureau used it as a prop – as the accompanying February 17, 1971 teletype from the SAC, San Francisco to Hoover indicates – in the penning of a bogus letter to Panther Field Marshall Don Cox ("D.C.") in Algeria as a means to "further exploit dissension within the BPP." Bennett's murder remains "unsolved," as does that of Sandra Lane Pratt.

Such atrocities cannot be separated from the FBI's intervention to exacerbate the "Newton-Cleaver Split," a COINTELPRO initiative which was by then in full swing, as was made clear in a January 1, 1971 teletype from the San Francisco SAC to Hoover. The forged letter proposed in this teletype reads as follows:

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 2/17/71

Transmit the following in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

URGENT

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (100-448006)  
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (157-601)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 Kely/mbk  
ON 2/14/70

COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS, RN.

TO FURTHER EXPLOIT DISSENSION WITHIN THE BPP AND  
SUSPICIONS REGARDING VARIOUS LEADERS, THE FOLLOWING LETTER  
IS PROPOSED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE:

"D.C.

"BY NOW YOU HAVE HEARD ABOUT POOR FRED. I HAVE WARNED  
HUEY OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES. IT SEEMS TO BE GETTING  
WORSE. J.B. AND ROBERT ARE NOW ALSO MISSING.

"IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION YOU BETTER HAVE A LONG TALK  
WITH ELDRIDGE BEFORE HE LETS KATHLEEN COME HERE. G. IS REALLY  
UP TIGHT. BIG MAN IS JUST DIVING AND NO HELP AT ALL.

"A.C."

THIS LETTER IS ALSO BLANTED TO IMPLY THAT IT CAME FROM

WHOSE EXACT WHEREABOUTS ARE NOT KNOWN TO THE  
BPP AND IS IN THE FORM OF A WARNING TO [REDACTED] IN VIEW OF

B/C

b2c(3)  
66

JAA/12  
(1)

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY [REDACTED]  
AUTOMATICALLY CONFIDENTIAL

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

AS4

M

Per

TEK

100-448006-2270

Teletype proposing forged letter playing upon the murder of Fred Bennett as a means of widening the "Newton-Cleaver split." As the document continues (next page) it becomes clear that the gambit is also part of a COINTELPRO to isolate LA-BPP leader Geronimo Pratt (continued on next page).

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I  
Date:

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

---

SF 157-601  
PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SITUATION INVOLVING THE DEATH OF FRED BENNETT. THE J.B. REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER IS [REDACTED] AND ROBERT IS [REDACTED] WHO TOGETHER WITH [REDACTED] HAVE PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH [REDACTED] AND ARE BELIEVED SYMPATHETIC TO THE DISSIDENT BPP GROUP REPRESENTED BY GERONIMO. THE WHEREABOUTS OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] IS UNKNOWN AT THE PRESENT TIME TO THE BPP. INASMUCH AS THE FIRST A.C. LETTER COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY NEWTON AS A WARNING FROM THE DISSIDENTS, THIS LETTER WILL FURTHER THIS BELIEF IF THERE IS ANY DISCUSSION BY NEWTON WITH BPP REPRESENTATIVES IN ALGERIA.

THE LETTER ALSO CASTS REFLECTIONS ON [REDACTED] A CLEAVER STALWART.

IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS MIGHT FURTHER SPLIT THE BPP AND PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RETURN TO THE U.S. OF KATHLEEN CLEAVER WHO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO UNIFY THE DISSIDENT FACTIONS IN THE PARTY IF SHE APPEARS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1965 O - 284-882

Eldridge,

I know you have not been told what has been happening lately. It is a shame that a person, as well-placed as I am and so desirous of improving our Party, cannot by present rules travel to or communicate with you. I really don't know where you stand in relationship to our leaders and really am not confident you would protect me in the event of exposure. Since this is my life-work, just let me say I have worked

long and well in your behalf in the past, and for the Party in many places on Planet Earth.

Things around Headquarters are dreadfully disorganized with the Comrade Commander not making proper decisions. The newspaper is in shambles. No one knows who is in charge. The Foreign Department gets no support. Brothers and sisters are accused of all sorts of things. The point of all this is to say I fear there is rebellion working just beneath the surface. You may know the story about "G" and his gang. I believe that people like "G" have many sympathizers who are not yet under suspicion but who should be. They have friends right in Headquarters where the Minister chooses to ignore them.

I am disturbed because I, myself, do not know which way to turn. While I think the Comrade Commander is weak, yet I do not like the evidences of disloyalty I see. I may be wrong but I think the core of this disloyalty (maybe you think what I consider disloyalty is actually supreme loyalty to the ideals of the Party rather than the leader himself) is with persons formerly close to the Field Marshall. If only you were here to inject some strength into the Movement, or to give some advice. One of two steps must be taken soon and both are drastic. We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander or get rid of the disloyal members. I know the brothers mean well but I fear the only sensible course that the Party can take is to initiate strong and complete action against the rebels, exposing their underhanded tricks to the community. Huey is really all we have right now and we can't let him down, regardless of how poorly he is acting, unless you feel otherwise. Remember he is still able to bring in the bread.

– Comrade C –

The letter was attributed by the Bureau to party member Connie Matthews ("Comrade C"), and designed – according to the text of the remainder of the teletype – not only to cause general "turmoil among the top echelon [of the BPP; e.g.: by casting doubt upon Field Marshall Don Cox, a Cleaver ally]," but to specifically target LA Panther leader Geronimo Pratt ("G") for suspicion by the Cleaver faction. Note the call for "drastic action" in the letter. This, after at least one Panther (Fred Bennett) was already thought to have been killed as a result of the Bureau's deliberate heightening of tensions attending "the split," and in the context of a lively internal dialogue among COINTELPRO planners concerning the probability that others would die if such tactics were continued. Under the circumstances, there can be little doubt as to the Bureau's intent in approving and sending the bogus missive.

Concerning Pratt, he had already been the target of a similar COINTELPRO operation which had led to his formal expulsion (as a "police agent" and/or a "Cleaverite") by the Newton faction on January 23, 1971.<sup>131</sup> This earlier operation, handled by LA COINTELPRO section head Richard W. Held and two subordinates, Richard H. Bloeser and Brendan Cleary, included the high priority targeting of Pratt – as one of the 100-odd "Key Activists" selected for inclusion in the Bureau's Black Nationalist Photo Album – and LA-BPP associate John William Washington for discrediting as part of the overall strategy to "deny unity of action" to the Panthers, a

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 1/28/70

FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-4054)(P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BPP

105-15571-2210  
105-1670-26-171

Re Los Angeles airtel and letterhead memorandum to the Bureau dated 11/28/69, entitled "BLACK PANTHER PARTY, RM - BPP", San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated 12/4/69, and Los Angeles letters to the Bureau dated 12/11/69 and 1/15/70.

Enclosed for the Bureau and San Francisco are one copy each of two hand prepared proposed counterintelligence leaflets, numbered 1 and 2 for reference.

Bureau approval is requested in the creation of an anonymous paper underground to attack, expose, and ridicule the image of the BPP in the community and to foment mistrust and suspicion amongst the current and past membership, through publication and dissemination of information embarrassing to the BPP. Activities of the underground, initially to be referred to as "the Los Angeles Three", therein identifying the source in a form of reference

⑦ - Bureau (RM)

[Redacted]

(U - 157-12311)(ELMER GIRARD PRATT)

1 - San Francisco (157-601)(info)(RM)

7 - Los Angeles

[Redacted]

(U - 157-2020)(ELMER GIRARD PRATT)(SI)

[Redacted]

RWH/vjh  
(16)

97 MAR 4 1970

NOV 1969  
172 MAR 4 1970



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo targeting Geronimo Pratt and his lieutenant John William "Long John" Washington for neutralization, denying "unity of action" to the LA-BPP.

matter brought out in the accompanying January 28 memo and June 26, 1970 teletype from the SAC, Los Angeles, to the director (see page 156).

This tied to a second dimension of a campaign to neutralize the LA party leader

LA 157-4054

common to Panther rhetoric, would be prepared to suggest participation by active and past members of the Los Angeles Black Panther Party (LA BPP). The selection of the organization's name is an arbitrary one which lends itself to a future display of the group's growth if the response warrants. The necessity for the anonymity of the underground organization could be explained, if necessary, as an imperative precaution in view of the past acts of violence and retaliation executed by the LA BPP.

It is anticipated that this counterintelligence proposal could serve as one phase of a continuous attempt to deny unity of action, in the effort of the LA BPP by calling to question the actions of the organization and the legitimacy of its leadership.

It is felt that the production and distribution of these leaflets could be such that the identity of the FBI as the source of the proposed organization could be effectively concealed.

In this respect, Bureau approval is requested in the preparation and dissemination of leaflets similar to the enclosed in the vicinities of 4115 South Central, 9818 Anzac, and 1810 East 103rd Street, locations of BPP activities in Los Angeles. It would be the intention of the Los Angeles Division to distribute leaflet No. 2 seven to ten days following the introduction of leaflet No. 1, as any follow up should not only make the effort a topical one, but stimulate increased reaction within the Los Angeles BPP.

Operation Number One is designed to challenge the legitimacy of the authority exercised by ELMER GERNARD PRATT, BPP Deputy Minister of Defense for Southern California, and JOHN WILLIAM WASHINGTON, an active member of the BPP in Los Angeles.

Operation Number Two is utilized to publicize the illicit sexual activities allegedly encouraged and engaged in by [REDACTED] 7c

- 2 -

which saw him charged on December 16, 1970 with the so-called "Tennis Court Murder" (committed on December 18, 1968 in Santa Monica, California).<sup>132</sup> The "evidence" linking Pratt to the crime was primarily that of an FBI infiltrator, Julius C. "Julio" Butler, who was to perjure himself during the ensuing trial by testifying that he had had no paid association with any police agency since joining the BPP.<sup>133</sup> At trial, the FBI also denied the existence of ELSURS logs concerning its wiretapping and other electronic surveillance of the Panther national headquarters in Oakland, a record which would have established that Pratt was in the San Francisco Bay area, some 350 miles north of Santa Monica, on the evening the murder occurred. When the monitoring was later revealed, the Bureau claimed that its logs covering the two-week period which might have exonerated Pratt had been "lost."<sup>134</sup> The upshot of the Bureau's bad-jacketing COINTELPRO was that during the course of his trial, the



## EAU OF INVESTIGATION

<b>LES</b>	<b>DATE</b> 6/26/70	<b>INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD</b> 5/6/69 - 6/21/70
	<b>REPORT MADE BY</b> [REDACTED]	<b>TYPED BY</b> 76 SCS
<b>CHARACTER OF CASE</b> [REDACTED]		

LA 157-3436

It is noted that PRATT's photograph is included in the Black Nationalist Photo Album.

For the information of the Bureau, in view of PRATT's adamant expression of hatred toward law enforcement personnel in general, no consideration is being given to reinterview PRATT for the purpose of development as a PRI. It is noted, however, that constant consideration is given to the possibility of the utilization of counterintelligence measures with efforts being directed toward neutralizing PRATT as an effective BPP functionary.

It is noted that the investigative period of this report overlaps that of referenced report in view of the fact that activities occurring prior to submission of referenced report were not reported until after submission of referenced report.

This report is being classified confidential because it contains information furnished by sources of continuing value and disclosure of these sources could result in their identification thereby affecting the Internal Security of the United States.

### LEADS

#### LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: Will continue to follow and report activities of ELMER PRATT in view of his being the BPP Deputy Minister of Defense.

### INFORMANTS

#### SOURCE

#### LOCATION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

70

Teletype denoting Geronimo Pratt's inclusion in the Black Nationalist Photo Album, his refusal to cooperate with the FBI as a "Racial Informant," and the Bureau's consequent intention to bad-jacket him.

target was isolated from the legal support which might have accrued from his former party associates, both within the Newton faction and – to some extent at least – the Cleaver faction as well. He was thus convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment.<sup>135</sup> At present, he remains incarcerated at San Quentin.<sup>136</sup>

An equally troubling case in New York involve[s] another COINTELPRO target, (Richard) Dhoruba Moore. A codefendant in the Panther 21 case who believed Newton had ordered his assassination, Moore jumped bail, fled the country, and was acquitted in absentia in March 1971. Police officers arrested him three months later at an after-hours club in the Bronx, booking him as a John Doe. The officers also confiscated a .45 calibre [sub]machine gun at the club. When they discovered Moore's identity, they charged him with the attempted murder of two patrolmen (Thomas Curry and Nicholas Binetti) who had been assigned to guard the Riverside Drive home of Panther 21 prosecutor Frank Hogan. Moore was indicted, tried, and convicted, with the court handing down a sentence of twenty-five years to life. The question that [goes] to the heart of the criminal justice system ha[s] less to do with Dhoruba Moore's guilt or innocence than whether he received a fair trial.<sup>137</sup>

A similar case is that of the "New York Three" – Herman Bell, Anthony "Jalil" Bottom and Albert "Nuh" Washington, members of the New York BPP chapter and alleged Black Liberation Army (BLA) members – sentenced to serve 25-year-to-life prison terms in 1975 for the 1971 shooting deaths of NYPD patrolmen Waverly Jones and Joseph Piagentini. Only much later, during the early '80s, did it begin to come out that the FBI had carefully concealed significant exculpatory material such as a ballistics report showing conclusively that the crucial piece of "physical evidence" introduced at trial – a .45 caliber automatic pistol in Bell's possession at the time of his arrest – was *not* (as prosecutors claimed) the weapon used to kill the policemen. Suppressed Bureau documents also record that a key government witness, Ruben Scott, was first tortured and then offered a deal on a pending murder charge against him in exchange for his "cooperation" against the three in court; Scott has subsequently recanted the entirety of his testimony. Two other witnesses were jailed for 13 months and threatened with loss of custody over their children to induce their testimony. Each woman was not only released from jail and allowed to retain custody, but also provided a rent-free apartment and \$150 per week stipend for several years after her stint on the witness stand. At the time Bell, Bottom and Washington were tried, and during their subsequent appeals, the FBI falsely contended it had "nothing relevant" regarding their case. As is plainly shown in the accompanying January 24, 1974 memo from G.C. Moore to W.R. Wannall, this was no accident; the Bureau was quite concerned to insure that it could not be identified as the source of information being presented by the state. It thus avoided being compelled to disclose evidence which might have served to exonerate the defendants or bring about reversal of their convictions. As of this writing, all three men remain in prison after 15 years.<sup>138</sup>

Like the case of Geronimo Pratt, both the Dhoruba Moore case and that of the

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Office of Legal Counsel

TO : Mr. W. R. WANNALL *WRW*

DATE: January 21, 1974

FROM : Mr. G. C. MOORE *GC*

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - Mr. P. V. Duly

SUBJECT: NEWKILL

PURPOSE:

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) made available to defense attorneys copies of its investigative reports relative to captioned matter, pursuant to a court order, which reports contained information furnished by the Bureau. The New York Office advised, however, that the Bureau could not be identified in these reports as the source of the information.

BACKGROUND:

Newkill is the code word used for the Bureau's investigation concerning the killing of two New York City police officers on 5/21/71. This investigation was initiated pursuant to request by President Nixon made of the Bureau on 5/26/71. Pertinent results of this investigation were made available to the public via letterhead memoranda (LHM's).

The 1/8/74 issue of "The New York Times" reported that New York State Supreme Court Justice Roberts ordered the prosecution in captioned matter to make available any information contained in police files favorable to the defendants. According to this article, the Justice, after reviewing the police files, turned over most of this material to defense lawyers.

We queried the New York Office as to whether any of the information furnished to the defense attorneys originated from the FBI and whether it could be clearly identified as such. New York Office, after contact with local authorities in New York, determined that the LHM's made available to the police by the Bureau concerning this matter were not turned over to the defense attorneys nor could the information furnished to the defense attorneys be clearly identified as originating from these LHM's. To date, there is no apparent indication that the defense attorneys may make a similar motion concerning information contained in Bureau files relative to our investigation on Newkill.

ACTION: For information.

157-22002

PVD:elw

57 JAN 28 1974

Exec AD  
Asst. Dir.:

- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Insp.
- Intell.
- Lab.
- Legal Coun.
- Plan. & Insp.
- Rec. Mgmt.
- Tech. Serv.
- Training
- Telephone Rm.
- Director's Sec'y

Memo showing the care taken by the FBI to hide the fact that it had gathered evidence which might have served to exonerate the New York Three. The coverup continued into the 1980s, and to an unknown extent goes on at present.

New York Three are bound up in the context of the FBI's COINTELPRO activities regarding the Newton-Cleaver split. These activities – as are partially reflected in the accompanying excerpt from a February 2, 1971 Hoover Airtel to 29 SACs (see next page) – left the BPP in divisive opposing factions, each utterly unable to provide coherent legal defense to its membership. That the FBI and cooperating police agencies capitalized upon this situation to the utmost has become increasingly apparent.

On other fronts, the Bureau engaged in a range of anti-Panther counterintelligence operations which ranged from the orchestration of murder to attempts to deny funding to BPP legal defense efforts. An example of the former may be found in the FBI's assistance to its allies in the LAPD's CCS to set up the celebrated prison author (and honorary BPP Field Marshal), George Jackson, for assassination inside San Quentin on August 21, 1971, and its subsequent use of the incident as the basis for accusations intended to neutralize Angela Y. Davis, head of Jackson's defense organization and a leading Panther-associated spokesperson.<sup>139</sup> On the latter count, as the accompanying May 21, 1970 memo from the New York SAC (see page 162) makes clear, efforts were undertaken (successfully, as it turned out) to utilize the earlier mentioned spurious information concerning BPP "anti-Semitism" to dry up legal defense contributions flowing from individuals such as Leonard Bernstein, wealthy conductor of the New York Philharmonic, to the Panther 21.<sup>140</sup>

According to the Senate Select Committee, other targets dealt with by the Bureau in a fashion comparable to that used against Bernstein included author Donald Freed (who headed the "Friends of the Panthers" organization in LA), Ed Pearl of the Peace and Freedom Party, the actress Jane Fonda, "the [unidentified] wife of a famous Hollywood actor," an unidentified "famous entertainer," and an employee of the Union Carbide Corporation, among others.<sup>141</sup> In each case, COINTELPRO actions were undertaken which "would be an effective means of combating BPP fund-raising activities among liberal and naive individuals."<sup>142</sup>

Elsewhere, the FBI utilized the services of an infiltrator to have the Sacramento chapter of the BPP print a racist and violence-oriented coloring book for children. When the item was brought to the attention of Bobby Seale and other members of the Panther leadership, it was immediately ordered destroyed rather than distributed. Nonetheless, the Bureau mailed copies to companies – including Safeway Stores, Inc., Mayfair Markets and the Jack-In-The-Box Corporation – which had been contributing food to the party's Breakfast for Children program, in order to cause the withdrawal of such support.<sup>143</sup> In the same vein, anonymous letters were mailed to the parishioners and bishop of a San Diego priest, Father Frank Curran, who had been allowing the Panthers to use his church as a Breakfast for Children serving facility, in order that use of the church be withdrawn and Father Curran transferred to "somewhere in the State of New Mexico for permanent assignment."<sup>144</sup>

Considerable COINTELPRO attention was also focused upon *The Black Panther* newspaper because, as was observed by FBI headquarters in 1970, "The BPP newspaper has a circulation of...139,000. It is the voice of the BPP and if it could be

# ROUTE IN LINE

2/2/71

**Airtel**

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J. F. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]

To: SACs, Albany New Haven  
 Atlanta New Orleans  
 Baltimore New York  
 Boston Philadelphia  
 Charlotte Pittsburgh  
 Chicago Portland  
 Cincinnati Richmond  
 Cleveland Sacramento  
 Columbia San Francisco  
 Dallas Savannah  
 Detroit Seattle  
 Indianapolis Springfield  
 Las Vegas Tampa  
 Los Angeles WFO  
 Newark

From: Director, FBI (100-448006)

COINTELPRO - BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) - DISSENSION  
 RACISM MATTERS  
 FEB 25 1971 2/10/71  
 COMM-FBI

Increasing evidence points to rising dissension within BPP causing serious morale problem and strained relationship among Panther hierarchy. Primary cause of these internal problems appears to be dictatorial, irrational and capricious conduct of Huey P. Newton. His extreme sensitivity to any criticism, jealousy of other leaders and belief he is some form of deity are causing severe problems within the group. Newton's relationship with Cleaver and other top leaders is strained. He has recently expelled or disciplined several dedicated Panthers includin

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ABF:drl  
(69)

EX-111  
 REC-100-448006-100  
 SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

97 FEB 1 1971

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
 OTHERWISE

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

Self-congratulatory Airtel describing the success of the COINTELPRO attending the "Newton-Cleaver Split" in terms of "rising dissension within the BPP causing serious morale problem and strained relationship among Panther hierarchy," which caused a rapid disintegration of the Party.

Airtel to Albany et al  
 RE: COINTELPRO - Black Panther Party (BPP) - Dissension  
 100-448006

[REDACTED] and Newton's [REDACTED] and companions who were involved in BPP underground operation (see 1/23/71 edition of "The Black Panther"); and the "New York 21" who were a leading cause celebre of Pantherism.

This dissension coupled with financial difficulties offers an exceptional opportunity to further disrupt, aggravate and possibly neutralize this organization through counterintelligence. In light of above developments this program has been intensified by selected offices and should be further expanded to increase measurably the pressure on the BPP and its leaders.

San Francisco and New York are already involved in counterintelligence actions and should continue to be alert for further opportunities. All other recipients should immediately devise at least two counterintelligence proposals and submit same to Bureau by 2/10/71. First proposal should be aimed strictly at creating dissension within the local branch. Second proposal should be aimed at creating dissension or problems between local branch and/or its leaders and BPP national headquarters. Submit each proposal in a separate airtel referencing this communication and in first paragraph specifically indicate whether proposal aimed at local dissension or national dissension.

In order for these proposals to be effective it is imperative that a close analysis be made of weaknesses and problems within the local BPP branch and that all proposals submitted be imaginative and timely. No proposal should be implemented without specific Bureau approval.

effectively hindered, it would result in helping to cripple the BPP."<sup>145</sup> The methods employed for this purpose included an unsuccessful effort to use the IRS to close *The Black Panther* down and the sending of bogus cards and letters, attributed to the Minutemen organization, to the paper's staff purporting to show that the violent right-wing group intended to attack them physically (the operation was apparently intended to frighten the staff into quitting or at least suspending production of their publication).<sup>146</sup> The Bureau also attempted to bring about bankruptcy of the paper by convincing freight companies to shift from the general rate pertaining to printed material to the "full legal rate allowable for newspaper shipment."

Officials advise this increase...means approximately a forty percent increase. Officials agree to determine cosignor in San Francisco and from this determine cosignees throughout the United States so that it can impose full legal tariff. They believe the

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161140) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 5/21/70

ReNYlet to Bureau, 2/25/70.

### 1. Operations Under Consideration

It is felt by the NYO that BPP operations can best be disrupted by exposing them to individuals and groups who would have a natural or conditioned animosity toward the BPP aims and ideals.

The above can be accomplished through the continued use of anonymous letters and handbills which would be directed toward those who may be expected to act through economic or personal means against the BPP thereby hindering BPP operations.

The NYO realizes the importance of negating the financial benefits coming to the BPP through the distribution of their official newspaper "The Black Panther" and will continue to attempt to derive a logical and practical plan to thwart this crucial BPP operation.

### 2. Operations Being Submitted

On 2/27/70, correspondence was directed to individuals known to have attended a BPP fund-raising function at the home of the well known musician, LEONARD BERNSTEIN. This correspondence outlined the BPP's anti-Semitic posture and pro-Arab position.

On 3/5/70, mimeograph copies of a "BPP solicitation letter" and a "Store owners letter" were sent to BPP headquarters in NYC as per Bureau instructions dated 3/5/70.

On 3/6/70, information was furnished to an established newspaper contact concerning the source of monies used to raise bail for one of the "Panther 21", a group of BPP members on trial in New York City.

- 2- Bureau (RM)
- 1- New York (43)

JLL:tf  
(3)

EX-115

REC 17

MAY 22 1970

1783

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

RACIAL INT. SECT.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo outlining plan to deny legal defense funding to the BPP in New York from supporters such as Philharmonic conductor Leonard Bernstein. Note reliance upon the "anti-Semitic" ploy and involvement of the JDL discussed earlier.

NY 100-161140

On 4/1/70, the NYO participated in the formulation of a Counterintelligence proposal submitted by San Francisco office and directed against black militant leader LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER.

On 4/20/70, the NYO sent a letter to various individuals familiar with BPP activities in the New York area concerning STOKELY CARMICHAEL's views on the late ADOLPH HITLER.

### 3. Tangible Results

On 5/7/70, [REDACTED] both of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on that date approximately 35 members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) picketed the Harlem Branch of the BPP in NYC. The purpose of this demonstration was to show that the JDL feels the BPP is anti-Semitic in its acts and words.

Also on the above date approximately 50 members of the JDL demonstrated outside of the Bronx, New York BPP Headquarters for the aforementioned reasons.

In view of the above actions by the JDL it is felt that some of the counterintelligence measures of the NYO have produced tangible results.

### 4. Developments of Counter-Intelligence Interests

As the summer season approaches the NYO will be keenly aware of the activities of various racial and hate groups in New York City for the exploitation of such activities within the continuing counterintelligence program.

The NYO will immediately inform the Bureau of any situations or developments that occur where counterintelligence techniques may be used.

airlines are due the differences in freight tariffs as noted above for the past six to eight months, and are considering discussions with their legal staff concerning suit for recovery of deficit...[T]hey estimate that in New York alone [it] will exceed ten thousand dollars.<sup>147</sup>

When such actions failed to engender the desired results, the San Diego field office came up with the idea of utilizing a stink-bomb to close the paper's production facility; the San Diego SAC recommended using Skatol, "a chemical agent in powdered form...[which] emits an extremely noxiously [sic] odor rendering the premises surrounding the point of application uninhabitable."<sup>148</sup> This plan also failed, probably because a burglary was required to carry it out, and agents could not "achieve entry" into the "area utilized for production of 'The Black Panther'."<sup>149</sup> Overall, the Bureau's counterintelligence offensive against this element of "the free press" was undertaken because, in the words of the SAC, New York:

[The FBI] realizes the financial benefits coming to the BPP through the sale of this newspaper. Continued efforts will [therefore] be made to derive logical and practical plans to thwart this crucial BPP operation.<sup>150</sup>



The FBI has admitted that, during the COINTELPRO era proper (1956-71), it ran some 295 distinct COINTELPRO operations against individuals and organizations which – using a broad definition – may be considered as part of the black liberation movement. Of these, 233 were aimed at the BPP between 1967 and 1971.<sup>151</sup> The total number of fatalities resulting from these brutally illegal activities on the part of the nation's "top law enforcement agency" will probably never be known, nor will the number of years spent by innocent people railroaded into prison cells or the number of lives wrecked in somewhat more subtle ways. The government has, for obvious reasons, been loath to offer anything approximating a comprehensive study of what is known such things, even in the midst of such "housecleanings" as the Church Committee investigations of the mid-'70s.

Under the weight of such ruthless, concerted and sustained repression – and despite the incredible bravery with which many of its members attempted to continue their work – the Black Panther Party simply collapsed. Some of its survivors moved into the essentially militaristic Black Liberation Army, founded by BPP member Zayd Malik Shakur (s/n: James Costan) and others in New York as early as 1971.<sup>152</sup> Many others dropped out of radical activism altogether. By 1974, although there was still an Oakland organization bearing the name, the BPP could no longer be considered a viable political force by any standard of measure. With it, whatever its defects may have been, passed the best possibility of Afro-Americans attaining some real measure of self-sufficiency and self-determination which has presented itself during the 20th century.

# COINTELPRO – New Left

If [SDS] or any group was organized on a national basis to subvert our society, then I think Congress should pass laws to suppress that activity. When you see an epidemic like this cropping up all over the country – the same kind of people saying the same kinds of things – you begin to get the picture that it is a national subversive activity...[SDS and other new left activists] should be rounded up and put in a detention camp.

– Richard G. Kleindienst –  
U.S. Deputy Attorney General  
1969

The “new left” was a primarily white, campus-based, initially non-marxist oppositional movement which emerged in the aftermath of the 1950s (“McCarthyite”) repression of “old left” political formations such as the CP, USA. Beginning with the establishment of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) by a handful of college radicals including Al Haber and Tom Hayden during 1960-61, the new left had by the end of the decade come to encompass a multiplicity of organizations and literally hundreds of thousands of participants.<sup>1</sup> Along the way, it had engaged itself in a range of issues and activities including the pursuit of a vision of “participatory democracy,” support to civil rights and black liberation groups like SNCC and the BPP, socio-economic reform in the inner cities, transformation of the educational process, attempts to hammer out a “new working class theory,” anti-Vietnam war endeavors and, ultimately, a neo-marxian form of anti-imperialism.<sup>2</sup>

In his memoirs, COINTELPRO head William C. Sullivan claims that as of the spring of 1968 – when an SDS-led student action closed prestigious Columbia University – “we didn’t know the New Left existed.”<sup>3</sup> As Sullivan tells the story:

I teletyped the New York office and asked them what was behind all this and demanded to know what information they had. That afternoon I received a memorandum from New York that had attached to it a number of newspaper articles. I teletyped New York again, saying, “I don’t want newspaper clippings. I want to know what you have in the files about the student uprising at Columbia University.” New York got back to me again with the terse response, “We don’t have anything.”<sup>4</sup>

As with many of the assertions contained in the FBI assistant director’s “history” of COINTELPRO, the account is less than truthful. At least as early as mid-1965, J. Edgar Hoover had asked for, and Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

[had] approved requests for taps on SDS."<sup>5</sup> There is also solid evidence that by this point, the Bureau had already begun to systematically infiltrate the student organization.<sup>6</sup> Such ELSURS and informant activity *vis à vis* SDS was an integral part of a more generalized FBI "political intelligence" emphasis during the period 1964-68 which saw the installation of more than 800 wiretaps and some 700 bugs (facilitated by at least 150 surreptitious entries), and an unknown number of informants and infiltrators, all utilized in "non-criminal investigations."<sup>7</sup> The Bureau had also been availing itself of the proceeds concerning SDS and other new left organizations deriving from CIA "mail covers" since at least as early as 1964.<sup>8</sup> Far from the Bureau's being unaware of the new left's existence until 1968, Hoover himself had gone on record in February 1966 describing SDS as "one of the most militant organizations" in the country and claiming that "communists are actively promoting and participating in the activities of this organization."<sup>9</sup> The same sort of perspective prevailed, albeit in somewhat less pronounced fashion, with regard to other new left individuals and organizations.

### *Friends of SNCC*

Actually, the Bureau's interest in the new left had been lively since as early as 1961, when white activists, often referred to as "Friends of SNCC," began to accompany that group's civil rights workers on "Freedom Rides" into the Deep South. The objective of the rides was to integrate public transportation facilities coming under interstate transport regulations in states such as Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Georgia, as well as to draw public attention to the Jim Crow laws still governing interracial affairs in the region and the lack of federal action to address the situation.<sup>10</sup> Kenneth O'Reilly recounts the performance of the FBI as the second of two buses arrived at Anniston, Alabama, about 60 miles from Birmingham, on May 13, 1961 (the first one, a Greyhound, having already been destroyed by local klansmen shortly before):

The FBI watched as the second bus, the Trailways, pulled into Anniston within an hour. Eight toughs boarded, demanded the black riders move to the rear, and then beat two of the white riders, Dr. Walter Bergman and James Peck...The sixty-one-year-old Peck, a retired school administrator, suffered permanent brain damage. When the bus arrived at its terminal in Birmingham about fifty minutes later, a mob of about forty Klansmen and members of the National States Rights Party [a neo-nazi group] greeted the Freedom Riders. Most carried baseball bats or chains. A few had lead pipes. [The FBI looked on again as] one of them knocked down the unfortunate Peck once more.<sup>11</sup>

Although the Bureau had been "aware of the planned violence for weeks in advance, the FBI did nothing to stop it and had actually given the Birmingham police [headed by the notorious segregationist Eugene "Bull" Connor] details regarding the Freedom Riders' schedule, knowing full well that at least one law enforcement

officer [Thomas H. Cook] relayed everything to the klan."<sup>12</sup> The Bureau, as journalist I.F. Stone observed at the time, "live[d] in cordial fraternity with the cops who enforce[d] white supremacy."<sup>13</sup> More, the FBI had a paid employee, Gary Thomas Rowe, among the klansmen who actually participated in the beatings administered at the Birmingham bus terminal. Such performance by the Bureau, which falsely claimed to be "neutral" and to lack "enforcement jurisdiction" in civil rights matters, remained consistent throughout the early '60s;<sup>14</sup> at best the FBI simply watched as activists were brutalized, at worst it assisted in orchestrating the brutalization.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time the Bureau was actively foot-dragging in its responsibilities to protect civil rights workers engaged in efforts to secure such fundamental social prerogatives for black people as voting and using public restrooms, it was busily investigating the victims themselves:

Under the pressure of events that began with the Freedom Rides and continued over the next two years, Hoover escalated FBI intelligence gathering activities. Earlier, in the mid-1950s, the Bureau conducted investigations of racial disturbances, particularly demonstrations and clashes arising out of school desegregation, but generally did not file reports with the [Justice Department] Civil Rights Division. Instead, the Bureau sent its reports to the Department's Internal Security Division, where the Division bumped them back over to Civil Rights after five or ten days. By organizing information from the FBI "around the requirements of internal security surveillance rather than civil rights protection," this procedure focused the Civil Rights Division's attention on the activities of the Communist party and not disenfranchisement, segregated schools and transportation, and other obstacles to black equality.<sup>16</sup>

Between March 1959 and January 1960, the FBI distributed 892 separate reports on "racial matters" – none having to do with the klan or other white racist organizations, but many of them dealing with support to the civil rights movement accruing from the budding new left – not only to the Justice Department, but to the various military intelligence agencies, as well as state and local police forces.<sup>17</sup>

[FBI Section Head Courtney] Evans' [Special Investigation] Division ran the names of hundreds of individuals through the files at the request of Kennedy administration officials. The subjects of these searches ranged from the National Negro Congress, a communist front that had been dead for fourteen years, to James Baldwin, William Faulkner, and fifty other Nobel Prize laureates whose names graced a White House dinner invitation list – part of John and Jacqueline Kennedy's program to encourage and honor cultural and intellectual achievement. In Faulkner's case, the Bureau noted his statement to the Civil Rights Congress, another communist front and successor to the National Negro Congress, on behalf of Willie McGhee, convicted of raping a white woman in Laurel, Mississippi, in 1945. (McGhee exhausted all possible appeals by March 1951, when the Supreme Court refused to hear his case, and to the day the state executed him the FBI seemed most interested in exploring the "Communist connections" of one of his noncommunist lawyers, Bella Abzug).<sup>18</sup>

Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that when three young activists—James Chaney, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman—disappeared in Neshoba County, Mississippi on June 21, 1963, the FBI had active “subversive” files open on one of the two whites, Schwerner, as well as Chaney, a 21-year-old black man. As it turned out, the three were in the area as part of a joint “Mississippi Freedom Summer” project being run by SNCC and CORE, registering voters in preparation for the sending of a black “Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” (MFDP) delegation to the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City, a significant step toward dismantling the Jim Crow structure of the “regular” state party hierarchy. On the fateful morning, they had driven from CORE headquarters in the sizable town of Meridian, Mississippi to the village of Longdale in order to investigate the beatings of three local blacks and burning of the Mt. Zion Church by the klan shortly before. On their return trip, they were arrested—ostensibly for speeding—by Neshoba County Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price and jailed in nearby Philadelphia, Mississippi. The deputy held them until approximately 10 p.m., released them, followed them out of town, and then stopped them again. This time, he turned them over to a group of klansmen who killed all three and then buried the bodies beneath a local dam construction project.<sup>19</sup>

The FBI had long since received informant reports that state klan leader Sam Bowers, Jr., had advised his followers—which included a high percentage of the state’s law enforcement personnel—of how they might “legitimately” respond to the “nigger-commie invasion:” “catch [activists] outside the law, then under Mississippi law you can kill them.”<sup>20</sup> The results of Bowers’ suggestion had been immediately forthcoming. By the Bureau’s own count, SNCC suffered some 1,000 arrests and at least 35 murders while engaged in constitutionally protected activities during Freedom Summer.<sup>21</sup> But the Bureau did absolutely nothing to protect the activists. Instead, it escalated its investigations of the intended *victims*, reporting many of the results of its intelligence gathering to the very police/klan amalgam which was perpetrating the violence. When the disappearance of Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman was reported to FBI agent Hunter E. Helgeson at the Jackson resident agency (nearest the murder scene), neither he nor his colleagues made any move to intervene.<sup>22</sup>

To the contrary, the FBI’s sole agent in Meridian, John Proctor, is known to have accepted an invitation to drink contraband liquor with Deputy Price on the afternoon following the murders.<sup>23</sup> It was more than 48 hours, after heavy Justice Department pressure had been exerted because the potential for major negative publicity attending the case had emerged, that New Orleans SAC Harry Maynor finally sent a mere five agents to “see if we can find those guys.”<sup>24</sup> Meanwhile, SNCC leader Robert Moses had already announced the obvious: “The kids are dead.” Schwerner’s wife, Rita, and Chaney’s mother demanded to see both Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson and President Lyndon Johnson concerning the fate of their loved ones, a matter which prompted television anchorman Walter Cronkite to describe the case during the Six O’Clock News on June 25 as being “the focus of the

whole country's concern."<sup>25</sup> Unsatisfied that the FBI's paltry performance would blunt the force of rising criticism, President Lyndon Johnson himself ordered Hoover to up the ante, dispatching FBI Assistant Director Alex Rosen to Mississippi, followed by Roy K. Moore (designated as SAC of a new field office in Jackson, established solely in response to the presidential ultimatum), Associate Director Cartha D. DeLoach and a total of 153 agents.<sup>26</sup> Finally, on July 10, Hoover himself put in a brief appearance to push things along.<sup>27</sup>

FBI Inspector Joseph Sullivan, who was named to head up the investigation in the field, ultimately commanded 258 agents and captioned his operation MIBURN (a contraction of "Mississippi Burning," in reference to the torching of the Mt. Zion Church which had led to Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman's fatal trip). While it may be true that Sullivan was well-intentioned, "FBI agents resigned rather than go to Mississippi" as part of the investigation, and those who did go could not overcome "the Bureau's prior performance, its deference to the rule of white over black and its indifference to the rule of law."<sup>28</sup> Most of the time was spent poking about in area swamps, trying to locate the bodies, a "process which turned up several black corpses and parts thereof - including a torso clad in a CORE t-shirt."<sup>29</sup> The remains were finally found on August 4, after the Bureau promised immunity from prosecution and paid \$30,000 to Delmar Dennis, one of the klan participants in the murders. The Bureau, however, sandbagged even then, filing reports which contained "no evidence which [could] form the basis for an indictment for these murders."<sup>30</sup> As a result, on October 27, 1967, seven of the 19 remaining murderers (including klan leader Bowers and Deputy Price) were convicted only of conspiring to deprive their victims of their civil rights and sentenced to serve three-to-ten years in federal prison. Charges against the other twelve were dropped or they were acquitted altogether. As U.S. District Judge Harold Cox put it at the time of sentencing: "They killed one nigger, one Jew, and a white man. I gave them what I thought they deserved."<sup>31</sup>

The Bureau later claimed that, in the wake of MIBURN, a major COINTELPRO was mounted against the klan. As William Sullivan put it:

Toward the end of the summer of 1964, Roy Wall, the special agent in charge of [the Philadelphia, Mississippi] office, called me. I told Roy, "Let's destroy these fellows, just utterly destroy them." I trusted Roy; he was an outstanding agent. He said that in Mississippi there were three different Klan organizations and that we were in a position either to keep them separated and have them compete and fight with each other for support, or to merge them into one organization. I asked Roy, "If we merge them into one, can you control it and if necessary destroy it?" Roy said, "Yes, we can do that." I told him to go ahead and merge them, through the use of informants. From that time on, the Klan never again raised its head in Mississippi.<sup>32</sup>

Sullivan's interpretation of events is novel, to say the least, insofar as each of the Mississippi klan organizations were part of a much larger apparatus, all of which was heavily infiltrated by the FBI and presumably under Bureau control by the end

of 1964. The FBI claimed to have more than 2,000 informants, or some 20% of overall klan membership across the South, by 1965.<sup>33</sup> Yet, far from never again raising its head, the klan continued to perpetrate considerable violence – in Mississippi and elsewhere – during the latter year. In his autobiography, Friend of SNCC organizer Abbie Hoffman described the situation in McComb, Mississippi during the summer of 1965:

The Ku Klux Klan was so strong they once held a rally in the middle of Route 80. Cars had to pass the meeting on side roads. It was hard to believe, but there they were: two hundred white sheets, flaming cross and all. [Twenty-four] years ago, the Klan was no outmoded joke. A faceless nightmare, they were furnished by police with a list of our license-plate numbers, and they patrolled the borders of each black community, gunning for organizers. "Coon huntin'," the local whites called it...Daily picket lines were scenes of vicious Klan beatings. Once I was thrown to the curb and kicked repeatedly. An FBI agent leaned over and asked sarcastically if my civil rights had been violated. No one ever got arrested except SNCC workers.<sup>34</sup>

A classic outcome of FBI assistance to the klan concerns Viola Liuzzo, a white mother of three and Friend of SNCC worker from Detroit, who was shot in the head and killed by a carload of klansmen near Selma, Alabama on March 25, 1965. One of the four men in the klan car was Gary Thomas Rowe, the FBI plant who had helped beat Freedom Riders in Birmingham during 1963, and who was a prime suspect in several bombings – including the infamous blast at Birmingham's 16th Street Baptist Church which killed four black children – during the same year.<sup>35</sup> The infiltrator was placed by the Bureau in its "witness protection program" rather than on trial, despite evidence that it was he who had actually fired the shot which killed Liuzzo.<sup>36</sup> Again, the FBI's investigation purportedly netted no evidence of use in a murder prosecution, and Rowe's colleagues – Collie Leroy Wilkins, Eugene Thomas and William O. Eaton – were sentenced only to ten-year sentences after being convicted of violating their victim's civil rights in December of 1965.<sup>37</sup>

While thus proving itself spectacularly unable or unwilling to come to grips with klan violence, the Bureau was simultaneously devoting its resources to harassing civil rights and new left activists, and in commissioning whitewashes of its conduct in the South. The former resulted in at least one major lawsuit against three FBI officials – Roy K. Moore, James O. Ingram and Hunter E. Helgeson – while the latter engendered such "authorized" (and celebratory) "historical works" as Don Whitehead's *Attack on Terror: The FBI Against the Klan in Mississippi* and its subsequent production as a television movie.<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, the FBI helped to destroy the MDFP initiative at Atlantic City, an entirely legitimate effort into which thousands had poured their time and energy – and upon which they had pinned their best hopes for achieving some form of nonviolent, "due process" change in American society – and for which Chaney, Schwerner, Goodman and scores of others had died.

Even though the MDFP delegation had received the required votes to be seated

at the convention, replacing Mississippi's Jim Crow delegation altogether, party regulars (headed by President Lyndon Johnson) contrived to block these legal rights, preserving the segregationist *status quo*. In accomplishing this, Johnson utilized a special 31-person task force of FBI agents - who infiltrated the convention floor itself, utilizing phony NBC press credentials - commanded by Bureau Assistant Director DeLoach to wiretap and bug such civil rights leaders as Martin Luther King and Fannie Lou Hamer, as well as CORE's James Farmer and Julius Lester, and SNCC's Stokely Carmichael, James Forman, Cleveland Sellers, and Ivanhoe Donaldson.<sup>39</sup> Not only were the Johnson forces thus made privy to the MDFFP's external communications with Democratic Party dignitaries such as Robert Kennedy, but the group's internal communications - with each other, and with various new left advisors - as well.<sup>40</sup> Needless to say, the political process was aborted under such conditions, a matter which inculcated an increasing sense of futility within much of the civil rights movement.

Under this cumulative cloud of disillusionment with "the system," the arena of the new left moved northward, an adjustment which paved one of the major routes to Columbia. Also by early 1965, SNCC itself had shifted much of its focus from the rural South to organizing within the vast black ghettos of northern cities such as New York, Newark, Washington, D.C., Detroit and Chicago. Correspondingly, SDS placed increasing emphasis upon its Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP), initiated during the summer of 1964, moving cadres into the inner cities and attempting to build "an interracial movement of the poor."<sup>41</sup>

### *Movement Against the War*

The geographical change meshed nicely with developments which began on September 14, 1964, when the administration of the University of California at Berkeley, headed by Chancellor Clark Kerr, attempted to prohibit activities on campus concerning "off-campus political causes." The student response, galvanized by Friend of SNCC organizer Mario Savio (who correctly saw the administration rule as a move to deny new left support to civil rights groups), was to launch the "Free Speech Movement," a short-lived entity which forced a reversal of the institutional position as of January 3, 1965. Ultimately, Kerr was forced from his job as the result of the massive student refusal to forfeit their rights in the face of his arbitrary power. In the interim:

[S]tudents carried confrontation with authority to the point of spontaneously surrounding a police car for thirty-two hours to prevent the young man inside [Jack Weinberg] from being taken to jail; the sit-in tactic was successfully transferred from Southern lunch counters...to the halls of ivy on three separate occasions, first with 200 students, then with 400, and finally with 1000; the police were called in, for perhaps the first time ever on a major university campus, to arrest, with proven brutality, 814 students who had engaged in a sit-in; undergraduates, joined by graduate students and a portion of the faculty, declared a successful strike of classes



that went on for five days, the first time that tactic had been used at a single university...Here, *ab ovo*, were all the elements of student protest that were to become familiar at so many campuses in the next six years.<sup>42</sup>

Within months, the events at Berkeley and their outcome had captured the imagination of student radicals across the nation and had been transformed into a generalized demand for "student power" within the institutional context. In simplest terms, the idea was that in redistributing power within the university, students would be taking a concrete step towards a much broader alteration of social power, an argument which could hardly be ignored in SDS circles.<sup>43</sup> Another of the primary tactical and emotional avenues leading to the insurrection at Columbia barely three years later had thus been paved.

As this was going on, moreover, the undeclared U.S. war in Vietnam heated up dramatically with the landing of a Marine expeditionary force at Danang on March 8, 1965.<sup>44</sup> Given the resulting upsurge in student anti-war sentiment, SDS elected to at least temporarily divert much of its energy to playing a key role in organizing the first mass demonstration protesting the U.S. role in Indochina; the event, held on April 17, attracted perhaps 25,000 people (the organizers had expected, at most, 5,000), and featured a landmark speech by SDS president Paul Potter.<sup>45</sup> In December, SDS co-founder Tom Hayden accompanied Yale historian/anti-war activist Staughton Lynd and CP theoretician Herbert Aptheker to North Vietnam to explore the extent to which "the other side" was inclined toward peace.<sup>46</sup> Although there was a distinct lack of consensus among SDS veterans as to whether and to what extent the organization should become permanently engaged in the "single issue" anti-war movement, an emphasis on such activity largely assumed a life of its own, at least at the local chapter level.<sup>47</sup> By December 1966, SDS had pledged itself to make opposition to the war a major agenda item and develop "anti-draft unions" on campuses throughout the country.<sup>48</sup> The third road to Columbia had been opened up.

Although it is unlikely the FBI director (or anyone else, for that matter; the nation had simply never before been confronted with increasing numbers of its youth actively rejecting the values and policies of the *status quo*) realized the full import of these events, he ordered intensified coverage of SDS as of April 1965 in order that the Bureau "have proper coverage similar to what we have...[on] the Communist Party." The directive shortly manifested itself in the large-scale infiltration of SDS chapters, a crudely ostentatious program of "interviewing" as many organizational members and supporters as could be identified, and the reinforcement of "cooperative arrangements" between the FBI and campus police and administrators. This was followed, in February of 1966, by a directive that agents investigate all "free university" activities associated with student power advocates insofar as the director had "reason to believe" these to be sponsored by "subversive groups" (mainly SDS). This led almost immediately (in April 1966) to distribution of a Bureau study of such activities in Detroit to military intelligence, the Secret Service, the State Department and the Justice Department. Another report, prepared in Philadelphia

at about the same time and based upon information provided by no less than thirteen infiltrators, was similarly disseminated. In May of 1966, Hoover ordered that such scrutiny of the new left be both intensified and expanded.<sup>49</sup>

No doubt contrary to Hoover's intentions, such overt FBI harassment seems if anything to have angered the "militants," stimulating them to higher levels of activity. The trend towards white radicals organizing around issues within their own rather than black communities also received sharp reinforcement in the spring of 1966 with the election of Stokely Carmichael as the president of SNCC, the formal articulation of that organization's black power position, its abandonment of nonviolence as a philosophical posture, and its determination that it needed henceforth to be "an all black project."<sup>50</sup> In clearest terms, Carmichael explained the need for new leftists (whom Carmichael described as "liberals") to transform their own home ground:

I have said that most liberal whites react to "black power" with the question, What about me?, rather than saying: Tell me what you want and I'll see if I can do it. There are answers to the right question. One of the most disturbing things about almost all white supporters of the movement has been that they are afraid to go into their own communities - which is where the racism exists - and work to get rid of it. They want to run from Berkeley and tell us what to do in Mississippi; let them look instead at Berkeley. They admonish blacks to be nonviolent; let them preach nonviolence in the white community. They come to teach me Negro history; let them go to the suburbs and open freedom schools for whites. Let them work to stop America's racist foreign policy; let them press the government to cease supporting the economy of South Africa [and the war in Vietnam].<sup>51</sup>

Although SDS was never to abandon the priority it had maintained on collaborative relations with what was rapidly becoming the black liberation movement, it subsequently concentrated more and more of its energy upon campuses populated largely by white students, developing the notion of student power into the concept of "youth as a social class," and striving to create a truly massive popular opposition to the war.<sup>52</sup> As it did so, "activating" an ever-greater proportion of Euroamerican youth in dissident politics, the FBI homed in with increasing intensity, albeit with little ability to tell the new left from the old at this juncture. For instance, both the FBI and the "friendly journalists" to whom it habitually fed information at *U.S. News and World Report* persisted in confusing both the CP, USA's campus-based W.E.B. DuBois Clubs and the SWP's Young Socialist Alliance with new left organizations for some time.<sup>53</sup> Similar misidentifications concerned the Maoist Progressive Labor Party (PLP) and its anti-war "youth group," the May 2 Movement (M2M).<sup>54</sup>

Meantime, by the spring of 1967, SDS membership had mushroomed to at least 30,000, with active chapters on more than 250 campuses nationally.<sup>55</sup> The national SDS organization, in combination with an array of *ad hoc*, localized or special-focus organizations such as the Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley, Spring Mobilization Against the War, and War Resisters League - most of which found local SDSers at

the core – was proving that the new left could mount a steadily escalating campaign of opposition to the war effort while simultaneously developing a sense of “community self-empowerment.” In April, some 200,000 people turned out for an anti-war march in New York City while at least 65,000 others marched in San Francisco; several hundred draft-age men burned their Selective Service cards in Central Park during the New York demonstration.<sup>56</sup> During the summer, more than 30,000 students fanned out into cities across the North to engage in a “Vietnam Summer” project of anti-war and draft resistance education in local communities.<sup>57</sup> By fall, as the Johnson administration made it clear that it intended to pursue the war regardless of the magnitude of “acceptable” forms of public protest – and with the Indochina theater commander, General William Westmoreland, requesting that the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam be increase to 543,000 – SDS tactics became more militant.<sup>58</sup>

On October 18, to kick off a national “Stop the Draft Week,” several thousand demonstrators at the University of Wisconsin at Madison announced that representatives for the Dow Chemical Corporation – manufacturers of the napalm utilized by U.S. forces in Vietnam – would no longer be allowed to recruit on campus. Chancellor William Sewell, as part of his new “get tough” arrangement with the FBI, dispatched riot police to break up the previously peaceful demonstration. His police, apparently getting tough in turn, used tear gas to disperse protestors for the first time on a major college campus. Unexpectedly, the crowd fought back with fury, *growing* rather than diminishing as the day wore on. In the aftermath of the clash a general boycott of classes was proclaimed, and endorsed even by the conservative student government, until Dow recruiting at Madison was canceled. As with Kerr, Sewell was forced to resign.<sup>59</sup> The action in Madison was followed, on October 20, by a demonstration in which an estimated 10,000 people marched on the army induction center in Oakland, California. Finding themselves in a head-on confrontation with local riot police, the demonstrators forced them to retreat.<sup>60</sup> On October 21 and 22, the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam brought together the largest anti-war demonstration in the history of the nation’s capital up to that point. Some 100,000 people marched to the seat of military authority at the Pentagon where many of them clashed physically with the large force of troops and federal marshals which had been assembled to “secure” the premises.<sup>61</sup>

A month later, on November 14, an action organized by the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee was utilized by Columbia SDS leaders Ted Gold and Ted Kaptchuk to spark a confrontation designed to prevent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara from speaking at the New York Hilton.<sup>62</sup> On at least 60 campuses, major demonstrations occurred during the remainder of 1967 and beginning of ‘68, all of them aimed at ending ROTC programs, or recruitment by the military, defense corporations and CIA.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, SDS chapters on some 50 campuses researched and made public the secret contracts obtaining between the defense/intelligence community and the “neutral” scientists working on their campuses.<sup>64</sup> The ability of the U.S. government to conduct a war for reasons other than those

provided to the public, and through a complex of other official lies and secret arrangements, was being seriously challenged.<sup>65</sup> One sign of how seriously the government had begun to take the anti-war opposition came in January 1968, when the

Justice Department under the "liberal" Attorney General [Ramsey] Clark initiated the single most repressive overt act of the Johnson administration – the indictment of William Sloane Coffin, chaplain of Yale University, nationally known pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock and three other anti-war leaders [Harvard graduate student Michael Ferber, writer/activist Mitchell Goodman and Marcus Raskin, director of the Institute for Policy Studies]...for conspiracy to "council, aid and abet" violations of the draft and to interfere with administration of the draft...There is very strong circumstantial evidence that the indictment was intended as a warning to all anti-war demonstrators and spokes[persons] that they might well face similar charges. All the overt actions cited in support of the indictment were public activities, such as signing statements and making speeches against the war, along with collecting draft cards turned in by *other* persons and forwarding them to the Justice Department. During the trial, the position of the Justice Department was that all twenty-eight thousand signers of an anti-draft statement, all persons who voiced support or even applauded at rallies where the defendants spoke, and even news[people] who reported the defendants' speeches could be indicted as members of the conspiracy. At one point, government prosecutors stated that the publishers and booksellers of a book which printed anti-draft statements could also be indicted...The outcome of the trial was that one of the defendants [Raskin] was acquitted and [the convictions of the remaining four set aside because of government misconduct during the trial; two were thereupon freed from further prosecution due to lack of evidence upon which charges might reasonably have been brought in the first place].<sup>66</sup>

For his part, J. Edgar Hoover – having deployed his agents to gather "evidence" for prosecution of those who had by then come to be known as the "Boston Five" – went on to sum up the Bureau perspective with the amazing contradiction of first announcing that "New Left organizations such as the Students for a Democratic Society work constantly in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the Communist Party throughout the nation," then describing SDS as "anarchistic and nihilistic."<sup>67</sup> In January of 1968, the FBI instituted its "Key Agitators Index," a roster in which SDS leaders and others in "anti-war groups" who were "extremely active and most vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience" featured prominently. Field agents were instructed to maintain "high level informant coverage" of "key [new left] activists," with emphasis on their "sources of funds, foreign contacts and future plans."<sup>68</sup> By March 1968, the Bureau was routinely sending reports to the White House concerning new left demonstrations and demonstrators.<sup>69</sup> And *then* came Columbia. Obviously, contrary to Sullivan's version of events, by this point the Bureau's intelligence files on the new left were brimming, and the apparatus through which the FBI would undertake its COINTELPROs against that poorly-defined entity was well established.

### *The COINTELPRO Begins*

The student explosion at Columbia University during April of 1968 incorporated all three strains of issues underlying new left activism: 1) institutional racism, as manifested in university construction of a gymnasium on land previously devoted to low-rent housing occupied by impoverished black and *Puertorriqueño* families, 2) institutional support to the U.S. "war machine," as specifically demonstrated in the relationship of the university to the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and 3) student power concerns, as expressed in popular resistance to the university administration's arbitrary dispensation of "discipline" – probation, suspension, expulsion and the like – to student radicals.<sup>70</sup> When a series of meetings between the campus SDS chapter and University President Grayson Kirk, conducted through the spring semester, resulted in no change in policy, the students undertook direct action, first occupying the gym construction site on April 23, and then occupying several university buildings over the next few days.<sup>71</sup> Their action effectively brought Columbia to a standstill, a matter they announced would not change until a list of demands – including the university's severing its ties with the "military-industrial complex," halting its gym construction project, and allowing students a meaningful voice in institutional governance – were met.<sup>72</sup>

Although the Columbia administration ultimately resorted to the massive use of local rather than federal police force to "restore order,"<sup>73</sup> the FBI responded to the events at the university – as is shown in the accompanying May 9, 1968 memo from C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan – by inaugurating a formal COINTELPRO campaign against the new left. As with other domestic counterintelligence operations, this one was designed to seize every opportunity to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership and adherents" by frustrating "every effort of these groups and individuals to consolidate their forces or to recruit new and youthful members" by capitalizing "upon organizational and personal conflicts of the leadership," spreading disinformation through "cooperation of reliable news media," and to otherwise "inspire action where circumstances warrant." Another internal Bureau memo, written at about the same time, specified the justification for the COINTELPRO as being the fact that "certain New Left individuals" were "calling for revolution in America" and "for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam," and had upon occasion "viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses."<sup>74</sup>

The Bureau's new COINTELPRO effort was quickly linked to illegal (under its charter) CIA domestic surveillance programs such as Project MERRIMAC, Project RESISTANCE and Operation CHAOS, which collectively amassed and in some cases circulated "intelligence information" in the form of "watchlists" on "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists and assorted 'New Leftists.'"<sup>75</sup> Before the last of these programs was allegedly terminated in 1974, they had caused "national security files" to be opened on at least

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

COLOMBIA

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
FROM : C. D. Brennan  
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

DATE: 5/9/68

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Bishop  
Mr. Casper  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. Felt  
Mr. Gale  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence caused to a large extent by various individuals generally connected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolution in America and call for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police brutality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes. The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses. With this in mind, it is our recommendation that a new Counterintelligence Program be designed to neutralize the New Left and the Key Activists. The Key Activists are those individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left and on whom we have intensified our investigations.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of this group and persons connected with it. It is hoped that with this new program their violent and illegal activities may be reduced if not curtailed.

General instructions are being furnished to all offices relating to the purpose and administration of this new program. Briefly, these instructions require all offices to submit an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations on the New Left and on the Key Activists on or before 6/1/68, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter, all offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting forth a summary of their accomplishments and future plans. Each office will maintain a pending case and assign experienced

- Enclosure  
EPG/DAW:jms  
(9)  
1 - Mr. Felt  
1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
1 - [redacted]  
1 - [redacted]  
1 - [redacted]

MCT-15  
REC-25  
449698  
MAY 21 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

Kickoff document: memo calling for initiation of a formal COINTELPRO against the new left and neutralization of its key leaders. Note these individuals are described as subject to ongoing investigation, contrary to the assertion of William C. Sullivan in his autobiography. Recommendations for action appear on next page.

Memo to Mr. Sullivan  
 Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

personnel to this program. All proposed counterintelligence action must be approved at the Seat of Government prior to instituting it. This new program will be supervised at the Seat of Government by a Special Agent supervisor in the Internal Security Section.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated Counter-intelligence Program directed at exposing, disrupting, and otherwise neutralizing the New Left and Key Activists.
  
- 2) That the attached letter setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program be forwarded to all offices.

Handwritten initials and signatures are present at the bottom of the page, including "TPP", "WES", "SK", and "LA".

23,500 U.S. citizens, as well as organizations including SDS, Women's Strike for Peace, the BPP, Clergy and Laity Concerned About the War in Vietnam, and Grove Press, Inc. In the process of running Operation CHAOS alone, the CIA generated some 3,500 "domestic security" memos for its own internal use, another 3,000 which were sent to the FBI as "action items," and "about forty memos and studies which were sent to the White House and high level executive officials."<sup>76</sup> Similarly, the Bureau also tied its new left counterintelligence operation to the National Security Agency's (NSA's) illegal international telephone and telegram monitoring of citizens, code-named Project MINARET, which targeted watchlisted names of individuals who "ranged from members of radical political groups to celebrities, to ordinary citizens involved in protests against the government," and a number of organizations which were "peaceful and nonviolent in nature."<sup>77</sup> The FBI also hooked its anti-new left information-gathering to an illegal surveillance net established by the Army Intelligence Corps:

According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Froehlke, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee in 1971, Army directives called for information collection on "any category of information related even remotely to people or organizations

active in a community in which potential for a riot or disorder was present." Before the program was terminated in 1971 due to public exposure and criticism, Army intelligence had about fifteen hundred plainclothesmen assigned to collect political information on what the Senate Intelligence Committee later termed "virtually every group seeking peaceful change in the United States." Index cards were gathered on more than one hundred thousand civilian protesters and on more than seven hundred and sixty thousand organizations and "incidents." In addition to centralized Army intelligence files maintained at bases near Washington, D.C. local army units carried on their operations and investigations, with little central control. Thus, Fourth Army headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, had its own collection of one hundred twenty thousand file cards on "personalities of interest."<sup>78</sup>

Meanwhile, HUAC helped establish the tenor for severe repression by issuing a "report" claiming that new left and black liberation formations were "seriously considering the possibility of instituting armed insurrections in this country," and that SDS was actually planning "guerrilla-type operations against the government." Although the committee could come up with precious little by which to substantiate its allegations, it nonetheless proceeded to recommend utilization of the Internal Security Act's concentration camp provisions to effect the "temporary imprisonment of warring guerrillas."<sup>79</sup> HUAC's recommendations resulted in a formal review by a Justice Department committee headed by Attorney General Ramsey Clark of federal "emergency detention guidelines," intended to increase "flexibility and discretion at the operating level." The resulting revision of the 1950 statute's implementation procedures allowed for the "preventive detention" of anyone who evidenced "membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last five years," leadership or "substantive participation" in a "front organization" within the past three years, or anyone else who "could be expected" to utilize a national emergency as a format in which to engage in "interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation" of the government, whether or not they could be shown to have committed "overt acts or statements within the time limits prescribed."<sup>80</sup>

Within the context of such official sensibilities, among the activists designated by the Bureau as being "key" to the new left, and therefore targeted for rapid COINTELPRO neutralization, were – as the accompanying June 10, 1968 memo from Hoover to the Newark SAC reveals – SDS founder Tom Hayden and long-time pacifist organizer David Dellinger, a leader of the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam (Mobe). Hayden, Dellinger and a number of other new left activists were also subpoenaed by HUAC as a result of their FBI "extremist" designations.<sup>81</sup> Hayden himself was already being subjected to a concerted effort to bad-jacket him, as may be readily seen in the accompanying May 27, 1968 memo from the Newark SAC to Hoover. Such immediate attention was undoubtedly paid to the pair – as well as self-defined anarchists Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, who had recently founded a largely mythical organization dubbed Youth International Party (Yippie!) – not on the basis of their supposed "guerrilla" activities, but because of their



- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]
- 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

SAC, Newark (100-50166)

6/10/68

EX-103

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI (100-449698) - 10

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

Reurlet 5/27/68.

Bureau letter of 5/10/68 instructed all offices to submit a detailed analysis of potential counterintelligence action against New Left organizations and Key Activists within their respective territories, together with specific recommendations and necessary facts on any proposed action. This letter also instructed that offices which have investigative responsibility for Key Activists should specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau regarding these individuals.

Your letter of 5/27/68 fails to provide the above information, consists primarily of general observations and indicates a negative attitude. It is also noted that this letter contains proposed action against Key Activist Thomas Emmett Hayden, now residing in Chicago, but makes no mention of David Dellinger, a Key Activist of your office. Specific comment on Dellinger should have been included as instructed.

The above-requested information should be submitted by return mail and conform to the instructions contained in Bureau letter of 5/10/68. It is imperative that this Counterintelligence Program be assigned to an experienced, imaginative Agent, and it is incumbent upon you to see that it receives the proper emphasis.

MAILED 12  
JUN 7 1968  
COMM-FBI

RLR:rsz  
(6) 75

NOTE:

Referenced letter from Newark failed to provide the specific information requested by the Bureau.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Bishop
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Gale
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

59 JUN 14 1968

Memo identifying Tom Hayden and David Dellinger as "Key Activists."

expressed intent to bring about massive street demonstrations during the Democratic Party's national convention, set for August in Chicago. The purpose of these

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (100-50166)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

DATE: 5/27/68

Re Bureau letter to Albany, 5/10/68.

It is believed that in attempting to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the "new left" by counterintelligence methods, the Bureau is faced with a rather unique task. Because, first, the "new left" is difficult to actually define; and second, of the complete disregard by "new left" members for moral and social laws and social amenities.

It is believed that the nonconformism in dress and speech, neglect of personal cleanliness, use of obscenities (printed and uttered), publicized sexual promiscuity, experimenting with and the use of drugs, filthy clothes, shaggy hair, wearing of sandals, beads, and unusual jewelry tend to negate any attempt to hold these people up to ridicule. The American press has been doing this with no apparent effect or curtailment of "new left" activities. These individuals are apparently getting strength and more brazen in their attempts to destroy American society, as noted in the takeover recently at Columbia University, New York City, and other universities in the U.S.

It is believed therefore, that they must be destroyed or neutralized from the inside. Neutralize them in the same manner they are trying to destroy and neutralize the U.S.

It is Newark's opinion that this can possibly be done in two ways:

1. The U.S. Government must be convinced, through the proper departments, that it must stop subsidizing its
- 2-Bureau (RM)
- 1-New York (INFO) (RM)
- 2-Chicago (THOMAS HAYDEN) (INFO) (RM)
- 3-Newark  
(1-100-48095) (THOMAS HAYDEN)

Memo outlining plan to bad-jacket Tom Hayden (continued on next page).

demonstrations being to demand an end to the U.S. war in Southeast Asia, the FBI appears to have viewed them as an insistence upon "defeat."<sup>82</sup>

By July 5, 1968 (the date of the accompanying letter from Hoover to the SAC, Albany), therefore, the Bureau had assembled a 12-point "master plan" through which it intended to destroy the new left opposition. This was coupled to a Justice

NK 100-50168

own destruction. Each field office should acquire the names and backgrounds of all students of the "new left", who have been arrested for the very type of activity we are now trying to curtail or halt. Any Government subsidization to these individuals should be stopped.

They must be taken out of the ranks of this predominantly college-age movement; separate them and diminish their power.

2. Certain key leaders must be chosen to become the object of a counterintelligence plot to identify them as government informants. It appears that this is the only thing that could cause these individuals concern; if some of their leaders turned out to be paid informers. Attacking their morals, disrespect for the law, or patriotic disdain will not impress their followers, as it would normally to other groups, so it must be by attacking them through their own principles and beliefs. Accuse them of selling out to "imperialistic monopoly capitalism".

THOMAS EMMETT HAYDEN  
KEY ACTIVIST, NEWARK DIVISION

Newark believes that it might be possible to attach the stigma of informant or Government "fink" to HAYDEN because of the apparent unlimited finances at his disposal enabling him to take numerous trips in and out of the U.S., without any job or other means of financial support. Also, the ease with which he travels to communist countries, his reception there, the privileges afforded him, and his eventual return with no actual remonstrations by this Government.

Newark suggests that after HAYDEN visits a certain city or country, that a news release, datelined Washington, D.C., be prepared noting that "according to informed Government sources", etc., certain events happened in that certain city or country which would reflect back on HAYDEN through similarity of circumstances or events. It is suggested further that these news releases be collected and when several promising items are collected, they be turned over to a representative of a cooperative news media with a suggestion that a feature writer be given the task of writing up a story pointing out the coincidences of HAYDEN's visits to certain cities and news stories emanating from Washington, D.C., pointing to HAYDEN as the source. The connection may be spotlighted by including certain sidelights or confidential bits of information which may only be known to HAYDEN and a Bureau source.

It is realized the above will take time, but in order for the plan to be effective, it must have a solid basis and a continual indictment.

One copy of this letter is being sent to Chicago since THOMAS HAYDEN changed his residence to there.

One copy of this letter is being sent to NYO for information because of available transportation facilities which give "new left" demonstrators in this area the opportunity to choose either New York or New Jersey locations for disruptive tactics.

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI (100-449604)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT  
(COINTELPRO - NEWLEFT)

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Felt  
1/3/68  
1 - Mr. Bishop  
1 - Mr. R.C. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan  
1 - [redacted]

Bulet 5/10/68 requested suggestions for counter-intelligence action against the New Left. The replies to the Bureau's request have been analyzed and it is felt that the following suggestions for counterintelligence action can be utilized by all offices:

1. Preparation of a leaflet designed to counteract the impression that Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other minority groups speak for the majority of students at universities. The leaflet should contain photographs of New Left leadership at the respective university. Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used.
2. The instigating of or the taking advantage of personal conflicts or animosities existing between New Left leaders.
3. The spreading of impressions that certain New Left leaders are informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies.
4. The use of articles from student newspapers and/or the "underground press" to show the depravity of New Left leaders and members. In this connection, articles showing advocacy of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal to send to university officials, wealthy donors, members of the legislature and parents of students who are active in New Left matters.
5. Since the use of marijuana and other narcotics is widespread among members of the New Left, you should be alert to opportunities to have them arrested by local authorities on drug charges. Any information concerning the

2 - All Field Offices

REC-27 100-449604-251  
16 JUN 1968

SEARCHED  
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COMM-FBI

SEE NEXT PAGE THREE

**The FBI's 12-point master plan for COINTELPRO - New Left  
(continued on next page).**

Department initiative, spearheaded by Attorney General Clark, to consolidate what was called the Interdivisional Information Unit (IDIU) to coordinate "all information" on organizations and individuals "who play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders, or in preventing our checking them."<sup>83</sup> By 1970, the IDIU computer was being utilized to coordinate a flow of more than 40,000 intelligence reports per year concerning "civil disorders and campus disturbances" involving over 10,000 "anti-war activists and other dissidents." Organizations targeted for IDIU attention included groups ranging from the NAACP and Urban League to SDS and the BPP. Individuals included under its rubric spanned the range from United Farm Workers organizer Cesar Chavez to black entertainer Sammy Davis, Jr., from folk singer/activist Joan Baez to an unnamed "bearded militant who writes and recites poetry."<sup>84</sup>

## THE COINTELPRO PAPERS

fact that individuals have marijuana or are engaging in a narcotics party should be immediately furnished to local authorities and they should be encouraged to take action.

6. The drawing up of anonymous letters regarding individuals active in the New Left. These letters should set out their activities and should be sent to their parents, neighbors and the parents' employers. This could have the effect of forcing the parents to take action.

7. Anonymous letters or leaflets describing faculty members and graduate assistants in the various institutions of higher learning who are active in New Left matters. The activities and associations of the individual should be set out. Anonymous mailings should be made to university officials, members of the state legislature, Board of Regents, and to the press. Such letters could be signed "A Concerned Alumni" or "A Concerned Taxpayer."

8. Whenever New Left groups engage in disruptive activities on college campuses, cooperative press contacts should be encouraged to emphasize that the disruptive elements constitute a minority of the students and do not represent the conviction of the majority. The press should demand an immediate student referendum on the issue in question. Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of students is not active in New Left matters, it is felt that this technique, used in carefully selected cases, could put an end to lengthy demonstrations and could cause embarrassment to New Left elements.

9. There is a definite hostility among SDS and other New Left groups toward the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the Progressive Labor Party (PLP). This hostility should be exploited wherever possible.

10. The field was previously advised that New Left groups are attempting to open coffeehouses near military bases in order to influence members of the Armed Forces. Wherever these coffeehouses are, friendly news media should be alerted to them and their purpose. In addition, various drugs, such as marijuana, will probably be utilized by individuals running the coffeehouses or frequenting them. Local law enforcement authorities should be promptly advised whenever you receive an indication that this is being done.

11. Consider the use of cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters which will have the effect of ridiculing the New Left. Ridicule is one of the most potent weapons which we can use against it.

12. Be alert for opportunities to confuse and disrupt New Left activities by misinformation. For example, when events are planned, notification that the event has been cancelled or postponed could be sent to various individuals.

You are reminded that no counterintelligence action is to be taken without Bureau approval. Insure that this Program is assigned to an Agent with an excellent knowledge of both New Left groups and individuals. It must be approached with imagination and enthusiasm if it is to be successful.

As an economy measure the caption "COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT" should be used on all communications concerning this Program.

## NOTE:

See memo C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated 7/5/68, captioned as above, prepared by BAW: jex.

COINTELPRO-New Left had, in the meantime, gotten well under way, as is evidenced by the accompanying May 29, 1968 memo from Hoover to his Philadelphia SAC, calling upon that office to undertake specific counterintelligence activities - including the generation of cartoons *à la* the materials being circulated with lethal results as a part of COINTELPRO-BPP at about the same time - to disrupt SDS within its area of operations. By late July, as is indicated in the accompanying August 9, 1968 letter from Hoover to the SAC, Los Angeles, the sending of anonymous letters had entered the arsenal of tactics being applied against SDS. All such efforts seem

# Memorandum

20/18  
FROM

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/29/68

SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49929) (P)

SUBJECT:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

*Comilio - New Left*  
*100-49929-1*

Re Bureau letter to all offices 5/10/68.

Enclosed herewith is one copy of a cartoon which appeared in the 5/7/68 issue of "The Temple News."

The disruption of the "New Left" through counter-intelligence activities poses problems which have not been previously present in this phase of our work. Whereas the Communist Party and similar subversive groups have hidden their indiscretions and generally shunned publicity, the New Left groups have flaunted their arrogance, immorality, lack of respect for law and order, and thrived on publicity. Communal living quarters for unmarried male and female members of the New Left have been publicized as a badge of "free-thinking" individualism. Adherence to principles of Marxism has been freely acknowledged. Members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) have openly admitted their affiliations and their adherence to anarchistic aims.

Publicity and public exposure of the New Left, however, can still be used effectively to thwart the growth of those organized groups such as SDS. It will be recalled that it was through such measures that we contained the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America (DCA) and exposed it as a tool of the Communist Party.

As noted in referenced Bureau letter, we must seize upon every opportunity to capitalize upon organizational and personal conflicts of the New Left leaders. The creation of factionalism is a potent weapon which must not be overlooked. No overall plan can be projected for the use of factionalism since its use depends upon circumstances at any one given time. Its effective use depends upon timely, keen analysis of information obtained through investigation and from our sources.

ENCLOSURE  
Bureau (Encl. 1) (RM) REC-105  
Philadelphia (100-49929) MCI 100-449698-37-1  
MAY 31 1968  
56  
RES: PSM  
MAY 31 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

**Memo detailing plan to disrupt SDS at Temple University through use of cartoons, pamphlets and anonymous letters (continued on next page).**

to have had the short-term objective of preventing the actualization of unified and coherent anti-war demonstrations in Chicago during early August. The longer term goal, of course, was to eliminate the new left as a factor in the U.S. political equation.

A most potent weapon not to be overlooked is the use of ridicule. In the past its use has been primarily restricted against individuals through cartoons and anonymous letters. Consideration should be given to greater use of this technique to discredit the entire New Left movement. An example is the cartoon attached which appeared in the "Temple University News," student newspaper at Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. Photographs of student "sit-ins," such as that which occurred at Columbia University, with appropriate captions, such as "Give to the College of your Choice," could be prepared and anonymously circulated among appropriate legislators, prominent alumni members, and others.

Specifically, in Philadelphia, the main target for counterintelligence under this program will be the SDS. There are no Key Activists in the Philadelphia Division territory as of the date of this letter. No specific recommendations are being made at this time; however, the following avenues of action are open and under consideration for future use:

1. Cooperative news media representatives have been used in the past. Reliability and discreetness have been proven. Recommendations for specific action will include necessary assurances that the Bureau's interest will be protected.

2. Philadelphia has used cartoons to ridicule leaders of the CP. It is felt this method has the most potential for obtaining our goals. Under consideration is a proposal that a series of cartoons be prepared and that the anarchistic aims of the New Left be emphasized by labeling them "Mobocracy." It is apparent that "Mob" action is repugnant to the majority of college students and other serious-minded youth. Methods of distributing such cartoons can be done anonymously or through established sources in each Division.


3. Philadelphia has established contacts with the Catholic War Veterans (CWV). Through these contacts it was possible to prepare a series of leaflets exposing the DCA which were printed and published by the CWV on a national basis. It is felt similar arrangements can be made for the CWV to issue a pamphlet exposing the SDS. Such a project would require the assistance of the Bureau and Chicago, the Office of Origin in the SDS case.

4. A leading member of the CP youth was neutralized when the Philadelphia Office publicized his homosexual activity. Weaknesses and deficiencies of individual members of the New Left should be used by us to neutralize them. Anonymous letters to the parents of individual members of the New Left might very well serve the purpose, neutralizing them through parental discipline.

Although the foregoing is not intended to be all-inclusive, it represents the basic approach of the Philadelphia Division to this new program. Appropriate Special Agent personnel have been alerted to this program. Recommendations for specific counterintelligence action will be submitted to the Bureau by separate letter.

As at Columbia, during the convention itself the burden of physically and overtly repressing the demonstrators - who were, after all, merely exercising constitutionally protected rights to speech, assembly and petition - was passed to the tactical units of the Chicago police, a "duty" the CPD performed with a relish later described even by an official government commission as constituting a "police riot."<sup>85</sup> In the aftermath, however, with the election of Richard Nixon, the FBI and

First of the cartoons produced and distributed by the Philadelphia FBI office as part of its COINTELPRO to destroy SDS at Temple University. The caption, in a parody of the rhetoric of Sen. Joseph McCarthy reads: "I have in my hand a list of 200 names of people who don't advocate the violent overthrow of the government."



Justice Department moved in to "legally" eliminate their quarry by leveling at them an essentially baseless set of "conspiracy" charges. As Robert Justin Goldstein has observed:

The Nixon administration instituted an extraordinary series of conspiracy trials against anti-war leaders—in fact, together with the Spock-Coffin trial of the Johnson administration, the Nixon administration prosecuted virtually every prominent anti-war leader. What was perhaps the most extraordinary thing about the prosecutions was that the major charges brought either all collapsed during the judicial process, or the cases were thrown out due to illegal government activities or refusal to disclose records of illegal wiretapping...While the prosecutions failed in one sense—historian William Manchester termed them "an unparalleled series of judicial disasters for the government"—they succeeded sensationally in another. Namely, they succeeded in tying up huge amounts of time, money and energy that the anti-war and radical movements could have used to expand rather than expend on protracted and costly defense struggles.<sup>66</sup>



Goldstein continues:

The first major conspiracy trial, the so-called Chicago Conspiracy or Chicago Eight trial, resulted from indictments handed down in March, 1969 of eight anti-war leaders under the 1968 Anti-Riot Act for conspiring to cross state lines with intent to incite a riot...On March 20, 1969 [a] Chicago grand jury returned indictments against...eight demonstrators, six of whom were highly visible radical leaders, including pacifist David Dellinger, Black Panther Party Chairman Bobby Seale, [former] SDS leaders [now key members of the Mobe] Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis, and "Yippie" leaders Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman [the other two defendants were little-known SDS members John Froines and Lee Weiner]...Seale's case was severed in mid-trial (and never retried) when Federal Judge Julius Hoffman found him in contempt of court and summarily sentenced him to an unprecedented four years in prison, as a result of repeated outbursts by Seale following Judge Hoffman's refusal to either allow Seale to defend himself or have the services of a lawyer of his own choosing. After a tumultuous trial – which at one point featured Seale tied to a chair with a gag in his mouth – the remaining seven defendants were found innocent of the conspiracy charge...two charged with teaching the use of incendiary devices were acquitted, and the other five were found guilty of crossing state lines with intent to incite a riot. Judge Hoffman...sentenced the five to five years in [prison] and \$5,000 fines, and then added 175 contempt sentences ranging from two and a half months to over four years against all seven defendants and two of their lawyers [William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass]. Many of the contempt charges were based on the flimsiest possible grounds; for example, Dellinger was sentenced to six months for calling the judge "Mr." Hoffman, and Davis was sentenced to twenty-nine days for applauding at one point and laughing at another. Eventually both the contempt and substantive convictions were overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [but the damage had been done].<sup>87</sup>

Barely had the Chicago conspiracy trial ended than another began, in December 1970, in Seattle. In this case, eight leaders of an organization calling itself the Seattle Liberation Front – predictably, they were described as the "Seattle Eight" – were accused of having conspired to damage federal property, the result of a February 1970 demonstration protesting the contempt sentences handed down in the Chicago trial which ended with windows broken and slogans spray-painted on the walls on the Seattle federal building. Although it was obvious that the February demonstration was a purely local affair, the planning for which had begun barely ten days prior to the event, four of the defendants were also charged under the 1968 anti-riot statute used against the Chicago Eight with having crossed state lines with intent to incite riot the preceding December, while a fifth was accused of having utilized interstate telephone lines for the same purpose.<sup>88</sup> Although the presiding judge, George H. Boldt, eventually declared a mistrial in these ludicrous proceedings, he followed the lead of his Chicago colleague in meting out harsh contempt sentences, based on the "totality" of the defendants' behavior during the trial. By this point, the once-vibrant Seattle new left movement was completely wrecked.<sup>89</sup>

This was followed in 1971 by the leveling of conspiracy charges against Catholic

priests Phillip and Daniel Berrigan, along with six others, claiming that they had conspired to raid draft boards, blow up heating tunnels in Washington, D.C., and kidnap presidential advisor Henry Kissinger. The case had been devised by the Bureau, but upon review by Justice Department attorneys was deemed so weak that it could not even be presented to a grand jury. However, on November 27, 1970, J. Edgar Hoover personally testified before an "appropriations subcommittee" represented only by a pair of long-time Hoover admirers – Senators Robert C. Byrd (D., West Virginia) and Roman L. Hruska (R., Nebraska) – as to the existence of the "plot," thus forcing matters into court.<sup>90</sup> At trial, however, the Bureau's "case" turned out to be based exclusively on the testimony of a single infiltrator/*provocateur*, Boyd Douglass, who had been paid some \$9,000 for his "services" by the FBI and certified by a federal psychiatrist as a "sociopath and pathological liar."<sup>91</sup> Although the defense declined to present a single witness, the jury deadlocked ten to two for acquittal on all major counts with which the Berrigans and their colleagues had been charged, voting to convict the accused only of having smuggled letters to one another during previous incarcerations.<sup>92</sup> Eventually, an appeals court overturned six of the seven convictions which were obtained even on this minor charge, given that Douglass had served as courier of the forbidden mail, and had done so on the express instructions of the FBI and at least one prison warden.<sup>93</sup> Ultimately, after all the smoke borne of sensational headlines had cleared, only Father Phillip Berrigan went briefly to prison, the only U.S. citizen ever sentenced by a court for sending or possessing "contraband" letters.<sup>94</sup>

Another conspiracy case brought in 1971 involved Daniel Ellsberg, a former high-level defense consultant with a government think tank, the Rand Corporation, who had shifted from staunch support of the Vietnam War to near-absolute condemnation of it, and his colleague, Anthony Russo.<sup>95</sup> The government charged that the pair had conspired to deny the government "its lawful function of withholding classified information from the public," by virtue of their removing several thousand pages of secret documentation (the so-called "Pentagon Papers") concerning the government's systematic deception of the U.S. public with regard to the country's Indochina policy from Rand facilities. They then passed the material along to *New York Times* reporter Neil Sheehan, who saw to it that selections appeared in the paper. Among other things, Ellsberg and Russo were charged with violating the 1917 Espionage Act, a wartime statute said to be in effect because President Harry Truman's invocation of it in 1950 – at the onset of the Korean War – had never been revoked (!).<sup>96</sup> Although the government was unable to establish that the Ellsberg/Russo "conspiracy" in any way jeopardized valid national security interests – to the contrary, federal prosecutors unsuccessfully argued at trial that no such jeopardy was required under the law – or even that the government possessed a statutory basis from which to contend that its classification and withholding of information from the public was "lawful," the case was taken to court.<sup>97</sup>

The Pentagon Papers trial was marked by a series of virtually unbelievable instances of government misconduct, including attempts by the government to suppress internal memoranda and studies casting doubt on the national security significance

of the papers, an apparent government denial of any wiretaps and then an admission that Ellsberg and someone connected with the defense had both been overheard on taps directed at other persons, and the secret offer of the directorship of the FBI [Hoover being dead by this point] to presiding Judge Matthew Byrne by White House Domestic Advisor John Ehrlichman in the middle of the trial. The most sensational revelation was that persons associated with the White House Special Investigations Unit [the so-called "Plumbers," including former FBI agents G. Gordon Liddy and James McCord]...had burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist [Dr. Louis Fielding] after the indictment was handed down...White House papers released in the course of the Watergate investigation revealed that the purpose of the burglary was to obtain information which could be used to create a "negative press image" of Ellsberg in an attempt to, as White House Counsel Charles Colson said, to "plumber" Howard Hunt in one telephone conversation, "put this bastard into one hell of a situation and discredit the New Left." With the final straw the government's temporary inability to uncover its wiretap records on Ellsberg, Judge Byrne ordered a mistrial and dismissed the case in April, 1973.<sup>98</sup>

The year 1972 witnessed yet another conspiracy extravaganza with the indictment of the so-called "Gainesville Eight" – thus designated as a result of the site of trial being set for Gainesville, Florida – all leaders of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). The defendants were charged with conspiring to disrupt the 1972 Democratic and Republican Party national conventions in Miami through use of weapons ranging from "fried marbles" and ball bearings glued to cherry bombs (effectively constituting low-powered fragmentation grenades) to "wrist slingshots," crossbows, automatic weapons and incendiary devices. The timing of the federal grand jury which led to the indictments, and to which all eight defendants were called, was such as to effectively gut any VVAW demonstrations – including peaceful ones – at the Democratic convention, while the holding of four of the accused without bond for refusing to testify, and the arraignment of all eight during the Republican convention ruined their plans for that one as well. At trial, government witnesses broadened the array of weaponry the eight allegedly planned to use to include anti-tank weapons such as bazookas, but it emerged that police infiltrators rather than the defendants had been the primary discussants of higher-powered weapons such as machineguns. The only physical evidence prosecutors could produce in this regard were slingshots available at any sporting goods store.<sup>99</sup> The government's supposed star witness, an FBI infiltrator named William Lemmer, turned out to have been threatened with a psychiatric discharge by the army, and recently ordered held for a sanity hearing at the request of his wife after he wrote her a letter blaming VVAW for the breakup of his marriage explaining that if he decided to "get" the defendants, it would be silently, in "tennis shoes" and with a "length of piano wire."<sup>100</sup> He had also been only recently released by local police after they arrested him in possession of a loaded rifle and pistol, and an examining doctor recommended he receive psychiatric help. The jury deliberated less than three and a half hours before acquitting all eight defendants of all charges against them, but by then VVAW had ceased to function as an effective organization.<sup>101</sup>

## Escalation

While the Justice Department was playing out its string of legal charades against the new left leadership, the FBI was quite busily engaged in more clandestine forms of repression. In the backwash of the Democratic convention in Chicago, it quickly set about fostering the divisiveness and fragmentation of dissident groups, a matter which is readily borne out in the accompanying August 28, 1968 memo from the director to the SAC, Detroit, calling for the employment of various COINTELPRO tactics against the Detroit Coalition Committee. Of particular interest to the FBI in the Detroit area was John Sinclair, head of a Yippie!-oriented organization called the White Panther Party, so much so that the Bureau provided considerable assistance to the local red squad in setting Sinclair up to receive an all but unprecedented nine-and-a-half year sentence for smoking marijuana at a rock concert in the presence of two undercover police officers.<sup>102</sup> In a number of other cases across the country, there was strong evidence that police had actually planted the "controlled substances" used to "judicially" effect political neutralizations.<sup>103</sup> As Frank Donner, an ACLU expert on political surveillance and counterintelligence was to put it in 1971, "The pot bust has become a punitive sanction against political dissent and the threat of prosecution [on drug charges] is a favorite method of 'hooking' student informers."<sup>104</sup>

Another favorite tactic was arrest and sometimes prosecution of student activists for "desecration of the flag." Despite clear first amendment protection, local police red squads working in collusion with FBI COINTELPRO desks habitually roused demonstrators who incorporated the flag into their apparel, altered it to include peace signs or other movement symbols, burned it, or even flew it upside down (the international signal of distress). By May of 1971, the ACLU alone reported that it had at least 100 "flag cases" under consideration.<sup>105</sup> Eventually, defendants were tried and a number convicted in Hawaii, Minnesota, New York, Colorado, Washington state, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and California before the Supreme Court finally ruled in *Spence v. Washington* (1974) that such prosecutions were unconstitutional.<sup>106</sup> Still, punishments on such grounds continued to occur through juvenile courts, as when in August 1974 an Ohio judge sentenced two teenaged girls to attend flag ceremonies for a week, observe a six-month curfew, and not to communicate with one another in any way for a year, all because they'd burned a flag during an anti-war demonstration.<sup>107</sup>

The "underground press," both "cultural" and political, was also a primary target during the early phases of COINTELPRO-New Left, as is made clear in the accompanying September 9, 1968 letter from Hoover to the SAC, New York, requesting a plan of attack; an October 7 proposal by the SAC; and Hoover's October 21 reply approving the operation. Focused upon is Liberation News Service (LNS), roughly the equivalent of Associated Press for the hundreds of alternative tabloids – mainly community-based – which had emerged across the country during the second half of the '60s. Between the point of inception of the COINTELPRO and late

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-449698)  
FROM : SAC, DETROIT (100-35108)  
SUBJECT: COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT  
BUDED: 8/29/69

DATE: 8/28/69

~~Confidential~~

ReBuaairtel dated 8/21/69.

Following the National Anti-War Conference in Cleveland, Ohio, 7/4-5/69, a coalition of anti-war groups in the Detroit area began meeting and an ad hoc committee called the Detroit Coalition Committee was formed. The Detroit Coalition Committee meets on Monday nights at 3705 Woodward Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, and [redacted]

One of the leaders of the Detroit Coalition is [redacted] Michigan, and who is believed to be a member of the [redacted] of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC). Detroit feels that the present conditions as they exist on the Detroit Coalition Committee do not make it advisable for [redacted]

(NMC) to permit the anti-war demonstration in Washington, D. C. on 11/15/69.

[Large redacted block]

One situation that seems to lend itself to the suggestions in referenced Bureau airtel would be some counter-intelligence action directed against [redacted] who resides at [redacted] Ann Arbor, and who is a manufacturer representative in this area. Since [redacted] appears to be on the [redacted] of the NMC and one of the [redacted] of the Detroit Coalition Committee, Detroit feels that a counterintelligence program directed against him would have a beneficial effect.

- 2 - Bureau (RM) REC-15
- 2 - Washington Field (RM)
- 2 - Detroit (1 - 100-34571)

~~Confidential~~

4 SEP 2 1969

WRD/cfc  
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4 SEP 16 1969

Classified by 1115  
Exempt from GDS, automatic  
Declassify on: [redacted]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



Memo describing plan to block emergence of a political coalition in Detroit.

1971, scores of alternative press workers were arrested (some repeatedly) on a variety of thoroughly bogus charges.<sup>108</sup> In one notable example, Dallas police, accompanied by FBI "observers," raided the offices of Dallas Notes in October of 1968, using a warrant which allowed them to search for "pornographic" material.

DE 100-35108

~~Confidential~~

The specific suggestion is that a letter could be written from the BUF at Washington, D. C. to the White Panther Party (WPP), 1510 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, and also to the "Michigan Daily", University of Michigan student newspaper at Ann Arbor, pleading the BUF cause. The letter which could possibly be initiated by an informant in the BUF in Washington, D. C., or which could be a fraudulent letter could ask the WPP, a white militant group that strongly supports the Black Panther Party (BPP), to help the BUF collect the just and modest sum of \$25,000.00 from the NMC by making a direct overture to [REDACTED], an NMC leader in Ann Arbor. The letter could state that the BUF realizes that a substantial part of this sum could be easily raised by the NMC in Michigan because of the many professional and academicians supporting the anti-war demonstration scheduled for Washington, D. C. The letter could also state that a copy is being directed to the University of Michigan student newspaper to further publicize the very just nature of the BUF request.

Detroit feels that the "Michigan Daily" would be delighted to publish this type of a letter. It is felt that such a letter would be of a disruptive nature if presented to the Detroit Coalition Committee by [REDACTED] and could develop into a situation where [REDACTED]

Such a letter would also be a disruptive factor to the amicable relations between the WPP and Black Nationalist supporters and groups in Ann Arbor, inasmuch as WPP would be forced to make a choice between BUF cause and the position of the white liberals in Ann Arbor who have been critical of the war and have to this point supported the WPP. The issue in the letter would be that the BUF knows that the white liberals, who are identified with the NMC, have unlimited sums of money available through their contacts and the sole issue is whether or not they want to give the \$25,000.00 to the BUF.

Comments of WFO are requested. If the Bureau approves of this suggestion, a draft of such a letter will be prepared by Detroit.

~~Confidential~~

The raiders left with more than two tons of items, including four typewriters and several credit cards, and ripped the electrical wiring out of the walls before leaving. The paper's editor was subsequently charged with "possession of pornography," an accusation which was thrown out as groundless by a local judge. He was then charged with "obscenity," resulting in another dismissal. Finally, he was brought into court, charged with "instigating a riot," convicted and sent to prison for three years. By this time, the paper was in a shambles.<sup>109</sup> The *Philadelphia Free Press*, for its part, found itself officially banned from all campuses of the Pennsylvania State University system, and thus denied much of its potential market.<sup>110</sup>

Nor is the case isolated. Shortly after the *San Diego Street Journal* had published

SAC, New York (100-163303) 9-9-68

Director, FBI (100-449698) 1 - Mr. [redacted]  
1 - Mr. [redacted]  
1 - Mr. [redacted]

**COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT**

*Jew*

Recent issues of the underground press have carried articles relating to the split which has developed within the Liberation News Service (LNS). One such article has even described a night raid which was conducted by members of the New York faction on the [redacted] faction which is now located in Massachusetts.

It would seem that this is an excellent opportunity to take advantage of the split to further disrupt the underground press and to attack the New Left.

Boston and New York consider this situation with a view to taking some action of a disruptive nature.

Promptly submit your suggestions in this regard.

2 - Boston (100-38580)

RHH:lrb (8) *1/4*

**NOTE:** *100-449698-34-25*  
Liberation News Service, a group which served underground presses throughout the country, formerly has its offices in New York and was run by [redacted]. A split has developed within LNS and [redacted] moved out of the LNS office in New York in the night taking certain equipment and funds for reestablishing himself at a farm in Massachusetts. The other faction is quite incensed over this and even went so far as to conduct a night raid on [redacted] facilities in Massachusetts. We should take the opportunity here to further this split.

REC-78 *100-449698-34-25*

MAILED 6  
SEP 6 - 1968  
COMM-FBI

10 SEP 9 1968

55 SEP 11 1968

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

Document outlining COINTELPRO action designed to disrupt Liberation News Service in New England, using the standard tactic of sending anonymous letters.

an exposé on the practices of the local business elite during the fall of 1969, the paper suffered an unwarranted raid of its offices coordinated by the local red squad while, simultaneously, more than 20 of its street vendors were arrested for "littering" and "obstructing the sidewalk." Not long afterward, an FBI operative named Howard Berry Godfrey led a Bureau-financed group of right-wing thugs calling themselves the "Secret Army Organization" (SAO) in a nocturnal entry of the paper's produc-

.....And Who Got The Cookie Jar?"

We see by the papers - New Left Notes, Guardian - that the Liberation News Service has been screwed into the ground while the peace movement has just been screwed. A real kindergarten performance by all concerned. See the cats run from the LNS office with the typewriters. See the girls dash away with the office supplies - See [redacted] carrying the check for \$6,000 skins. See SDS people weeping and grinding their teeth. (Scene change)

See the farm at Montague, Massachusetts. See the hip confrontation. What language! Now, all the men are fighting. Now the pigs are near. Will the State of Massachusetts charge [redacted] with kidnaping? Will he be executed in public? Will LNS survive? Baby, at this point we wonder.....

New Left Notes described [redacted] - one of the founders of LNS and onetime member of SDS - as suffering from megalomania. Could be. [redacted] has always been a bit of a nut. Nice guy, understand, but just a little uptight where LNS was concerned. He has screamed charges of SDS take-over and conspiracy. He's named [redacted] a traitor. With it all, he's managed to turn LNS from an efficient movement news service into a complete mess. The establishment of a bastard LNS at "Fortress Montague" is the most unrealistic bag of all. [redacted] you've left the scene of the action in exchange for assorted ducks and sheep.

[redacted] has used the old bat "doctrinaire propaganda" to describe the monthly contribution of SDS to the LNS subscriber packets. It just ain't true, [redacted] and you know it. SDS contributed meaningful ideas, yes. Maybe just a squib of intelligence. A little color. Some meat. How many of the hCO-odd subscribers complained? One? Two? The office staff saw the response to the monthly mailing. Most was favorable, some not so hot. But not one letter was received by the New York office accusing LNS of engaging in SDS propaganda. Actually, after Chicago, what's wrong with a little SDS spiff?

"He saved LNS from withering away", says [redacted]. Not so. He say he killed it dead. Sort of a literary euthanasia. The New York Staff is trying to keep one limb alive at [redacted] under the medical care of [redacted]. Will it live? Probably, we don't know.

It's a bad scene when a good movement organization engages in civil war. Some of the details might be termed funny (We like the kidnaping bit), but dirty wash in public can only hurt. The situation was stupid, stupid, stupid.

What now? [redacted] got the bread. Others got the office junk. [redacted] got the finger. A fink ran off with the water cooler. And we got the cookie jar. LNS seems dead. Long live, LNS.

- A former Staffer

tion facility, stealing over \$4,000 of its equipment and "putting it [temporarily] out of action."<sup>111</sup> In the South, things were just as bad:

*Kudzu*, produced in Jackson, Mississippi, served as a major organizational center for the New Left and counterculture in that area. The tenacity of the paper and its allies can be gauged by the fact that by 1968 the newspaper had survived a conviction on obscenity charges, the arrest of salespeople, the confiscation of cameras, and even eviction from its offices. On October 8, 1968, eighteen staff members and supporters of *Kudzu* were attacked and beaten by Jackson deputy sheriffs...In 1970, *Kudzu* was



C

SAC, New York (100-163302) 10/21/68  
 REC-123  
 Director, FBI (100-449688) *100-449688-34-32* 1 - Mr. [redacted]  
 1 - Mr. [redacted]  
 COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

Reurlet 10/7/68.

Authority is granted to make the anonymous mailing as suggested in referenced letter. The letter submitted as an enclosure therewith may be used for this purpose.

You must take all necessary steps to insure that the Bureau is not identified as the source of this letter.

Advise promptly of any reaction noted from the New Left as a result of this mailing.

RHH:lle  
 (5)

**NOTE:**

The Liberation News Service, an underground publishing organization, has recently split over ideological considerations. One faction, including the founder, moved to Montague, Massachusetts, where he bought a farm using part of LNS funds. The faction that remained in New York, subsequently, resided the farm. This resulted in charges of kidnaping being placed by local authorities against the raiding faction. Both of these groups have become anxious over the situation, and the New Left press has contained considerable charges and countercharges of these groups. We are attempting to use this situation to further split the New Left. New York, along with referenced letter, submitted a proposed anonymous letter ridiculing this situation and criticizing Montague faction. This proposal has merit and we are authorizing their anonymous mailing.

MAILED 7  
 OCT 21 1968  
 COMM-FBI

*RHH*

Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. DeLoach  
 Mr. Mohr  
 Mr. Bishop  
 Mr. Casper  
 Mr. Callahan  
 Mr. Conrad  
 Mr. Felt  
 Mr. Gale  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Sullivan  
 Mr. Tavel  
 Mr. Trotter  
 Tele. Room  
 Miss Holmes  
 Miss Gandy

*J. Edgar Hoover*  
*[Handwritten initials]*  
 OCT 21 1968

Letter approving action to split LNS.

put under direct surveillance by the FBI. For more than two months FBI agents made daily searches without warrants...On October 24 and 25, *Kudzu* sponsored a Southern regional conference of the Underground Press Syndicate. The night before the conference the FBI and Jackson detectives searched the *Kudzu* offices twice. During the search, an FBI agent threatened to kill *Kudzu* staffers. On the

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-449698)

FROM : SAC, MILWAUKEE (100-15657)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

DATE: February 14, 1969

*P. [unclear]*

Re Milwaukee letters dated 10/10/68, and 11/15/68.

1) Potential Counterintelligence Action

At the present time the Milwaukee Office is exploring the possibility of exposing to the general public the fact that [redacted] both of whom are [redacted] at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, have written articles for "Kaleidoscope," an underground newspaper published in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Much of the material appearing in "Kaleidoscope" is extremely pornographic in nature. [redacted] have been associated with the [redacted] faction and have been very sympathetic toward the radical and New Left element. It is believed that by exposing their connection with "Kaleidoscope" public indignation could be aroused against them and the administration of the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, for permitting instructors at that school to engage in this type of activity.

*Q*

*100-449698-30-8*

2) Pending Counterintelligence Action

The pending counterintelligence action as set forth in referenced letter dated 10/10/68, [redacted] concerning the activities of Students For a Democratic Society (SDS), is no longer feasible in view of the fact that [redacted] no longer holds the position of [redacted] and has changed his employment.

*8-7 M-L 2-17-69  
[unclear]  
[unclear]*

2-Bureau (100-449698) (Registered Mail)  
1-Milwaukee (100-15657)  
RES/els  
(3)

*775*

FEB 17 1969



FEB 27 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

COINTELPRO plan aimed at the Kaleidoscope newspaper in Milwaukee.

morning of October 26, FBI agents again searched the offices. That evening local police entered the building, held its eight occupants at gunpoint, produced a bag of marijuana, then arrested them...A Kudzu staff member commented, "The FBI used to be fairly sophisticated, but lately they have broken one of our doors, pointed guns in our faces, told us that 'punks like you don't have any rights,' and threatened to shoot us on the street if they see us with our hands in our pockets."<sup>112</sup>

In New Orleans, street vendors for the *New Orleans Nola Express* were repeatedly arrested on charges such as "vagrancy" and "peddling without a license." The harassment continued until the paper pressed a federal discrimination suit; District Judge Herbert Christenberry then concluded that the plaintiffs had "overwhelmingly established a policy by the police to arrest people selling underground newspapers under the guise that they were impeding pedestrian traffic," and issued an injunction against further official actions of this sort.<sup>113</sup> Comparable situations are known to have prevailed in Atlanta, Berkeley, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., no doubt a rather incomplete list.<sup>114</sup> The accompanying February 14, 1969 memo from the Milwaukee SAC to Hoover gives a clear indication of the real source of most such "problems."

As in most COINTELPROs, FBI counterintelligence operations against the new left prominently featured efforts to pit group against group within the overall targeted communities, often through production and distribution of bogus literature. The accompanying September 19, 1968 Airtel from the Newark SAC, proposed such an operation against Princeton SDS (using a John Birch Society-oriented student organization as a "counter" in the plan), and Hoover's September 24 Airtel approved the idea. Similarly, the accompanying October 17, 1968 Airtel from the director to his New York SAC outlined a scheme through which "anonymous communications" could be used to bring the New York University SDS chapter "into conflict" with black student organizations such as Katara, the Afro-American Student Society, and Black Allied Student Association. On October 21, the SAC responded with an Airtel concretizing the means by which the original concept could be implemented, a matter approved by Hoover in the accompanying letter dated October 25. As Hoover noted in his initial missive, the plan was to bring about "disruption of both the New Left and black student power forces" on campus, a concept tying in neatly with an ongoing Bureau effort to repress not only SDS but Black Student Unions (BSUs) nationally.<sup>115</sup>

During this same period, the Bureau also began to place increasing emphasis upon utilization of the strategy pursued against Arizona State University professor and SWP member Morris Starsky (see Chapter 3). For example, contacts from FBI officials are known to have played a significant role in the decision of Yale University trustees to terminate renowned history professor and anti-war activist Staughton Lynd after his 1966 trip to Hanoi with SDS leader Tom Hayden and CP historian Herbert Aptheker in defiance of a State Department ban on such travel. There is strong evidence that the Bureau continued to intervene in Lynd's subsequent attempts to secure a faculty position, notably in Illinois where the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities reversed decisions to hire him at the Chicago Circle Campus, Northern Illinois University, and even Chicago State College. The board, parroting J. Edgar Hoover's rhetoric, publicly stipulated its actions were predicated in the understanding that Lynd's travel, writings and speeches went "beyond mere dissent" (exactly how this was so, they didn't say). As a result, Lynd was forced out of academia altogether.<sup>116</sup>

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 0/19/68

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-120898)

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-50166)

SUBJ: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
DISRUPTION OF NEW LEFT

Re Newark letter dated 9/12/68.

The following concerning the mailing of 150 pamphlets depicting certain SDS members at Princeton University (PU) as akin to apes.

It has been determined that on 9/27/68, a dinner is to be held at Princeton, N.J. which is being sponsored by the PU Conservative Club. A large number of PU students, friends, and faculty is expected to attend. The Conservative Club is comprised of pro-American students and adults who are outspoken in their dislike for SDS and any anti-American sentiment.

Most outspoken member of the Conservative Club is \_\_\_\_\_ who is also on its committee. On occasion she distributed pro-American anti-communist leaflets on Nassau Street, in Princeton, N.J., and is reportedly a supporter of the JOHN BISHOP SOCIETY. Newark believes that 120 of the pamphlets to sent to her in the hope that she will distribute them at the Conservative Club dinner or on the streets in vicinity of PU. Another member of the Conservative Club, who is opposed to anti-war demonstrators, is \_\_\_\_\_ all members of the Conservative Club, are also very pro-American and anti-SDS in their thoughts and actions. It is suggested that five copies of the pamphlet be sent to each of above.

100-449698-31-1

100-100-17872 (SDS) ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

SEP 20 1968

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

*Handwritten notes:*  
sent to DT, M  
9/19/68

**Airtel outlining COINTELPRO against Princeton SDS.**

In another instance, Michael Parenti, a political scientist and anti-war activist at the University of Vermont, was denied renewal of his teaching contract - despite unanimous recommendations that he be retained from his dean, department and

1 - Mr. [redacted]

9/24/68

Airtel

To: SAC, Newark (100-50166)

From: Director, FBI (100-449698) <sup>ST 170</sup> 434

COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT 100-449698-31-11  
INTERNAL SECURITY

Reurairtel 9/19/68.

Reairtel states that 120 copies of the previously prepared pamphlets regarding the SDS at Princeton University would be sent to conservative, [redacted], who would be expected to distribute them at a Conservative Club meeting scheduled 9/27/68.

It is felt that some of these pamphlets may be sent to [redacted] with a handwritten anonymous note requesting her to distribute them at the Conservative Club meeting. It is not felt that a number as large as 120 should be used in this manner. It would appear that 50 would be more realistic.

MAILED 27  
SEP 24 1968  
COMM-FBI

It is further noted that reairtel mentions nothing of distributing the pamphlets to the various eating and debating clubs on campus. You should consider sending some of these to the above organizations as well as to other professional societies at Princeton. Of course, all distribution should be sent anonymously with all measures being taken to protect the Bureau as their source.


RJH:mms  
(4) *mms*

NOTE:

On Newark's suggestion we have previously prepared a pamphlet which casts SDS in a derogatory light. The pamphlet depicts certain Princeton SDS leaders as apes. Newark has suggested that of the 150 pamphlets supplied 120 of these be sent to an outspoken conservative who would be expected to distribute them at a Conservative Club meeting at Princeton University. While the Conservative Club may make use of this among conservative people, it is felt that a greater distribution should be made of the pamphlet so that a broader cross section of the student body at Princeton will receive it.

Airtel approving COINTELPRO against SDS at Princeton.

even the university administration - after the institution's trustees received a spate of anonymous letters condemning his political activities. The trustees specified that, although in no way questioning Parenti's "professional competence" or effectiveness as a teacher, they were nonetheless bound to "protect the image of the



Cartoon used in Princeton COINTELPRO.

University" from new left radicalism.<sup>117</sup> At UCLA in 1969, the regents fired philosophy professor Angela Y. Davis on the basis of her association with the Black Panther Party, CP and Soledad Brothers Defense Committee, as well as for having given political speeches "so extreme...and so obviously false," despite her endorsement by every relevant university official and by a blue-ribbon faculty committee formed by the regents themselves to pass judgment on Davis' academic competence.<sup>118</sup> The correspondence of the Los Angeles FBI office during this period suggests the Bureau played an active part in helping the regents' decision along.

Similarly, George Murray, an English instructor and BPP Minister of Education, was summarily suspended by Chancellor Glenn Dumke of the California State College system in 1969, after the BPP leader publicly advised black students to adopt principles of armed self-defense. Two other San Francisco State professors were also sacked for their political views at the same time as Murray, and two others denied tenure, one for protesting Murray's suspension and the other apparently for having participated in Murray's original hiring. Interestingly, Dumke's action sparked a sustained student strike which eclipsed those which had earlier occurred at Berkeley and Columbia – in perseverance and militancy, if not in publicity received – which paralyzed the institution for several months.<sup>119</sup> Perhaps the worst case of this sort involved Peter G. Bohmer, a radical economics professor at San Diego State

**Airtel**

**To: SAC, New York (100-163303)**

**From: Director, FBI (100-449898)**

**COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT**

Reurtel 10/11/68, captioned "Student Agitation, New York University 10/11/68 by Students For A Democratic Society, Katara, and Afro-American Student Society; IS - C; RM."

Metel, in developing the situation created by SDS, Katara, and the Black Allied Student Association (BASA) at New York University, stated that SDS appeared to be attempting to capitalize on the [redacted] controversy. Katara and BASA, on the other hand, are intent on preventing SDS from dominating this situation.

It would appear that this situation is a fertile field for disruption of both the New Left and the black student power forces.

New York, by return airtel, submit suggestions including anonymous communications whereby SDS, Katara, and BASA can possibly be brought into conflict with one another as a result of their grab for power at New York University.

MAILED 23  
OCT 17 1968  
COMM-FBI

100-449618-34-37

1 - (100-448006)

RHH:jms  
(6)

REC 54

OCT 27 1968

**NOTE:**

Recently [redacted] an instructor at New York University, in a public address called both Nixon and Humphrey "leftist bastards." As a result, he was dismissed by New York University. As a result of this action, the above groups instituted student agitation at New York University.

Metel states that as a result of this agitation, New York University agreed to allow [redacted] to serve as an advisor to Negro students on the campus; and while he has no official connection with New York University, he will be furnished office space. Metel further states that during the campus agitation resulting from this incident, SDS appeared to be attempting to capitalize on the [redacted] controversy. This seeming grab for power would appear to offer an opportunity to drive a wedge between the New Left and the black student power advocates. This has been coordinated with Special Agent [redacted] of the [redacted]

COINTELPRO to block student coalition at New York University.

University, who was arbitrarily fired by Chancellor Dumke in 1971, despite the fact that he was in contention for a teaching award (which he won, two weeks after his dismissal).<sup>128</sup> This was followed, on the night of January 9, 1972, by shots being fired

[REDACTED] The Black Racist With  
A Megaphone Mouth

There are times when the movement - especially SDS - allows itself to be sucked into backing rather 'dim causes. During the recent confrontation with [REDACTED] and NYU over the firing of [REDACTED] a member of Katara was heard to say "This is a black thing, man. Keep the Jew-boys in their own building". He was referring to the occupation of the Gould Student Center on the uptown NYU campus by the blacks and the ground floor of the library by the whites, mostly SDS.

Most students active in SDS consider the [REDACTED] thing a poor excuse to occupy anything. This man has uttered incredibly stupid statements on Black - Jewish relations. In an article written for the African - American Teachers Forum, [REDACTED] stated that the minds of black students were being poisoned by "anti-black Jewish teachers." As a result, black campus organizations are busy biting the hands which have helped them the most. [REDACTED] continues to suffer from diarrhea of the mouth. The pity of it all is that by operating alone at NYU, Katara, Bass and other loose black organizations screwed up the bit. [REDACTED] Katara leader, led his followers out of the student center shouting "Beep, beep, bop, bop, ungaw, black power. We won. We won." [REDACTED] would be retained by NYU; black power would be served. [REDACTED] It was a flop, flop, not bop, bop. SDS knew it immediately. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were up against the wall, not NYU.

SDS leaders on New York campuses should wake up. Put a stop to unlimited concessions to demands of black organizations. And this includes being called a "Jew bastard" to your face, or smiling while a militant informs us that the blame for the ghettos rests on the heads of Jewish businessmen who have "bled the blacks for two hundred years". For that matter, Mr. [REDACTED] is the perfect example of a racist. He's a black George Wallace. They are two of a kind; only the skin is different.

We think SDS should continue the fight for black rights, but let's be a little choosy. Katara and Bass should be left to go their own way. No support should be given until asked for.

In the future many students in SDS will refuse to support black racism in any form. My heritage (Jewish) is as precious to me as that of any black. I'll not see it shit on, brothers. We're with you but let's knock off racist stupidity.

SDS Member, NYU (Class of '71)

---

Anonymous letter used in the NYU COINTELPRO, proposed in an Airtel dated October 21, 1968. Note the blatant racism employed.

---

through the windows of Bohmer's home, one of which struck the right elbow of one of his friends, Paula Tharp, permanently disabling her. It turned out that the attempted assassination had been performed by the FBI-sponsored Secret Army Organization, and that Bureau infiltrator Howard Berry Godfrey had been in the car along with gunman George M. Hoover who had fired the shots. Although Godfrey immediately informed his handler, SA Steve Christianson, of what had happened, it was more than six months before the Bureau took action in the matter.<sup>121</sup>

Some of the gambits employed by the Bureau in COINTELPRO-New Left were



1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

SAC, New York (100-163303)

10/25/68

REC-15

*ST*

Director, FBI (100-449698)

COINTELPRO NEW LEFT  
100-449698-34-39

Reurairtel 10/21/68.

Authority is granted to mail the letter submitted as an enclosure to your airtel to selected New Left and black student power organizations and individuals. This mailing is to be anonymous.

In preparing this letter you are to assure that all necessary steps are taken to protect the Bureau as the source of the letter.

Advise the Bureau promptly of any results obtained.

RHH:mfs  
(4) *mfs*

NOTE:

New York University was the scene of recent trouble created by SDS and black power student organizations, Katara and Yasa. This trouble arose as a result of a professor by the name of [REDACTED] being discharged following his calling Richard Nixon and Vice President Hubert Humphrey "racist bastards." In the demonstrations that followed SDS tried to assume control and was resisted by the black student groups. New York has prepared an anonymous letter purportedly from a New Leftist criticizing the black power groups for their attitude.

*rem*  
*R.H.H.*

- Tolson
- DeLoach
- Mohr
- Bishop
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

MAILED 22  
OCT 25 1968  
COMM-FBI

*d*

*W. J. ...*  
101 50

*mfs*

NOV 1 1968 TELETYPE UNIT

Letter approving NYU COINTELPRO.

not so much sinister as they were weird. A classic example may be found in the proposal lodged in the accompanying November 21, 1968 memo from the SAC, Philadelphia, to J. Edgar Hoover. Seriously garbling the realities pertaining to hippies, Yuppies!, and SDSers, the SAC apparently genuinely believed that periodic

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-449698)
FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49929) (P)
SUBJECT: COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

DATE: 11/21/68

Rebulet to all offices 5/10/68 and Philadelphia letter to the Bureau 5/29/68.

Enclosed herewith is one copy each of two sketches prepared by the Philadelphia Office.

Relets refer to the disruption of the New Left through counterintelligence activities.

The emergence of the New Left on the American Scene has produced a new phenomenon - a yen for magic. Some leaders of the New Left, its followers, the Hippies and the Yippies, wear beads and amulets. New Left youth involved in anti-Vietnam activity have adopted the Greek letter "Omega" as their symbol. Self-proclaimed yogis have established a following in the New Left movement. Their incantations are a reminder of the chant of the witch doctor. Publicity has been given to the yogis and their mutterings. The news media has referred to it as a "mystical renaissance" and has attributed its growth to the increasing use of LSD and similar drugs.

Philadelphia believes the above-described conditions offer an opportunity for use in the counterintelligence field. Specifically, it is suggested that a few select top-echelon leaders of the New Left be subjected to harassment by a series of anonymous messages with a mystical connotation.

- 2 - Bureau (100-449698)(Enc.
1 - Philadelphia (100-49929)

EES/lpa (4)

Handwritten notes and stamps including '100-449698-37-11', 'REC-15', and 'NOV 22 1968'.




Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo detailing plan to use occult mysticism as a mechanism to sow "suspicion, distrust, and disruption" within new left circles at Temple University. Contrary to appearances, this seems not to have been a joke. Text and sample cartoon continue on following pages.

receipt of such nonsense, mailed anonymously, would cause "concern and mental anguish" on the part of "hand-picked" targets, and that "suspicion, distrust, and

Sample of the cartoons utilized in the COINTELPRO at Temple (right). Text of memo continues below.



The enclosed sketches are a sample of such a message. This could be followed by a series of messages with the same sketch bearing captions such as "The Siberian Beetle is Black" or "The Siberian Beetle Can Talk." The recipient is left to make his own interpretation as to the significance of the symbol and the message and as to the identity of the sender.

The symbol utilized does not have to have any real significance but must be subject to interpretation as having a mystical, sinister meaning. "The Chinese Scorpion," "The Egyptian Cobra," or some such similar name would be considered to have a sinister, mystical meaning. The mathematical symbol for "infinity" with an appropriate message would certainly qualify as having a mystical, sinister meaning.

Mailing could be done from a specified location or the mailing site could be changed on each subsequent message. Consideration might even be given to sending the first message from outside the United States with subsequent messages emanating from various cities in the United States.

It is believed that the periodic receipt of anonymous messages, as described above, could cause concern and mental anguish on the part of a "hand-picked" recipient or recipients. Suspicion, distrust, and disruption could follow.

The proposed action, suggested above, is basically a harassment technique. Its ultimate aim is to cause disruption of the New Left by attacking an apparent weakness of some of its leaders. It is felt there is a reasonable chance for success. The cost of such an operation to the Bureau is minimal. The Bureau's interest can be protected with the usual precautions taken in such matters.

SAC, Philadelphia (100-49929)

12/4/68

Director, FBI (100-449698) *606* . 1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

Reurlet 11/21/68.

The observations of your office with regard to the captioned Program are appreciated and it is felt that with the proper selectivity of subjects the approach suggested in relet could be fruitful.

In choosing a subject for such an approach, a thorough knowledge of his background and activities is necessary. In this regard, the subject or subjects chosen should be individuals with whom we have close contact through live informant coverage. Through these informants, we might be able to enhance the effect of the mailings by planning "appropriate" interpretations of the symbols.

The significance of the symbols should be slanted so as to be interpreted as relating to something that is currently going on in the New Left. In this regard, the factional disputes within SDS and the dispute between SMC and the Radical Organizing Committee readily come to mind.

Prior to instituting such a Program and with the above comments in mind, submit your recommendations as to the appropriate subject to be included in such a Program along with the symbolism to be used and the desired interpretations to be expected.

Take no steps to carry out this phase of the Program without prior Bureau approval.

RRH:jcs  
(4)

NOTE:

By relet, PH took note of the fact that some leaders of the New Left, particularly the hippies and the Yippies, follow mysticism and various cults. PH believes that this propensity for symbolism can be used in the above Program by selecting a few top-echelon leaders as targets for a series of anonymous messages with mystical connotations. According to PH, the recipient of such a message would be left to make his own interpretation as to the significance of the symbol, as well as to the identity of the sender. PH pointed out that it might be possible to subject these individuals to a certain amount of mental anguish, suspicion, distrust, and disruption through these means.

J. Edgar Hoover approves the Temple COINTELPRO.

disruption" within the new left would follow. As may be seen in the accompanying December 4 letter of response from Hoover, the director quickly approved the idea, and a raft of "Siberian Beetle" cartoons were duly mailed. There is no record of the results.

In a far more serious vein, the IRS collaborated with the FBI in what amounted to a counterintelligence campaign. During the period 1968-74:

[T]he IRS gave to the FBI confidential tax information on 120 leaders of the anti-war and militant black movements, as part of the FBI's COINTELPRO activity. According to a February, 1969, FBI memo, the Bureau also succeeded in getting the IRS to inquire into many of these cases, anticipating that the inquiry "will cause these individuals considerable consternation, possibly jail sentences eventually" and would help the FBI achieve its objective of obtaining "prosecution of any kind" in order to "remove them from the movement." The IRS also furnished the FBI with a list of contributors to SDS developed in connection with an IRS audit of SDS. The IRS also passed the list on to the White House.<sup>123</sup>

Additionally, at the Bureau's behest, the IRS established a Special Services Staff (SSS) unit devoted to coordinating "activities in all Compliance Divisions involving ideological, militant, subversive, radical, and similar type organizations." This purview was shortly broadened to include all persons who traveled to Cuba, Algeria or North Vietnam, and those who "organize and attend rock festivals."<sup>123</sup> The program of punitive (and thus illegal) tax audits and other investigations which followed was "justified" because of a need to "help control an insidious threat to the internal security of this country" and because such "enforcement" might "have some salutary effect in this overall battle against persons bent upon destruction of this government," to wit: dealing a decisive "blow to dissident elements" within the U.S.<sup>124</sup> Altogether, SSS established files on 2,873 organizations including SDS and the BPP, of course, but also others such as the ACLU, American Library Association, American Jewish Congress, Common Cause, National Education Association, *New York Review of Books* and *Rolling Stone*. In addition, SSS files were opened on 8,585 individuals including such redoubtable "revolutionaries" as liberal New York Mayor John Lindsay, U.S. Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest Gruening, newspaper columnist Joseph Alsop, singers James Brown and Joan Baez, and actress Shirley MacLaine.<sup>125</sup>

### *War at Home*

By 1969, the new left was developing a conscious emphasis on anti-imperialist analysis, combining its support to the black liberation movement (and Third World liberation movements more generally), its opposition to the war in Vietnam, and its belief that it must endeavor to reorganize its own society in a fundamentally different way than that mandated by the *status quo*. A central preoccupation of the movement focused on how to translate such analysis into action.<sup>126</sup> One of the ways in which this was approached was to begin to incorporate more "systematic" marxian appreciations of politics into the more-or-less theoretically inchoate new left vision. A second was to attempt to solidify alliances with black liberation formations such as the BPP. The FBI, of course, upped its COINTELPRO ante in an effort to prevent either initiative from materializing.

On the first count, as can be discerned in the accompanying November 3, 1969 letter from Hoover to the SAC, San Francisco, the Bureau utilized standard counter-

1 [REDACTED]

SAC, San Francisco

11/3/69

Director, FBI (62-111181)

DEMOV                      O COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

SR

ReLAirtel 10/23/69.

Referenced airtel states that the New Mobilization Committee (NMC) has decided to purge the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) from the antiviet demonstration to be held in San Francisco on 11/15/69 and that all affiliation with the SWP and the YSA is to be dissolved.

This situation seems to afford an excellent opportunity to drive a wedge between the SWP and the peace groups in the Los Angeles area.

Consistent with the security of your sources, you should prepare an anonymous communication criticizing the action taken by NMC in freezing the SWP and YSA out of the forthcoming demonstration.

Forward a copy of this communication to the Bureau along with your recommendations as to the groups and individuals who should receive it. In addition, you should consider furnishing this information to appropriate cooperative news representatives. Take no action in this respect without first obtaining Bureau authority.

1 - 100-449698  
1 - Los Angeles (100-74253)

100-449698-  
NOT RECORDED  
NOV 3 1969

RHE:bjp/mef  
(6)

NOTE:

The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) is sponsoring a massive demonstration in San Francisco on 11/15/69. Los Angeles has advised that the leadership of NMC has decided to exclude the Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance, from these demonstrations. This would seem to offer an excellent opportunity to cause confusion in the organizing for this mass demonstration by causing dissent amongst its sponsors.

0652 - 11111 - 604

COINTELPRO targeting the Mobe and SWP.

intelligence techniques to "drive a wedge" between the new leftist New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (called "Mobe," like the National Mobilization Committee which preceded it) and the old left SWP (this is the other side of a COINTELPRO simultaneously aimed at the SWP; see Chapter 3). At the same time, the Bureau was even more serious about wrecking the emergence of any meaningful alliance between SDS and the BPP, and other non-white liberation organizations. As is brought out clearly in the accompanying June 19, 1969 memo from Chicago SAC Marlin Johnson to Hoover - and Hoover's response to Johnson in the accompanying

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**Memorandum**

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) (100-449698) DATE: 5/18/69

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (157-2209) (100-43316)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE - (BLACK PANTHER PARTY)

COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

Re Chicago letter 4/30/69, under the first of the above two captions and Chicago letter, 5/1/69, under the caption as carried above.

The referenced letter of May 1, 1969, was directed toward inhibiting the embryonic alliance formed locally recently between the Black Panther Party (BPP) and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). It was suggested that efforts be made to exploit the coalition by depicting the working relationship as an effort on the part of SDS to utilize the BPP as a mercenary group fighting a black war for white liberation.

A careful review and analysis of BPP activities locally since relet of April 30, 1969, reflects that the tenuous working relationship between these two groups continues to exist and the activities and programs as recommended in Chicago letter of May 1, 1969, continue to be valid. Chicago will await the Bureau's response to this recommendation prior to initiating any efforts in this direction.

In recent weeks also the local BPP group has effected a similar coalition with the Young Lords, a near north side Puerto Rican youth gang and the Young Patriots, the latter an off-shoot of Jobs or Income Now (JOIN), an SDS affiliated group of young whites. Chicago will follow this and related developments closely and as the opportunity presents itself will submit appropriate counterintelligence suggestions.

1cc: [unclear]

Bureau (RM)  
Chicago  
(1 - 157- (YOUNG LORDS)  
(1 - 100- (YOUNG PATRIOTS)

JCB/bab  
(8)

REC-88

MAY 21 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RECEIVED CHICAGO FIELD IN 100-449698-50

Memo proposing COINTELPRO action against the Chicago Rainbow Coalition.

June 21 letter - the FBI was quite active in sabotaging the establishment of a "Rainbow Coalition" between SDS, the BPP, the Puertorriqueño Young Lords Organization and a politicized white youth gang called the Young Patriots (this is another dimension of a COINTELPRO simultaneously aimed at the BPP; see Chapter 5).

SAC, Chicago

5/21/69

Director, FBI

RA

1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)  
(CGFILE 157-2209)  
(BUFILE 100-448006)

COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT  
(CGFILE 100-45316)  
(BUFILE 100-449618)

ReCGlet 5/1/69.

*Y/re*

Authority is granted to instruct selected BPP informants for use in creating a rift between the BPP and the Students for a Democratic Society. These sources should be given different arguments so that this does not look like a plan. Your selection of the sources should be of those who are in a position to influence BPP thinking. Be careful that the sources do not find themselves isolated from the BPP leadership.

MAILED 8  
MAY 21 1969  
COMM-FBI

The articles appearing in the 4/24/69 edition of "New Left Notes" and "The Guardian" are being reviewed for reproduction as suggested in relet. You will be advised concerning this.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-907618

JAM:ra (6)

*MRS*

REC-10

100-447000-927

MAY 21 1969

NOTE:

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the BPP are cooperating in several ways to exploit their common revolutionary aims. Together these organizations pose a formidable threat. Chicago has proposed that BPP informants be instructed to plant the idea that the SDS is exploiting the BPP. There are various good arguments available to accomplish this such as the SDS is using the BPP for their dirty work or the SDS will relegate the BPP to the status of servants. The planting of this idea in the minds of BPP leaders should pose no problem. It would be a definite advantage if these two groups were alienated. We are authorizing Chicago to instruct selected informants to plant ideas and cautioning them to make sure that the various ideas are different in nature and, of course, will not leave BPP leaders with the idea that this is a plan. Chicago has also made available some newspaper articles with the thought in mind of anonymous mailings. These articles question the SDS - BPP alliance. We are reproducing these articles and will consider for use as counterintelligence.

The anti-Rainbow Coalition COINTELPRO is approved. Once again, note the blatant utilization of racism as a means to separate political organizations, a strategy which could not fail to have profound effects in the society at large.





Date: 10/16/70	
Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plaintext or code)	
Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority)	
<p>TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-449698)</p> <p>FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-50166) (P)</p> <p>COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT</p> <p>Re Newark letter, 9/28/70.</p>	
<p>In the 10/10/70 issue of, "The Black Panther", there are cartoons on pages 3, 4, and 5, depicting a woman holding a gun, a boy holding a gun and a "molotov cocktail" and an elderly man holding a gun.</p> <p>It is suggested the following letter, handwritten on "5 x 10" store-type paper, be sent to the BPP at 93 Summit Ave., Jersey City, NJ, BPP Headquarters:</p> <p>"Dear Pussycats:</p> <p>"I just read the 10/10/70 issue of your paper, particularly pages 3, 4 and 5 and was much impressed with the people's Army. A woman, a boy and an old man. Man, you sure are tough. You're a joke man. You're some vanguard of the oppressed black.</p> <p>"With your leaders fleeing the country and "Huey the Homo" afraid to raise his voice for fear he'll get busted again, I guess all you got left are the women, kids and old men. The rest are so dumb they can't be trusted with a weapon because they keep forgetting which end the bullet comes out of.</p> <p>"So go ahead, get high on wine and dream your alcoholic dreams of conquest. About the only successful conquest you can accomplish is over your modest and proper (what a joke) mattress back ladies auxiliary.</p> <p>"If you'd have joined us last year you'd have been a lot better off. You'd have had some brainpower behind you, but now? Big Zero, with a revolving door leadership.</p> <p>Newark SDS"</p> <p>Full precaution will be taken to protect the Bureau as the source of the letter, which will be written by a Special Agent and mailed in Newark, NJ.</p>	

Airtel outlining plan to set SDS and the BPP at odds with one another in the Newark area. Note the blatant appeal not only to racism, but to sexism and homophobia in the bogus letter proposed. Unlike similar missives employed to inflame relations between US and the BPP during the same period (see Chapter V), this COINTELPRO engendered no lethal results, an outcome attributable more to the restraint of the Panthers than of the FBI.

Date: 6/17/70

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED  
(Priority)

---

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (P)

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)

*pl*  
*DeG*  
*Hyde*

Re Los Angeles teletype to Bureau, 6/15/70, entitled "COMMITTEE UNITED FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS (CUPP), IS-MISCELLANEOUS, THREAT AGAINST PRESIDENT NIXON".

Bureau authority is requested in sending the following letter from a fictitious person to ARMY ARCHERD, Hollywood "gossip" columnist for the "Daily Variety", who noted in his 6/11/70 column that JANE FONDA, noted film actress, was to be present at the 6/13/70 Black Panther Party fund raising function sponsored by CUPP in Los Angeles. It is felt that knowledge of FONDA's involvement would cause her embarrassment and detract from her status with the general public.

"Dear Army,

I saw your article about Jane Fonda in 'Daily Variety' last Thursday and happened to be present for Vadim's 'Joan of Arc's' performance for the Black Panthers Saturday night. I hadn't been confronted with this Panther phenomena before but we were searched upon entering Embassy Auditorium, encouraged in revival-like fashion to contribute to defend jailed Panther leaders and buy guns for 'the coming revolution', and led by Jane and one of

② - Bureau (RM) REC 16  
2 - San Francisco (RM)  
2 - Los Angeles

2 JUN 19 1970

(6)

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

SEARCH SECTION

Airtel targeting actress Jane Fonda.

cause Fonda "embarrassment and detract from her status with the general public."

Held appears to have specialized in such things. Only two months previously, he had launched a similar operation (and for similar reasons, albeit compounded by a sexual twist) against the actress Jean Seberg:

LA 157-4054

the Panther chaps in a 'we will kill Richard Nixon, and any other M-----F----- who stands in our way' refrain (which was shocking to say the least!). I think Jane has gotten in over her head as the whole atmosphere had the 1930's Munich beer-hall aura.

"I also think my curiosity about the Panthers has been satisfied.

"Regards

/s/ "Morris"

If approved, appropriate precautions will be taken to preclude the identity of the Bureau as the source of this operation.

In April 1970, when Seberg was in her fourth month of pregnancy, the Bureau sought a way to make her an object lesson to any other parlor pinks who might be thinking of supporting the Panthers. According to one former FBI agent [M. Wesley Swearingen] who worked in Los Angeles at the time, a culture of racism had so permeated the Bureau and its field offices that the agents seethed with hatred toward the Panthers and the white women who associated with them. "In the view of the Bureau," [Swearingen] reported, "Jean was giving aid and comfort to the enemy, the BPP...The giving of her white body to a black man was an unbearable thought for many of the white agents. An agent [allegedly Held] was overheard to say, a few days after I arrived in Los Angeles from New York, 'I wonder how she'd like to gobble my dick while I shove my .38 up that black bastard's ass [a reference to BPP theorist Raymond "Masai" Hewitt, with whom Seberg was reputedly having an affair]."<sup>127</sup>

On May 27, 1970, Held sent the accompanying Airtel to headquarters requesting approval to plant a story with Hollywood gossip columnists to the effect that Seberg was pregnant, not by her husband, Romaine Gary, but by a Panther. As indicated in the accompanying May 6 response by letter from Hoover, Held's idea was approved, although implementation was postponed "approximately two additional months," to protect the secrecy of a wiretap the Bureau had installed in the LA and San Francisco BPP headquarters, and until the victim's "pregnancy would be more visible to everyone." The director also took the time to stipulate that Seberg deserved to be "neutralized" simply because she'd been a "financial supporter" of the Black Panther Party. The schedule was apparently accelerated, because on June 6, Held sent Hoover the accompanying letter and attached newspaper clipping demonstrating the "success" of his COINTELPRO action: a column by Joyce Haber laying out the Bureau fiction, which had run in the *Los Angeles Times* on May 19. Known by the FBI to have been emotionally unstable and in the care of a psychiatrist before the operation began, Seberg responded to the "disclosure" by attempting suicide with an overdose of sleeping pills. This in turn precipitated the premature delivery of her

Date: 4/27/70

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448005)  
 FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-4054) (P)  
 SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS  
 RACIAL INTELLIGENCE - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Re San Francisco airtel to the Bureau dated 4/23/70, entitled, "BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), LOS ANGELES DIVISION, RM-BPP."

Bureau permission is requested to publicize the pregnancy of JEAN SEBERG, well-known movie actress, by \_\_\_\_\_ Black Panther Party (BPP) \_\_\_\_\_ by advising Hollywood Gossip-Columnists in the Los Angeles area of the situation. It is felt that the possible publication of SEBERG's plight could cause her embarrassment and serve to cheapen her image with the general public.

It is proposed that the following letter from a fictitious person be sent to local columnists:

*by*

"I was just thinking about you and remembered I still owe you a favor. So-----I was in Paris last week and ran into Jean Seberg, who was heavy with baby. I thought she and Romaine had gotten

*1 copy*

2 - Bureau (RM)  
 2 - San Francisco (Info) (RM) **REC-51**  
 2 - Los Angeles

100-448006-1766  
 17 MAY 1 1970

RWH/rs  
 (E)

**RACIAL INT. SECT.**

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
 Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-000 (11)

Airtel initiating COINTELPRO against Jean Seberg.

fetus; it died two days later. Henceforth, a shattered Jean Seberg was to regularly attempt suicide on or near the anniversary of her child's death. In 1979, she was successful. Romaine Gary, her ex-husband (who all along maintained he was the father of the child) followed suit shortly thereafter.<sup>128</sup> There is no indication Richard Wallace Held ever considered this to be anything other than an extremely successful COINTELPRO operation.

LA 157-4054

together again, but she confided the child belonged to [redacted] of the Black Panthers, one [redacted]. The dear girl is getting around!

"Anyway, I thought you might get a scoop on the others. Be good and I'll see you soon.

"Love,

Sol"

Usual precautions would be taken by the Los Angeles Division to preclude identification of the Bureau as the source of the letter if approval is granted.

Meanwhile, the Bureau continued to undertake COINTELPRO-New Left operations through various municipal police departments, inculcating its view of the opposition - and preferred modes of combatting it - among rank-and-file cops not only via its already pronounced interlocks with local red squads, but through a more broadly-focused program of publications such as *Anti-Terrorist Digest*, seminars, briefings and training sequences.<sup>129</sup> One outcome, according to a government commission assembled in 1969, was that grassroots police - never tolerant of or friendly toward "deviants" of any sort - rapidly and increasingly came to view "students, other anti-war protestors and blacks as a danger to our political system, [and] themselves as the political force by which radicalism, student demonstrations and black power [could] be blocked." They reported that the corresponding "police response to mass protest [had] resulted in steady escalation of conflict, hostility and violence" within U.S. society as a whole.<sup>130</sup>

Tangible examples of this trend were legion. In March 1968, for example, police suddenly and without warning attacked a Yippie! demonstration being conducted inside New York's Grand Central Station, frenetically clubbing demonstrators and bystanders alike.<sup>131</sup> A month later, in April, New York's finest followed up with a comparable attack against peaceful anti-war demonstrators assembled at Washington Square (and with the already-mentioned assault upon the students at Columbia).<sup>132</sup> The same month, as a prelude to the massive police violence directed against demonstrators during the Democratic convention, the Chicago police tac squad brutally assaulted an anti-war rally in the Loop.<sup>133</sup>

In June, police attacked a peaceful crowd assembled in Berkeley to hear speeches supporting the then-ongoing student uprising in France; there followed a week-long reign of terror during which police tear-gassed private residences, indiscriminately beat members of a crowd leaving a movie theater, gassed at least two first aid stations, broke into and vandalized a church, smashed the cameras of newspaper photographers, and sent at least 37 people to the hospital.<sup>134</sup> An official

5/6/70

SAC, Los Angeles (157-4054)  
 Director, FBI (100-448005) - 1766

COUNT&RINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
 BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUP'S  
 RACIAL INTELLIGENCE - BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Reurairtel 4/27/70.

Resirtel requests Bureau authority to forward a letter from a fictitious person to Hollywood, California, gossip columnists to publicize the pregnancy of Jean Seberg, well-known white movie actress, by [redacted] BPP [redacted] to possibly cause her embarrassment and tarnish her image with the general public. Information from [redacted] indicated that Seberg was four months pregnant by [redacted]

To protect the sensitive source of information from possible compromise and to insure the success of your plan, Bureau feels it would be better to wait approximately two additional months until Seberg's pregnancy would be obvious to everyone. If deemed warranted, submit your recommendation at that time.

1 - San Francisco

JFM:drl  
 (5)

NOTE:

Jean Seberg has been a financial supporter of the BPP and should be neutralized. Her current pregnancy by [redacted] while still married affords an opportunity for such effort. The plan suggested by Los Angeles appears to have merit except for the timing since the sensitive source might be compromised if implemented prematurely. A copy is designated to San Francisco since its sensitive source coverage is involved.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
 Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Soyars \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holmes \_\_\_\_\_

MAILED 24  
 MAY 5 1970  
 COMM-FBI

97 MAY 8 1970

Approval of the Seberg COINTELPRO.

investigation revealed that "the most common [civilian] observation was that the police appeared to have 'gone berserk' or 'lost their cool' or otherwise acted in a non-rational way."<sup>125</sup> During the August convention in Chicago, the violence was even more gratuitous. Over a thousand persons - including more than 65 of the approximately 300 media personnel assigned to cover street demonstrations - suffered significant injuries at the hands of the police during convention week. As the Walker Commission later put it:

Item by *Los Angeles Times* gossip columnist Joyce Haber (right) which caused Jean Seberg to miscarry and ultimately commit suicide. Excerpt from SA Richard Wallace Held's letter (below) taking credit for the column as a "successful" COINTELPRO.

**JOYCE HABER**

## Miss A Rates as Expectant Mother

Let us call her Miss A, because she's the current "A" topic of chatter among the "ins" of international show business circles. She is beautiful and she is blonde.

Miss A came to Hollywood some years ago with the tantalizing flavor of a basket of fresh-picked berries.

The critics picked at her acting debut, and in time, a handsome European picked her for his wife. After they married, Miss A lived in semi-retirement from the U.S. movie scene. But recently she burst forth as the star of a multi-million dollar musical.

Meanwhile, the outgoing Miss A was pursuing a number of free-spirited causes, among them the black revolution. She lived what she believed which raised a few Establishment eyebrows: Not because her escorts were often blacks, but because they were black nationalists.

And now, according to all those really "in" international sources, Topic A is the baby Miss A is expecting, and its father, Papa's said to be a rather prominent Black Panther.



Joyce Haber

DIRECTOR, FBI (157-448006)      DATE: 6/3/70

TO: SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-1054)

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS  
BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE -  
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Re Los Angeles airtel to the Bureau dated 4/21/70, and Bureau letter to Los Angeles dated 5/6/70.

Enclosed for the Bureau is a copy of an article by Hollywood "gossip" columnist JOYCE HABER, extracted from page 12, part IV, the 5/19/70 issue of the Los Angeles Times, presumably regarding the pregnancy of JEAN SEBERG, noted movie actress, by [Redacted]

[Large redacted block]

COPIES FILED IN



The violence was made all the more shocking by the fact that it was often inflicted upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed no order, made no threat. These included peaceful demonstrators, onlookers, and large numbers of residents who were simply passing through, or happened to live in, the areas where confrontations were occurring.<sup>136</sup>

In December 1969, the New York police once again attacked a peaceful demonstration, this time on the occasion of an appearance at a local hotel by President Nixon. Among other things, the cops yanked six people from a passing van, beat them with riot batons and trundled them into paddy wagons, apparently for the sole reason that they'd made a gesture indicating "peace" while driving by, and one had shouted from the window of the vehicle: "This is what Richard Nixon's fascist police are going to be like, and don't you forget it."<sup>137</sup>

May 1969 saw the so-called "People's Park" confrontation in Berkeley when students and community people attempted to prevent an area owned by the University of California, formerly devoted to low-cost housing, from being converted into a parking lot. When activists began to create a community park on the lot construction site, police attacked in a fashion which prompted even so establishmentarian a publication as *Newsweek* to observe that they "had gone riot, displaying a lawless brutality equal to that of Chicago, along with weapons and techniques that even the authorities in Chicago did not dare employ; the firing of buckshot at fleeing crowds and unarmed bystanders and the gassing – at times for no reason at all – of entire streets and portions of [the] college campus."<sup>138</sup> During the week of this wave of repression in Berkeley, even peaceful marches and demonstrations were arbitrarily banned, tear-gas was sprayed from helicopters, some 200 persons were badly injured by police clubs and gunfire (including one who was permanently blinded), and one man – James Rector – was killed.<sup>139</sup> During the week, California Governor Ronald Reagan strongly backed these police atrocities, asserting that, "If it's blood they want, let it be now."<sup>140</sup>

The deaths of student demonstrators at the hands of FBI-prepped local police was hardly a novelty. The first such fatality had occurred in May 1967 during demonstrations at Jackson State College (Jackson, Mississippi) when cops fired shotguns into an unarmed crowd, killing one and wounding two others.<sup>141</sup> Three students – Samuel Hammond, Delano Middleton and Henry Smith – were killed and 28 others wounded when South Carolina state troopers fired without warning on another group of peaceful demonstrators, this time from South Carolina State College in Orangeburg during February 1968. Most of those shot were hit while lying prone on the ground, attempting to get out of the line of fire (in the aftermath, the nine highway patrolmen identified as having done the shooting were "cleared of wrongdoing" and promoted).<sup>142</sup> In May 1969, another student, Willie Ernest Grimes, was shot and killed by police during demonstrations at North Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical College.<sup>143</sup> During February 1970, a student named Kevin Moran was killed and two others wounded by police gunfire – and several more otherwise injured by police and national guardsmen – during demonstrations

which ultimately resulted in the burning of a Bank of America branch facility.<sup>144</sup> In March of the same year, 12 students were shot and 57 others injured by police during demonstrations at SUNY, Buffalo.<sup>145</sup>

Probably the most notorious incident involving the shooting of student demonstrators occurred at Kent State University in Ohio on May 4, 1970, when national guardsmen opened fire on a crowd protesting the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, killing four – Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer and William Schroeder – and wounding nine (several of the dead and wounded were bystanders rather than demonstrators; one – Schroeder – was even a member of the campus ROTC unit).<sup>146</sup> Only days before, however, the Ohio guard had fired on a similar group at Ohio State University, wounding 20.<sup>147</sup> This was followed, on May 14, by Mississippi highway patrolmen actually firing into a dormitory at Jackson State (again), killing two – Phillip Gibbs and James Earl Green – and wounding twelve.<sup>148</sup> During July, two students – Rick Dowdell and Harry Rice – were killed by police at the University of Kansas in Lawrence,<sup>149</sup> another – Randy Anderson – shot to death on the campus of the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee,<sup>150</sup> and black organizer Carl Hampton was gunned down in Houston, Texas.<sup>151</sup> Even as late as November 1972, police were still shooting student activists; two died as the result of a volley fired by deputy sheriffs at Southern University in New Orleans.<sup>152</sup>

In the last incident, a special commission created by the Louisiana state attorney general quickly determined there had been “no justification for the shootings,” but the deputies went free.<sup>153</sup> It was by then an old story. In May 1971, a government commission investigating the murders at Kent State concluded – after a county grand jury had absolved local guardsmen of any wrongdoing – that the actions of the Ohio guard had been “unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable.”<sup>154</sup> Ohio officials nonetheless refused to bring charges against those implicated, and U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell declined to convene a federal grand jury to follow up.<sup>155</sup> Ohio, in the meantime, had indicted 25 Kent State students, ex-students and faculty on felony charges such as “inciting to riot.”<sup>156</sup> A county grand jury activated after the fatalities at Jackson State perhaps summed up the official attitude most succinctly when it not only found police killings of unarmed demonstrators to be “justified,” but declared that protestors “must expect to be injured or killed when law enforcement officers are required to reestablish order.”<sup>157</sup>

With the active assistance of the FBI, local police and national guard units consistently “explained” such conduct as being necessitated by the violent behavior of the victims themselves. It steadily came out, however, that much or most of the alleged new left violence was either fabricated or actually the result of Bureau/policy tactics designed to rationalize the virulence of the repression before the public. At Kent State, for example, “during the ten days following the shootings, while the campus was closed, police ransacked every room among [the university’s] thirty-one dormitories, without warrants, in search of weapons; they found a total of two hunting weapons [one of which was inoperable], sixty knives, three slingshots, several BB guns and a yellow button which stated, ‘Dare to struggle, dare to

win."<sup>158</sup> Still, the state – with active connivance by the FBI – pursued attempts to blame students in court for the actions of the Ohio National Guard, a matter which eventually led to Student Body President Craig Morgan and two others winning \$5,000 judgments in malicious prosecution suits.<sup>159</sup>

At Ohio State, the official story was that activists closing and chaining the gates to the campus – allegedly preventing “crowd control” – had “forced” the guard to fire on demonstrators. It was later revealed that those who had committed the act in question were in reality members of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, deliberately attired in such a way as to impersonate demonstrators before the news media.<sup>160</sup> The use of such *provocateurs* to create the appearance of “justification” for even the worst forms of repression was consistent. Aside from such earlier-mentioned FBI infiltrators of the new left as William Divale, Phillip Abbott Luce, and *provocateurs* such as William Lemmer, Boyd Douglass and Howard Berry Godfrey:

Probably the most-well known *agent provocateur* was Thomas Tongyai, known as Tommy the Traveler. Tongyai, who was paid by both the FBI and local police, spent over two years travelling among colleges in western New York state urging students to kill police, make bombs and blow up buildings. He supplied students with radical speakers, literature and films, tried to organize an SDS chapter at Hobart College, organized SDS conferences in Rochester and urged students to participate in the Weatherman “Days of Rage” in Chicago in October, 1969. Tongyai constantly talked violence, carried a grenade in his car, showed students how to use an M-1 rifle and offered advice on how to carry out bombings. After some students at Hobart College apparently took his advice and bombed the Hobart ROTC building, and Tongyai’s cover was exposed, the local sheriff commented, “There’s a lot of difference between showing how to build a bomb and building one.” As a result of disturbances connected with Tongyai’s activities on the Hobart campus, nine students and faculty faced criminal charges, but Tongyai was cleared by a local grand jury and went on to become a policeman in Pennsylvania.<sup>161</sup>

Similarly, “Horace L. Packer, an FBI informer who was the chief government witness in the Seattle Eight conspiracy case, testified he was under FBI instructions to ‘do anything to protect my credibility.’ He testified that while infiltrating SDS and Weatherman at the University of Washington he supplied campus radicals with drugs, weapons and materials used for preparing molotov cocktails. Packer even admitted he supplied and the FBI paid for paint used to spray the Federal courthouse in Seattle during a demonstration in February, 1970 – a key element in the charge of conspiracy to damage federal property which was one of the major charges of the case. Packer also testified that he used drugs, including ‘acid, speed, mescaline’ and cocaine while acting as a [*provocateur*], that he ‘smoked dope all the time,’ that he was arrested several times during campus demonstrations, and that he had violated the conditions of a suspended sentence he had received for participating in a Weatherman assault on ROTC facilities at the University of Washington.”<sup>162</sup> Also in Seattle:

Probably the most incredible provocation incident involved an FBI and Seattle police informer, Alfred Burnett, who lured Larry Eugene Ward into planting a bomb at a Seattle real estate office on the morning of May 15, 1970, by paying Ward \$75, providing him with the bomb and giving him transportation to the bombing scene. Ward, a twenty-two year old veteran who had been twice wounded and decorated three times for service in Vietnam, was shot and killed by waiting Seattle police as he allegedly fled after the bombing attempt, although he was unarmed, on foot and boxed in by police cars.<sup>163</sup>

Burnett, the key player in this Cerro Maravilla-like ambush (see Chapter 4), was "a twice-convicted felon who had been released from jail as the result of FBI statements that he could provide valuable information...Burnett said later, 'The police wanted a bomber and I got one for them. I didn't know Larry Ward would be killed.' Seattle Police Intelligence Chief John Williams blamed the FBI, stating, 'As far as I can tell Ward was a relatively decent kid. Somebody set this whole thing up. It wasn't the police department.' Subsequently, Seattle's mayor publicly advocated killing convicted bombers before a Senate committee, and citing the Ward case, noted the incidence of bombings in Seattle had declined since the slaying. He added, 'I suspect killing a person involved in a bombing...might be somewhat of a deterrent.'"<sup>164</sup>

In the so-called "Camden Twenty-Eight" case, the defendants were acquitted of all charges accruing from their breaking into a New Jersey Selective Service office and attempting to destroy the draft files therein after the trial judge instructed the jury to return verdicts of "not guilty" if it felt the government had gone to "intolerable lengths" and otherwise conducted itself in a manner "offensive to the basic standards of decency and shocking to the universal standards of justice" in setting up the "crime." The prosecution's star witness, Robert W. Hardy, had admitted on the stand that he had – upon instructions of the Bureau – infiltrated the group, proposed the action, provided "90 percent" of the burglary tools utilized, and offered his "expertise at breaking and entering" to allow the plot to go forward.<sup>165</sup> Elsewhere, "Another campus agent provocateur was Charles Grimm, who functioned as a local police and FBI informant on the campus of the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. Among his activities were the burning of Dressler Hall on the campus on May 7, 1970 (at the direction of the FBI, he said), the throwing of three molotov cocktails into a street on May 14, 1970 and the throwing of objects at police officers on the campus on May 18, 1970."<sup>166</sup>

Among those indicted by a federal grand jury in Detroit on March 6, 1970 for conspiracy to bomb police and military installations was Larry G. Grathwohl – reputedly one of "the most militant members" of the SDS Weatherman faction – an FBI infiltrator, known as a demolitions expert, who gave bomb-making lessons to the group, regularly brandished both a .357 magnum revolver and a straight razor, and admitted to the *New York Times* having personally participated in the bombing of a public school near Cincinnati in 1969.<sup>167</sup> Charges were dropped against Grathwohl (but not against his alleged co-conspirators who, by then, had gone under-

ground), and he "retired" into the Bureau's witness protection program, eventually writing a sensationally self-serving account of his exploits entitled *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen*.<sup>168</sup>

Meanwhile, William Lemmer was hardly the only infiltrator/*provocateur* attempting to make the VVAW appear "violence prone." For instance, Reinhold Mohr, a secret member of the Kent State University police force, was arrested in April of 1972 by local cops while carrying in his car a rocket launcher and submachinegun he'd been trying to peddle to the campus chapter of the veterans' organization as a means – as he put it to the intended buyers – of "furthering the armed struggle against imperialism." Perhaps ironically, it was Kent State VVAW which tipped the city police that "there's a nut running around out there with a bunch of automatic weapons." Although Mohr was clearly in violation of a number of state and federal statutes, he was quickly released without charges when the chief of campus security and local FBI agents confirmed he'd "only followed orders" in attempting to foment violence.<sup>169</sup>

Another individual who, by his own account, expended a considerable amount of time and energy working to subvert VVAW was Joe Burton, a *provocateur* active in the Tampa, Florida area from 1972 to '74 (i.e.: after COINTELPRO had supposedly ceased to exist in 1971). Describing his assignment as being the "disruption of radical groups" from both the U.S. and Canada, Burton explained how the Bureau had dispatched counterintelligence specialists from headquarters to assist him in forging various documents and to establish a bogus radical organization dubbed the "Red Star Cadre." This front was used as a prop upon which Burton could "argue from the left" that various *bona fide* groups such as VVAW, the United Electrical Workers Union (UE), the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and the United Farm Workers (UFW) were "not militant enough" and to attempt to lure their members into violence and other illegal activities.<sup>170</sup> A comparable – if less effective – operation was run by a husband and wife team, Jill and Harry E. ("Gi") Shafer, III, through a bogus entity called the Red Star Collective in New Orleans. The Shafers were later used to infiltrate the support apparatus of the American Indian Movement (see next chapter), boasting afterwards that they'd managed to "divert" substantial funds raised for legal defense.<sup>171</sup>

In much the same fashion, Howard Berry Godfrey, the Bureau's operative within the right-wing Secret Army Organization in southern California hardly contented himself with participation in the attempted assassination of Peter Bohmer. To the contrary, as Godfrey later testified, he had served as a conduit during 1971 and '72 through which the FBI had pumped more than \$60,000 worth of weapons and explosives into the terrorist group. Further, he admitted to having provided not only the explosive device, but also the demolitions training utilized by the SAO in its June 19, 1972 bombing of the left-leaning Guild Theater in San Diego.<sup>172</sup> As he himself subsequently acknowledged, by the time Godfrey's cover was blown he had participated in the burglaries of several southern California new left organizational offices, infiltrated the staff of the radical Message Information Center in Los